Uncertainty – Enemy of Democracy? Influence of Uncertainty on Leadership Evaluations and the Role of Self-Esteem and Power by Schöl, Christiane
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
einer Doktorin der Sozialwissenschaften 
der Universität Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty – Enemy of Democracy? 
 
Influence of Uncertainty on Leadership Evaluations and the 
Role of Self-Esteem and Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Dipl.-Psych. Christiane Schöl 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Josef Brüderl 
Erstgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Dagmar Stahlberg 
Zweitgutachter:  Prof. Dr. Herbert Bless 
Tag der Disputation: 23. Juli 2009 
Table of Contents   I
                                   Table of Contents 
PREFACE IV 
1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1 
2 THEORETICAL PART 3 
2.1 Authoritarianism – The Problem 3 
2.1.1 The Authoritarian Personality and its Measurement 4 
2.1.2 Threat and Authoritarianism 6 
2.1.3 The Authoritarian Reaction 8 
2.1.4 Summary and Conclusion 8 
2.2 Leadership Styles and their Evaluation – The Focus 9 
2.2.1 Authoritarian and Democratic Leaders 10 
2.2.2 Leadership Evaluations 11 
2.2.3 Leadership Evaluations as Attitudes 13 
2.2.4 Summary and Conclusions 15 
2.3 Uncertainty – The Situational Precondition 16 
2.3.1 The Concept of Uncertainty 16 
2.3.2 Uncertainty Resolution as a Primary Human Motive 17 
2.3.3 Underlying processes of Uncertainty Resolution 19 
2.3.4 Summary and Conclusion 22 
2.4 Self-Esteem – The Individual Predisposition 22 
2.4.1 High versus Low Self-Esteem 24 
2.4.2 Self-Esteem and Voice 25 
2.4.3 Self-Esteem and Affective and Cognitive Measures 26 
2.4.4 Summary and Conclusion 27 
2.5 Power – The (Re-) Solution 28 
2.5.1 Power and its Impact on Behavior 29 
2.5.2 Power and Information Processing 30 
2.5.3 Summary and Conclusion 31 
2.6 Implicit Processes – The Assessment 32 
2.6.1 Implicit Measures 32 
2.6.2 Theoretical Models of Implicit Processes 35 
2.6.3 Changes in Implicit Processes 36 
2.6.4 Summary and Conclusions 38 
Table of Contents   II
2.7 Delineation of General Hypotheses 39 
2.7.1 Uncertainty – The Situational Precondition 40 
2.7.2 Self-Esteem – The Individual Predisposition 40 
2.7.3 Valence and Success – A Specification 42 
2.7.4 Power – The (Re-) Solution 43 
2.7.5 Explicit versus Implicit – The Assessment 45 
2.7.6 Study Overview 45 
3 EMPIRICAL PART 46 
3.1 Study 1 – The Democratic Standard Attitude 46 
3.1.1 Method 47 
3.1.2 Results 52 
3.1.3 Discussion 57 
3.2 Study 2 – The Authoritarian Reaction 58 
3.2.1 Method 60 
3.2.2 Results 62 
3.2.3 Discussion 65 
3.3 Power as (Re-) Solution 67 
3.4 Study 3a – Dispositional Power 68 
3.4.1 Method 68 
3.4.2 Results 72 
3.4.3 Discussion 74 
3.5 Study 3b – Salience of Dispositional Power as (Re-)Solution 74 
3.5.1 Method 75 
3.5.2 Results 77 
3.5.3 Discussion 82 
3.6 Study 4a – Situational Power 83 
3.6.1 Method 84 
3.6.2 Results 85 
3.6.3 Discussion 86 
3.7 Study 4b – Priming of Situational Power as (Re-) Solution 86 
3.7.1 Method 87 
3.7.2 Results 90 
3.7.3 Discussion 95 
 
Table of Contents   III
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 96 
4.1 Summary of findings 96 
4.2 The Theoretical Framework Reconsidered 98 
4.2.1 Deliberation and Automaticity – a Paradox? 98 
4.2.2 Are the effects driven by powerfulness or powerlessness? 99 
4.2.3 Why is the differentiation between success and valence important? 100 
4.2.4 Why is the differentiation between implicit and explicit important? 102 
4.2.5 Do implicit processes influence behavior? 104 
4.3 Relations to Other Approaches 105 
4.3.1 Leadership Prototypes 105 
4.3.2 Mood 107 
4.4 Implications for Future Research 108 
4.4.1 The Situational Precondition – Further Manipulations 109 
4.4.2 The Individual Predisposition – Mediating Processes 109 
4.4.3 Further (Re-) Solution 110 
4.4.4 Further Assessment 110 
4.4.5 The Attitude-Behavior Link 111 
4.5 Democracy at Risk? – A Conclusion 111 
5 REFERENCES 113 
6 APPENDIX 136 
 
Preface   IV
                                           Preface 
Having finished my dissertation by now, I would like to take the opportunity to thank the 
following persons for their support.  
 
First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Dagmar Stahlberg for her guidance, advice and 
critical feedback throughout my dissertation. She provided me with constant support and the 
opportunity to realize my research ideas.  
 
My thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Herbert Bless for his inspiring suggestions and comments on 
my dissertation project. The CDSS sessions were very helpful.  
 
I would like to especially thank Patrick Müller and Matthias Blümke for the great collaboration 
in the ongoing research project. I gratefully acknowledge their encouragement, comments 
and methodological input.  
 
My special thanks also go to Ursula Szillis and Jana Janßen for proofreading the manuscript 
and their academic and personal support during the last years.  
 
Thanks to all research assistants, namely Christiane Ahlheim, Stephanie Beck, Mika Eberl, 
Johanna Hoffmann, Johannes Kraus, Gesine Röwer, Carola Weidner, and Susanne Weigl 
for their helping hand in conducting the present experiments. 
 
I am deeply grateful to my family, Eva-Maria, Rolf and Stephan-Markus Schöl as well as to 
my godmother Gertrud Nolterieke for their empathy and continuous help since the very 
beginning. 
 
I dedicate this work to the one person who went with me through all the ups and downs of 
the last three years, my husband Sven Sauer whose support and encouragement is 
invaluable and was crucial for the success of the present dissertation. 
 
 
Introduction and Overview   
 
1
1 Introduction and Overview 
Throughout history there has been the question: How should people be led, governed or 
guided? A duality of two opposing approaches prevails: democracy and autocracy, ranging 
from personal freedom and autonomy to total subordination of the individual. Nowadays, at 
least in Western cultures the benefits of democracy seem to be out of question. 
Nevertheless, in threatening and uncertain times, authoritarian systems such as National 
Socialism emerged. And even today, after the events of September 11th people are willing to 
accept more and more restrictions of their civil rights such as biometric identification 
information on national IDs, observation of citizens’ private activities, restrictions on freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly and civil liberties in general. 
Why should a substantial amount of people in Western cultures, people who strongly 
endorse democratic values, tend to favor authoritarian leaders in situations of uncertainty? 
What is the reason for this self-imposed subordination? Already Kant (1954/1784) tried to 
find an answer to the question why people subordinate themselves voluntarily to illegitimate 
control, preferring a state of dependency rather than one of individual autonomy. Although 
this is an old question, to date, the psychological processes that lead to authoritarian 
reactions have not been extensively studied and are not yet fully understood. At the same 
time the importance to find an answer to this question becomes more and more important. 
Galbraith (1977) stated that today we live in an “age of uncertainty” that is considerably less 
predictable than political and economic life in past decades. A prominent example is the 
current financial crisis that is now a worldwide concern with highly threatening 
consequences. The new president of the U.S.A. Obama posited “If we don’t act swiftly and 
boldly, we could see a much deeper economic downturn that could lead to double-digit 
unemployment”. Paul Krugman, a Nobel prize winning economist, argued: “This looks an 
awful lot like the beginning of a second Great Depression”. Paul Volcke, an economic adviser 
to Barack Obama even went a step further and stated “I don’t remember any time, maybe 
even the Great Depression, when things went down quite so fast, quite so uniformly around 
the world”. Thus, the current financial crisis posits a worldwide threat and uncertainty plays 
an enormously important role for millions of people. Are we in danger of a recurrence of 
authoritarian systems such as the National Socialism? Is democracy at risk? These 
questions highlight the importance of unraveling and understanding the underlying processes 
of the relation between uncertainty and authoritarian tendencies. 
A growing body of research investigated the link between these threats and levels of 
authoritarianism. Most studies in the field, however, mainly focused on the impact of 
situational factors and by this neglected one main internal complement to external threats, 
that is, uncertainty.  
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The present dissertation is set out to specify and extend previous research findings by 
investigating the effect of felt uncertainty on submissive attitudes towards authorities and, in 
particular, towards authoritarian leaders. Not everyone is expected to show such an 
authoritarian reaction to feelings of uncertainty. Individuals with low self-esteem have been 
shown to lack confidence in themselves and to be susceptible to external influence which 
makes them in particular prone to an authoritarian reaction. 
As an important resource in social interactions between leaders and followers power is 
also assumed to play a critical role in the evaluation of authoritarian leadership. Being aware 
of having power is expected to make even individuals with low self-esteem confident in 
themselves and by this prevent them from their authoritarian reaction to uncertainty. 
In sum, whereas past research reliably demonstrated a link between threat and 
authoritarianism in general, this dissertation takes the next step by determining individual 
difference variables that influence the authoritarian reaction to uncertainty in the domain of 
leadership. 
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2 Theoretical Part 
First, the present chapter starts out by introducing the research topic of authoritarianism and 
reporting previous research that examined the general link between threat and 
authoritarianism (2.1). Subsequently, research relevant to specify the main research 
assumptions of the present dissertation is reviewed.  
Second, as one main component of authoritarianism is the submission to authorities, 
the present dissertation focuses on this component and investigates the evaluations of 
authoritarian and democratic leadership (2.2).  
Third, as different kinds of threat are all assumed to evoke aversive feelings of 
uncertainty in the individual, the present dissertation concentrates on subjective uncertainty 
and strategies of uncertainty resolution (2.3). 
Fourth, as individuals with low self-esteem perceive a lack of self-confidence and 
control but individuals with high self-esteem do not, it is hypothesized that both groups react 
differentially to uncertainty: low self-esteem individuals in an authoritarian and high self-
esteem individuals in a democratic way (2.4). 
Fifth, as power induces self-confidence and control, it is hypothesized that the salience 
of high power (compared to no salience of power or salience of low power) buffers 
individuals against their reactions to uncertainty (2.5).  
Sixth, as the evaluation of authoritarian leaders can be influenced by social desirability 
effects, implicit attitude measures should be more sensitive to unravel the expected 
authoritarian reaction of low SEs to uncertainty than explicit ones (2.6). 
The chapter closes with an overview of the research project of the present dissertation 
and the delineation of general hypothesis. 
2.1 Authoritarianism – The Problem 
The term authoritarian can be conceived as either sides of the same coin, the attitudes and 
behaviors of an authoritarian leader or an authoritarian follower. As Son Hing, Bobocel, 
Zanna and McBride (2007) put it “When a dominant leader is paired with at least one 
submissive follower, their relationship is authoritarian”. The present dissertation focuses on 
the submissive follower and investigates the mechanisms that cause voluntary subordination 
under an authoritarian leader. In the following the concept of the authoritarian personality and 
measures to assess it are introduced (2.1.1), followed by a situational approach investigating 
the link between threat and authoritarianism (2.1.2). Then, the assumption of an authoritarian 
reaction to threatening situations is presented (2.1.3). The section concludes with a summary 
of research findings and a discussion of their relevance for the present dissertation (2.1.4). 
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2.1.1 The Authoritarian Personality and its Measurement 
Evoked by the attempt to explain the rise of Nazism, in their classic work ”The Authoritarian 
Personality”, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) attempted to elucidate 
the psychological bases of fascism, anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism. Rooted in Freudian 
psychodynamics, they conceived authoritarianism as a personality syndrome characterized 
by nine surface traits: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, conventionalism, 
anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypy, preoccupation with power and toughness, 
destructiveness and cynism, projectivity, and exaggerated interest in sexuality. These 
surface traits were viewed as a psychodynamic pattern with a single underlying dimension - 
the authoritarian personality caused by a rigid parental style. Adorno and colleagues (1950) 
developed a paper-pencil measure of authoritarianism, the Fascism scale (F-scale; Adorno 
et al., 1950) that aimed at assessing an attitudinal syndrome of prejudice against outgroups 
and minorities, ethnocentric ingroup glorification, politico-economic conservatism, and pro-
fascist attitudes. Research found relationships among the F-scale, social background, and 
social attitudes, however, evidence on the dynamics and origins of authoritarianism proved to 
be elusive (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). 
Allport (1954), Rokeach (1954), and Wilson (1973) proposed three prominent 
alternative conceptualizations of the authoritarian personality. Allport (1954) argued in his 
book “The Nature of Prejudice” that the authoritarian personality is characterized by the need 
for structure, order and control, as well as punitive hostility to deviance, unconventionality, 
novelty, and change. His conceptualization was very influential on a theoretical basis, but he 
never developed a measure to assess his concept of the authoritarian personality. Rokeach 
(1954) conceptualized the authoritarian personality in terms of a dogmatic and rigid cognitive 
style that predisposes to authoritarian ideologies (both left and right) and intolerance of 
others with dissimilar beliefs and values. In order to measure this cognitive style he 
introduced the Dogmatism scale (D-scale; Rokeach, 1954). Wilson (1973) conceived the 
authoritarian personality as characterized by conservatism which makes the individual 
unable to cope with social change. He developed his Conservatism scale (C-scale; Wilson, 
1973) to assess a set of social attitudes assumed to reflect the personality dimension.  
Empirical studies showed that in despite of the aim to assess a unitary personality 
dimension, the F-, D- and C-scales were not unidimensional, but were characterized by an 
unstable and unclear multidimensional factor structure, that had in part problems of 
acquiescience, lacked internal consistency reliability and yielded only poor correlations with 
validity criteria (Altemeyer, 1981).  
From a more behavioral perspective, Altemeyer (1988) conceptualizes authoritarianism 
as a personality dimension that is acquired through interpersonal interactions during 
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childhood and adolescence. He focuses on the three basic authoritarian components 
originally proposed by Adorno and colleagues (1950): “submission to the authorities who are 
perceived to be established and legitimate” (authoritarian submission); “general 
aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by 
established authorities” (authoritarian aggressiveness), and “adherence to the social 
conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society” (conventionalism; Altemeyer, 
1981, p. 148) and defines his concept as right-wing authoritarianism that can be assessed by 
his Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA scale; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996) . According 
to his view, “Right-wing authoritarianism is an individual factor, a personality variable, a trait if 
you like, developed on the premise that some persons need very little situational pressure to 
(say) submit to authority, while others often require significantly more. Conceived as a set of 
covarying attitudes (that is, attitudes that tend to go together), it is operationally defined as a 
score on an attitude scale that I named (in a burst of creativity) the RWA scale.” (Altemeyer, 
1988, p. 3). Sample items of the 30-item version of the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1996) are: 
“Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy 
the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us,” “It is always better to trust the 
judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy 
rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds,” and “The ‘old-
fashioned ways’ and ‘old-fashioned values’ still show the best way to live.” 
Compared to previous authoritarianism scales the RWA scale has been found to be 
more reliable, unidimensional and balanced for acquiescence. It has been shown to be 
associated with phenomena such as right-wing extremism, aggression towards 
nonconformity and deviance, ethnocentrism, and generalized prejudice (Altemeyer, 1981, 
1988, 1996).  
It has long been hypothesized that threat and uncertainty play an important role in the 
development of authoritarianism. Already Fromm (1941) argued that the modern world and 
the consequences of capitalism state a threat to security and can lead to authoritarianism. 
Adorno and colleagues (1950) assumed the authoritarian personality to be a product of 
threatening inconsistent child-rearing practices causing an inner conflict between repressed 
aggression and fearful submission toward parental authority and by this to all authority. 
Allport (1954) argued that ego weakness and personal insecurity causes the need for 
structure, order and control. Rokeach (1954, 1960) posited that external threat and perceived 
anxiety are one main cause for dogmatism and Wilson (1973) hypothesized that anxiety and 
fear of uncertainty contribute to the development of conservatism.  
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2.1.2 Threat and Authoritarianism 
Although there is a long tradition of explaining authoritarianism from a personality 
perspective empirical evidence suggests that authoritarian attitudes and behaviors are not 
only a matter of personality but can also be induced by situational factors. Analyzing archival 
data, Sales (1972) showed that in times of the Great Depression conversion rates from non-
authoritarian to authoritarian church denominations were substantially higher than in times of 
economic security. McCann (1999) replicated these findings demonstrating that annual threat 
levels were positively related to annual percentage changes of authoritarian denominations 
and negatively related to annual percentage changes of less authoritarian denominations. 
Comparing archival data from threatening historical periods (the 1930's and 1967-1970) and 
non-threatening periods (the 1920's and 1959-1964), Sales (1973) showed that many 
indicators associated with authoritarianism were significantly higher in periods of societal 
threat than in non-threatening years. In a replication, Doty, Peterson, and Winter (1991) 
compared archival data from the U.S.A for high-threat (1978-1982) and low-threat (1983-
1987) periods. McCann (1997) showed that during years of high threat presidential elections 
were more influenced by perceived strength and power of the candidates than during low 
threatening times. Peterson and Gerstein (2005) content coded themes of authoritarianism in 
American comic books and found more authoritarian indicators during years of relatively high 
social and economic threat (1978-82 and 1991-92) compared to years of relatively low threat 
(1983-90).  
Besides correlational and longitudinal evidence, two experimental studies provide 
additional evidence for the link between threat and authoritarianism. Sales and Friend (1973) 
showed that participants threatened by failure in two experimental tasks increased in their 
post-experimental compared to their pre-experimental levels of authoritarianism assessed by 
the F-scale. In contrast, participants encouraged by success in these tasks showed a 
decrease from their pre- to their post-experimental authoritarianism scores. Overall, these 
differential changes were greater for individuals that attributed their performance on the tasks 
to internal causes. In a recent experimental study, Duckitt and Fisher (2003) demonstrated 
that reading a hypothetical scenario describing the future as insecure and threatening led to 
heightened ideological authoritarianism compared to a secure future scenario. In their meta-
analytic review Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) showed that both dispositional 
and situational variables associated with management of uncertainty and threat predicted a 
heightened appeal to conservative opinions and leaders. Conservatism was defined as 
resistance to change and opposition to equality. In their uncertainty-threat model Jost and 
colleagues (2003) assumed that stability and hierarchy provide reassurance and structure, 
whereas change and equality imply greater chaos and unpredictability. Amongst others 
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political conservatism was assessed by measures of authoritarianism, e.g. Altemeyer’s RWA 
scale (1981, 1988, 1996).  
The studies cited above followed the assumption that individuals in general will 
demonstrate greater levels of authoritarianism when confronted with perceived threats. 
Threat is expected to exert a direct influence on attitudes and beliefs resulting in authoritarian 
attitudes and behaviors. A more differentiated conceptualization argues that only individuals 
that are susceptible to contemporary threat information will react in that way. Threat is 
expected to interact with individual difference characteristics (e.g., dispositional 
authoritarianism) to influence attitudes and behaviors and this leads to authoritarian attitudes 
and behaviors (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). In her authoritarian dynamic theory (ADT), 
Stenner (2005) considers the authoritarian dimension as characterized by an authoritarian 
pole that reflects a “preference for uniformity and insistence upon group authority” and a 
libertarian pole that represents a “preference for difference and insistence upon individual 
autonomy” (p. 15). Whereas –as cited above- many theorists assume an increase in 
everyone’s authoritarianism under threat, ADT predicts a polarization effect. In low 
threatening situations, authoritarian and libertarian individuals should not differ in tolerance-
related positions, but they “will suddenly sharply diverge in the stances they adopt toward 
any issue touching upon diversity, dissent, and deviance” (Stenner, 2005, p. 323) under high 
threatening circumstances. Thus, authoritarians respond to threat by an increase, libertarians 
by a decrease in their authoritarian attitudes and behavior. In other words, an authoritarian 
activation occurs only in authoritarian individuals and this is only the case when the individual 
is threatened and the authoritarian manifestations are required to cope with the threat. This 
reasoning is in line with the concept of dominant response that is assumed to be enhanced 
by arousal (Hull, 1943; Zajonc, 1965). One could argue that authoritarian displays are the 
dominant response for authoritarians and because threat increases arousal authoritarianism 
is enhanced. In contrast, the dominant response for libertarians should be democratic 
resulting in decreased authoritarianism under threat. 
Consistently, Feldman and Stenner (1997) found evidence of a significant interaction 
between societal threat and authoritarian predispositions on intolerance, prejudice and 
punitiveness. Rickert (1998) showed that authoritarians experiencing economic threat were 
more likely than non-threatened authoritarians or non-authoritarians to support social policies 
restricting benefits for powerless and disadvantaged groups. Lavine and colleagues (1999) 
showed that high authoritarian individuals were more responsive to threat-related messages 
about voting (emphasizing the negative consequences of failing to vote), whereas low 
authoritarian individuals were more responsive to messages emphasizing the rewards of 
voting (emphasizing the positive benefits of voting). The interaction of threat and 
authoritarianism influenced participants’ perceptions of message quality, which mediated 
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voting intentions and behaviors. In a recent study, McCann (2008) demonstrated that the 
number of death sentences and executions, a phenomenon that can be interpreted as an 
expression of authoritarian aggressiveness, was higher in more threatened conservative 
states than in less threatened conservative states, and was lower in more threatened liberal 
states than in less threatened liberal states. As conservatism and authoritarianism have been 
shown to be related (e.g., Stone, 1980; Stone & Smith, 1993), these findings are in line with 
the polarization effect predicted by ADT (Stenner, 2005). 
Overall, it has been shown that situational threat heightens authoritarianism. However, 
most of the studies showing a general link between threat and authoritarianism were at the 
societal level and used aggregated data of authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. Individual 
predispositions were not taken into account and, therefore, these studies did not allow for the 
potential interaction of threat and personal variables such as authoritarian dispositions in 
relation to authoritarian displays. Also, the experimental study of Duckitt and Fisher (2003) 
cannot rule out the possibility that only persons high in authoritarianism reacted to the 
insecure future scenario by adopting more authoritarian attitudes and others did not. Only 
Sales and Friend (1973) accounted for pre-authoritarianism scores in their experiment, 
however, the changes in authoritarianism they observed were fairly small. Thus, the link 
between threat and authoritarianism “observed in the aggregate can be equally compatible 
with a process that depends upon variation in individual predispositions and one that does 
not” (Stenner, 2005, p. 30).  
2.1.3 The Authoritarian Reaction 
Oesterreich (2005) propose that one main response to stressful and threatening situations is 
to seek the security and shelter provided by authorities. He assumed that this flight into 
security is a basic reaction of all human beings which is acquired when children first learn to 
cope with reality. In frightening situations parents or other persons responsible for upbringing 
the child provide security and the flight towards the parents’ shelter is, therefore, an 
inevitable and necessary reaction. During socialization individuals learn to overcome this 
“authoritarian reaction” by developing their own coping strategies. In situations in which a 
threat is emotionally overtaxing and cognitive coping strategies fail to resolve it, however, 
even adults may react in an authoritarian way by orientation toward and submission under 
persons in power. The latter are attractive because they have the means to give shelter and 
solve the individuals’ problems and by this reduce feelings of anxiety and insecurity. 
2.1.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The studies cited above used very different kinds of outcome variables that were only loosely 
solded to the core elements of authoritarianism. Oesterreich (2005) proposes that individuals 
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exhibit an authoritarian reaction when they feel emotionally overtaxed. That is, they seek the 
shelter of someone who supposedly has the power to handle the situation. Submissiveness 
to authorities is one of the main components of the authoritarianism concept and leaders can 
be conceived of as persons who seem to have the power and means to provide guidance in 
threatening situations. Therefore, the present dissertation investigates the evaluations of 
authoritarian and democratic leaders in particular (2.2) rather than authoritarianism in 
general. These leadership evaluations are specified as attitudes with an affective and 
cognitive component. 
Although there is a long tradition of explaining authoritarianism from a personality 
perspective, empirical evidence suggests that authoritarian attitudes and behaviors are not 
only a matter of long-term socialization and personality but can also be induced by short-term 
factors of the situation. That is, threat and insecurity were found to be strongly linked to 
authoritarian attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. In the research reviewed above, however, the 
term of threat is used rather loosely and the studies addressed very different types of threat. 
One commonality, all these different kinds of threats share, is that they have an impact on 
the individual, that is, they induce feelings of uncertainty. Therefore, the present dissertation 
focuses on the reactions to uncertainty in particular (2.3) rather than to threat in general.  
Explanations for the threat-authoritarianism link take two different perspectives: one 
approach argues that threat increases everyone’s authoritarianism. The other approach 
posits that the increase in authoritarian displays is due to an interaction of threat and 
individual predispositions such as level of pre-authoritarianism. As the latter approach 
gathers growing empirical support that the former approach cannot rule out and individuals 
might differentially overcome their authoritarian reactions, the present dissertation aims at 
identifying a relevant individual difference variable that moderates the link between 
uncertainty and the authoritarian reaction, namely self-esteem (2.4). 
2.2 Leadership Styles and their Evaluation – The Focus 
The following section is intended to specify the defining features of authoritarian and 
democratic leadership and their main differences (2.2.1). Previous research on the 
evaluations of these two leadership styles regarding satisfaction and outcome variables is 
presented (2.2.2). As leadership evaluations can be conceived as attitudes with an affective 
and a cognitive component, relevant aspects from the research on attitudes are introduced 
(2.2.3). The section concludes with a summary of research findings and a discussion of their 
relevance for the present dissertation (2.2.4). 
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2.2.1 Authoritarian and Democratic Leaders 
Leadership has long been a focus of research in the field of social psychology and social 
sciences (e.g., Bass, 1990; Chemers, 1987, 2001). Chemers (2001) defines leadership as   
“a process of social influence through which an individual enlists and mobilizes the aid of 
others in the attainment of a collective goal” (p. 376). Thus, leadership is the process of 
influencing followers to contribute towards a common goal. One of the main perspectives on 
the study of leadership emphasizes the behavior of leaders, that is, what leaders do and, in 
particular, how they do it. The classic leadership research states a conception of leadership 
that differentiates the way power is distributed, whose needs are met, and how decisions are 
made (Bass, 1990; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939; Vroom & Yetton, 1973; Yukl, 1998). Bales 
(1950) distinguished between two key leadership roles on groups, a task specialist and a 
socio-emotional specialist. The behavior of a task specialist is more likely to be dominant and 
directive to fulfill the group’s task, the behavior of the socio-emotional specialist is more likely 
to be concerned with the feelings of other group members. The Michigan leadership studies 
(Likert, 1961) proposed a dimension of leadership behavior with the two poles of production 
centered and employee centered. In a similar vein, the Ohio State leadership program (e.g., 
Fleishman, 1973; Stogdill, 1974) differentiated between initiating structure and consideration. 
Initiating structure means defining the group’s objectives and organizing the followers’ work 
toward goal attainment. Consideration means concern for the welfare of subordinates. 
Fiedler (1967) speaks of task oriented and relations oriented.  
Although different terms are used there seems to be a general distinction between two 
clusters of leadership styles. Authoritarian and democratic leadership can be conceived as 
the most extreme exemplars of these clusters (Bass, 1990; Lewin et al., 1939; Vroom & 
Yetton, 1973; Yukl, 1998). Neuberger (1972) analyzed 30 experimental studies on 
authoritarian and democratic leadership and extracted five dimensions that distinguish 
between both leadership styles: participation rate, structure, control, power of decision, and 
motivation. Authoritarian leadership is characterized by low participation and motivation, but 
high structure, control and power of decision. Democratic leadership is characterized by the 
opposite values, that is, high participation and motivation, but low structure, control and 
power of decision. Authoritarian leaders dictate methods and stages of goal attainment one 
step at a time, direct the actions and interactions of followers and are unconcerned about the 
group members’ autonomy and development. Democratic leaders, in contrast, encourage 
group members to determine their own policies, explain the steps toward attaining the goals, 
let them initiate their own tasks and interactions and are concerned about their need to 
contribute to deciding what is to be done (Lippitt, 1940). The primary difference between 
authoritarian and democratic leadership can be seen in the amount of granted participation, 
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that is, the control group members have over the decision-making process and their actions 
(Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1998).  
2.2.2 Leadership Evaluations  
At least in Western societies, a general aversion to authoritarian leadership has been found 
in a number of studies. For example, Nielsen and Miller (1997) reported that even groups 
starting with a dictatorial decision rule nearly always reverted to a democratic rule, regardless 
of their performance quality. Research on social dilemmas showed that group members 
generally refuse to assign an authoritarian leader to solve conflicts over public goods or 
public resources. For example, Samuelson and Messick (1986) found that group members 
preferred to divide resources equally among themselves to avert a resource crisis rather than 
letting a leader make the decisions. Rutte and Wilke (1985) reported that group members 
preferred solving a collective resource threat through democratic solutions, such as 
consensus or majority rules voting, rather than through autocratic leadership. Consistently, 
Van Vugt and De Cremer (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999, Experiment 1) showed that after 
they repeatedly failed to provide a public good through voluntary contributions group 
members chose a democratic rather than an authoritarian leader to improve their group 
performance. 
Strongly related to research on authoritarian and democratic leadership are studies 
from the fairness literature that manipulate whether participants are or are not allowed to 
voice their opinion in a decision making process (e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 
1979; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Granting voice has often been found to 
cause positive reactions, whereas denying voice leads to negative feelings and 
dissatisfaction. Procedural justice theorists proposed two different explanations of voice 
effects: A number of theorists suggest that the act of expressing voice conveys a symbolic, 
value-expressive meaning and is psychologically rewarding regardless of outcomes (e.g., 
Folger, 1993; Lind, Kanfer, & Early, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos, 2001). Thus, a 
democratic leadership style may communicate more appreciation and respect to group 
members compared to an autocratic style (Tyler & Lind, 1992). According to an instrumental 
perspective (Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), individuals wish to 
have the opportunity to express their opinion because they believe that having voice 
increases their control over outcomes of the decision. Hence, they believe that outcomes are 
more likely to be favorable for them. Thus, having some input into the decision-making 
process may lead to better personal outcomes than having no input at all (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975).  
Consistently, leadership evaluations often distinguish between work satisfaction and 
outcome. A number of studies reported differential evaluations of authoritarian and 
Theoretical Part   
 
12
democratic leadership depending on the dimension to be judged. In one of the most famous 
leadership studies, Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939; White & Lippitt, 1953) investigated the 
effects of an authoritarian, democratic, or laissez-faire leadership style on groups of pupils. 
Groups led by an authoritarian teacher showed much more discontent, hostility, and 
aggression than democratically led groups, they were slightly more productive in completing 
various group tasks. Neuberger (1972) analyzed 30 experimental studies of authoritarian and 
democratic leadership and found a clear predominance of democratic leadership regarding 
satisfaction. Results regarding outcomes were not that clear, both leadership styles led to 
better outcomes in different studies or there were no differences. The results are 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Number of studies in which the authoritarian leadership style, the democratic leadership style 
or none of both prevailed when differentiated by satisfaction and outcome (Neuberger, 1972) 
 
Predominance of No Difference between 
 Authoritarian 
leadership 
Democratic 
leadership 
Authoritarian and 
Democratic Leadership 
Satisfaction 6 17 5 
Outcome 9 8 6 
 
 
In their meta-analysis, Miller and Monge (1986) analyzed the correlations of 
participation with satisfaction and productivity scores differentiating between laboratory and 
field studies. They found a relatively high positive correlation between participation and 
satisfaction (r = .38) with a higher correlation for laboratory than field studies (r = .46 and       
r = .16, respectively). The authors explain the difference between the laboratory and field 
studies by higher internal validity -that is control over extraneous variables- of the laboratory 
studies. In field studies the effect of participation on satisfaction may be diluted by other 
organizational influences. The overall correlation between participation and productivity was 
lower (r = .11). The differentiated analysis showed for laboratory studies a negative (r = -.33) 
and for field studies a positive correlation (r = .27). Miller and Monge (1986) argue that the 
substantial difference between laboratory and field studies in regard of productivity can be 
attributed to differential task complexity. Whereas tasks in laboratory studies typically are 
simple and well-defined manipulated, tasks in field studies typically are more complex and 
might therefore require more participation to solve.  
In summary, most of the studies to contrast authoritarian and democratic leadership, 
the democratic leadership style led to a better group atmosphere and higher satisfaction 
ratings. Regarding productivity and outcome results were not that clear (for an overview see 
Bass, 1990). Consistently, one can distinguish between follower’s evaluations of leadership 
valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and success (success/failure), that is, do followers like a 
leader and do they believe a leader to be successful. In a similar vein, Hogg (2007) stated 
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“How do we evaluate leaders and leadership…? In answering this question it is useful to 
distinguish between the two evaluative dimensions of effective/ineffective leaders and 
good/bad leaders.” (p. 717). 
These two dimensions of evaluation do not have to coincide, a liked leader might be 
seen as ineffective and an unliked leader might be seen as very successful. Such mixed 
patterns have also been found in the domain of social perception for stereotype content. 
Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002) distinguished between a warmth and a competence 
dimension for stereotype content and found frequent mixed clusters for certain out-groups 
that combined high warmth with low competence (e.g., housewives) or high competence with 
low warmth (e.g., business women). 
2.2.3 Leadership Evaluations as Attitudes 
Leadership evaluations can be conceived as attitudes with different components: valence 
and success. Thomas and Znaniecki (1927) posited that the field of social psychology is the 
study of attitudes because attitudes determine the actual and potential responses of a person 
in the social world. A broad variety of attitude definitions has been proposed. According to 
Allport’s (1936) definition “An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized 
through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response 
to all objects and situations with which it is related” (p. 810). From a tripartite perspective, 
evaluative responses to certain attitude objects can be categorized into affective, cognitive 
and behavioral reactions (e.g., Katz & Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; Smith, 
1947). Rosenberg and Hovland (1960, pp. 3-4) defined the affective component as 
expressions of liking or disliking, i.e. the favorable or unfavorable feelings one has towards 
an attitude object. Ostrom (1969) used the term “gut reactions” to describe these emotional 
and physiological reactions. The cognitive component contains the believed desirable and 
undesirable qualities of an attitude object, thus, the perceptions, concepts, and beliefs about 
an attitude object. The behavioral component encompasses supportive or hostile action 
tendencies in past or future actions. While theory hypothesizes a high overlap of these three 
components, each component is expected to have its own unique determinants (Insko & 
Schopler, 1967; M. J. Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). A more contemporary view 
conceptualizes attitudes as “unidimensional summary statements” (Thompson, Zanna, & 
Griffin, 1995, p. 362). Eagly and Chaiken (1993), for example, defined an attitude as “a 
psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree 
of favour or disfavour” (p. 1). In their multi-component model of attitudes, they state that 
attitudes are overall evaluations of stimuli that are derived, but are conceptually separable 
from its affective, cognitive and/ or behavioral bases (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zanna & 
Rempel, 1988). Following these assumptions, summary attitudes toward authoritarian and 
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democratic leaders can be drawn from an affective and/ or a cognitive component. Valence 
judgments of leadership (pleasant vs. unpleasant) can be conceived as reflecting the 
affective, success evaluations (success vs. failure) as reflecting the cognitive attitude 
component. 
Attitude components do not have to be consistent. They can be ambivalent to the 
extent that the summary evaluation includes both positive and negative evaluations that are 
in conflict with each other (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Kaplan, 1972; Katz & Hass, 1988; Olson 
& Zanna, 1993; Thompson et al., 1995). Attitudinal ambivalence is understood as the 
evaluative tension associated with this conflict and is assessed by asking whether a person 
feels mixed or torn about the attitude object (Priester & Petty, 1996). Intra-attitudinal 
ambivalence results from a conflict within one attitude component, for example between 
positive and negative beliefs, or positive and negative emotions. Inter-component 
ambivalence results from a conflict between different attitude components, for example 
between affect and cognition, or between the overall attitude and one of the components 
(see Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995). The stability of an attitude over time, its 
resistance to change, and its predictive value of behavior are determined by attitude 
strength. Attitude strength, in turn, is amongst other factors influenced by non-ambivalence 
(e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). Thus, diverging evaluations of leadership in regard of the 
valence and success dimensions can lead to ambivalent summary evaluations with 
decreased attitude strength making them prone to attitude change.  
2.2.3.1 Stored Evaluations or Temporary Constructions? 
In the present dissertation it is argued that the authoritarian reaction to uncertainty is 
reflected by changes in the evaluations of authoritarian and democratic leaders. Thus, the 
key question is, whether attitudes can be changed by temporary context cues. Traditionally, 
attitudes have been conceptualized as global evaluations that can be accessed from memory 
and persist over time. Sherif and Cantril (1947), for example, stated that “attitudes, once 
formed, are more or less enduring states of readiness” (p. 22). According to Allport (1935) 
“attitudes are often as rigid as habits” (p. 813) and “often persist throughout life in the way in 
which they were fixed in childhood or youth” (p.814). Moreover, Tesser (1993) found a large 
heritable component in some attitudes that makes them especially resistant to change.  
Some researchers, however, view attitudes as temporary constructions that are 
created “on-the-spot”, i.e. on the basis of information accessible at the moment individuals 
are asked to make attitudinal judgments (e.g., Bem, 1972; Schwarz, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 
1992). According to this attitude-as-construction perspective not all potentially relevant 
information, but only a subset is retrieved from memory in a given situation (e.g., 
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Whether particular information is retrieved 
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depends on its accessibility in memory. Higgins (1996) defined accessibility as “the activation 
potential of available knowledge” (p. 141) which is determined by a number of factors such 
as inherent salience of an information, the frequency and recency of prior activation as well 
as the strength and number of corresponding associations (e.g., Higgins, 1996). 
Therefore, attitudes are to some extent dependent on the information temporarily 
accessible in the specific situation (for reviews see Lord & Lepper, 1999; Schwarz & Bless, 
1992; Tesser, 1978; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Wilson & Hodges, 1992). An extensive 
and growing body of research provided empirical support showing that attitudes can be 
inferred from different information such as observations of one’s own behavior (e.g., Bem, 
1972; Fazio, 1987), bodily states (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Laird, 1974; 
Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), current thoughts and feelings (e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985; 
Judd & Lusk, 1984; Millar & Tesser, 1986 a,b; Wilson & Hodges, 1992), goals (e.g., Shavitt, 
Swan, Lowrey, & Wanke, 1994), mood (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & 
Strathman, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), standards (e.g., Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 
1992; Kenrick, Gutierres, & Goldberg, 1989; Strack, Schwarz, Chassein, Kern, & Wagner, 
1990), and the nature of social context (e.g., Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Schwarz & Bless, 
1992; Strack, 1992; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988).  
These research results strongly argue for the notion that attitudes can be changed by 
temporary context cues. Thus, the authoritarian reaction to uncertainty can be reflected by 
changes in leadership evaluations. 
2.2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The main difference between the authoritarian and democratic leadership can be seen in the 
amount of granted participation. In its extremity authoritarian leadership represents a clear 
hierarchy, whereas democratic leadership is characterized by granting voice in important 
decisions. In Western societies democratic leadership is associated with many positive 
attributes and feelings whereas authoritarian leadership is linked with strongly negative 
characteristics. Leadership evaluations often distinguish between work satisfaction and 
outcome. As satisfaction and outcome do not always converge it seems useful to distinguish 
between the two dimensions of valence (pleasant/ unpleasant) and success (success/ 
failure) in leadership evaluations. The valence dimension can be conceived of as affective, 
the success dimension as cognitive attitude component. Conflict within and between these 
components leads to attitude ambivalence that makes the attitude prone to change. 
Originally, attitudes were conceived as persistent entities, resistant to change. Although 
some attitudes seem to be quite stable over time a wide range of studies found that attitudes 
are at least to some extent dependent on the information temporary accessible in the specific 
situation. In the present dissertation the effects of temporary uncertainty on evaluations of 
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authoritarian and democratic leadership are investigated on an affective valence and a 
cognitive success dimension.  
2.3 Uncertainty – The Situational Precondition 
Times of terrorism, political and economic crises, national conflicts, rapid changes, and 
unpredictable social interactions are enormous threats individuals all over the world have to 
cope with. Despite the fact that these threats are of very different kinds, in the present 
dissertation it is hypothesized that they have one feature in common, that is, they induce 
feelings of uncertainty. The present section starts out with a definition of the concept of 
uncertainty (2.3.1). It is explicated why uncertainty resolution is conceived as a primary 
human motive and different strategies to resolve uncertainty are presented (2.3.2). 
Subsequently, a theoretical model of the processes that take place in the individual under 
uncertainty is addressed (2.3.3). The section closes with a summary of research findings and 
a discussion of their relevance for the present dissertation (2.3.4). 
2.3.1 The Concept of Uncertainty 
A variety of different uncertainty definitions exists that will be summarized in the following. 
Influenced by cognitive models such as expected utility theory (for an overview, see Harless 
& Camerer, 1994; Luce & von Winterfeldt, 1994), research on behavioral decision making 
and game theory judgment assumes that the decision-making process is mainly determined 
by the cognitive task of judging possible outcomes and weighing them according to their 
likelihood of occurring. Uncertainty is conceived of as probabilistically determined events, i.e. 
an outcome is uncertain when only probabilities are available in a decision making process 
instead of determined (certain) outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Besides anticipated 
emotions associated with the occurrence of outcomes, affective components are mostly 
neglected in these utility approaches. 
A more psychological view on uncertainty includes the subjective feeling of lacking 
sufficient information to judge a situation, even if this information objectively may exist 
outside the person’s perception (and by this the situation is objectively deterministic). In an 
extension of decision making theory, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) argue 
that individuals react to the prospect of risk with anticipatory emotions such as fear, anxiety, 
or dread experienced in the immediate presence of the decision making process. They refer 
to Peters and Slovic’s (1996) distinction between two “psychological” dimensions of risk: (a) 
the dread that risk induces by the perceived lack of control and (b) the unknown risk of 
potential harmful impacts. Kagan (1972) conceives uncertainty in terms of a cognitive 
conflict, dissonance or disequilibrium. According to his view, uncertainty can be induced by 
an event in the presence that is discrepant to prior expectations or an event in the future that 
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is unpredictable. Thus, sources of uncertainty can be the incompatibility between cognitions, 
cognitions and experiences, and cognitions and behavior in a given situation or the 
unpredictability of events in the future. The latter is especially aversive when negative events 
are expected such as penalty, harm, failure, or rejection. Kagan (1972) assumes that feelings 
of uncertainty are accompanied by a physiological state of alertness and not resolving 
uncertainty can lead to a strong negative affect such as distress, anxiety, fear, shame, or 
guilt.  
According to Hogg (2000), self-uncertainty is especially aversive because it is 
accompanied by reduced control over one’s life. The self is conceived of as the organizing 
structure that directs all of one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors. Uncertainty arises when 
subjectively important aspects of one’s life are in question, that means uncertainty about 
attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and behaviors that are important for the sense of self. In 
consequence, the need for self-certainty is fundamental because it represents the means of 
gaining control over one’s life. 
Van den Bos and Lind (2002) refer to Kagan (1972) and assume that feelings of 
uncertainty, doubt or confusion are provoked by the confrontation with inconsistent 
cognitions, experiences and behaviors or by the inability to predict the future. In order to 
manipulate uncertainty experimentally Van den Bos (2001) asked participants to answer the 
following two questions: (1) “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your 
being uncertain arouses in you” and (2) “Please write down, as specifically as you can, what 
you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain”.  
Following Baumeister (1985), McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) 
conceived of personal uncertainty as “an acute kind of identity crisis that can arise from 
awareness of having inconsistent or unclear self-relevant cognitions” (p. 473). Accordingly, 
they induced self-relevant uncertainty by asking participants to think of a complex personal 
dilemma about which they had not already decided whether they should keep or change the 
status quo. Participants were instructed to give a short description of the dilemma, to 
deliberate about advantages and disadvantages as well as alternative possible selves 
associated with both poles of the dilemma. 
The present work follows a psychological conception of uncertainty and encompasses 
both cognitive and affective components of uncertainty. In order to meet this broad definition, 
the experimental studies of the present research described below (see Study 3b and Study 
4b) draw on the manipulation of uncertainty introduced by Van den Bos (2001). 
2.3.2 Uncertainty Resolution as a Primary Human Motive 
The literature cited above argues that in most cases uncertainty is aversive, especially when 
it is self-relevant. It has been claimed that resolving uncertainty is one of the most basic 
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human needs. On the basis of experimental studies and clinical observations Maslow (1954) 
developed a theory about the structure and dynamic of human needs. He distinguishes five 
different categories: physiological, security, belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization 
needs. This concept of content structure is combined with a concept of dynamic force. That 
is, he proposed a hierarchical order of need actualization, assuming that elementary needs 
take effect at first and contents of next higher levels only become relevant when needs of the 
preceding steps are satisfied. The need for security directly follows after the physiological 
needs and occupies a very basic position in the hierarchy that makes the resolution of 
uncertainty primary to all higher needs.  
Festinger (1954) stated in his social comparison theory that there is a “motivation to 
know that one’s opinions are correct and to know precisely what one is and is not capable of 
doing” (p. 217), implying that individuals are driven to evaluate their abilities and opinions 
and strive for maximizing certainty and minimizing uncertainty. He argues that knowing one 
is correct is a critical human motive that drives interpersonal social comparison when non-
social means are not available. Consistently, Kagan (1972) proposes that uncertainty 
resolution is a primary human motive and that uncertainty is an alerting state that elicits 
reorganization processes in the cognitive structure aimed at its resolution. He argues that 
very different secondary motives such as achievement, affiliation, dominance, or dependency 
(Atkinson, 1958; H. A. Murray, 1938) can be in the service of the fundamental strive for 
uncertainty resolution. For example, in some individuals, the dependency motive will be 
activated when uncertainty is present, whereas in others the dominance motive will be 
aroused. Which one is chosen is determined by the situation on the one hand and the 
personal characteristics on the other.  
In his uncertainty reduction hypothesis Hogg (2000) proposes that individuals perceive 
subjective uncertainty as aversive, strive to reduce feelings of uncertainty, and use group 
identification as means to reduce uncertainty. He bases his assumptions on social identity 
theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Consistently he argues that the process of self-categorization, 
that is, joining and identifying with groups, is an effective way to reduce uncertainty about 
oneself and about feelings, thoughts, and behaviors that relate to self and to interactions with 
others. Assimilation of self to an in-group prototype defines the self and prescribes feelings, 
thoughts, and behaviors, as well as specifies and regulates the course of interaction with in-
group and out-group members and by this reduces uncertainty about how to feel, think and 
behave. At the same time, prototypes are relatively consensual, and –as a consequence- the 
(physically or cognitively present) other group members reduce uncertainty by validating 
one’s world view and self-concept. In consequence, the main prediction of Hogg’s (2000) 
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uncertainty reduction hypothesis is that under uncertainty individuals are more likely to 
identify with groups.  
In their uncertainty management model, Van den Bos and Lind (2002) proposed 
fairness judgments as an important means to reduce and to cope with uncertainty because 
fairness promotes predictability and controllability in social interactions (see also Lind & Van 
den Bos, 2002). Similarly to Hogg’s (2000) model it is assumed that social integration 
reduces uncertainty and that justice judgments provide the information about one’s 
integration and one’s status in a group. 
McGregor and colleagues (2001) argue that one strategy to reduce uncertainty is 
compensatory conviction, that is, individuals cope with personal uncertainty by 
spontaneously emphasizing certainty and conviction about unrelated attitudes, values, 
personal goals, and identifications. The authors found that focusing on a self-consistent set 
of values and personal goals effectively reduced feelings of uncertainty.  
Uncertainty is also an important motivational construct for communication theories. 
Uncertainty in interpersonal communicative contexts is maladaptive and can produce 
negative reactions. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975), uncertainty is a function of 
the ability to predict and to explain actions of self and others. Another person can feel, think 
and behave in a variety of alternative ways. For a successful interaction, it is important to 
predict how an interaction partner is likely to behave and to choose from one’s repertoire 
those responses that will optimize the communication outcomes. Individuals communicate to 
reduce uncertainty, and effective communication requires interpersonal certainty (e.g., 
Berger, 1987).  
Moreover, uncertainty plays a role in organizational socialization theories (e.g., Lester, 
1987; Saks & Ashforth, 1997). During their entry in an organization, newcomers experience 
high levels of uncertainty. They are motivated to reduce this uncertainty by seeking 
information from superiors and peers that renders the work environment more predictable 
and controllable. In specific, newcomers’ uncertainty concerns predicting one’s own success 
or failure in the organization and what specific action out of possible behavioral alternatives 
will be rewarded or punished by superiors. 
Thus, many different ways to cope with uncertainty have been proposed. Which 
strategy is chosen depends on the individual and the specific situation. In the following a 
model of the general processes underlying the resolution of uncertainty is introduced that is 
the basis for the main hypotheses of the present dissertation.  
2.3.3 Underlying processes of Uncertainty Resolution 
Theories of social cognition propose that uncertainty affects information processing by 
motivating more effortful cognitive processes. Festinger (1954), for example, argued that 
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individuals engage in social comparisons when they feel uncertain about themselves. 
Extending Festingers argument, Pelham and Wachsmuth (1995) propose that individuals 
uncertain about their self-views engage in more systematic processing when making social 
comparisons. Early attribution theorists argued that uncertainty engenders a careful 
elaboration of the causal structure of events (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973), because “man 
grasps reality and can predict and control it, by referring transient and variable behavior and 
events to relatively unchanging conditions, the so-called dispositional properties of the world” 
(Heider, 1958, p. 79). 
Also, dual process theories of attitude change emphasize the importance of certainty 
because in their pursuit of different motivations, namely accuracy, impression, and defense 
motivation, individuals follow a sufficiency principle when processing information (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Motivation determines the threshold of desired judgmental 
confidence and the perceived difference between the current and the desired level of 
confidence determines the degree of cognitive elaboration. Individuals will spend only as 
much cognitive effort as is required to satisfy goal-related needs, as defined by the three 
motivation types (least effort principle) and will spend whatever cognitive effort is required to 
attain a sufficient level of confidence to accomplish goals (sufficiency principle). The feeling 
of certainty, then, functions as an internal cue that no further processing is necessary (also 
see Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992). Consistently, Edwards and Weary (1993) assume 
that the finding that information is processed more systematically by depressed individuals is 
attributable to a lack of confidence in their own judgments (also see Gleicher & Weary, 1991; 
Weary, 1990).  
Weary and Edwards (1996) extended their assumptions about depressives to 
individuals that feel causally uncertain in general. They conceive causal uncertainty as a 
special case of a more general form of uncertainty. In their model of causal uncertainty 
resolution Weary and Edwards (1996) distinguish between causal uncertainty beliefs and 
causal uncertainty feelings. Causal uncertainty beliefs are defined as “generalized self-
constructs about one’s uncertain or inadequate understanding or detection of causal 
relations in the social world” (Weary & Edwards, 1996, p.159). The authors propose 
individual differences in the accessibility of these beliefs and argue that some individuals 
have chronic causal uncertainty beliefs due to frequent perceptions of loss of control (e.g., 
depressives). In addition, causal uncertainty beliefs can be temporarily activated in most 
individuals by situational factors such as situational expectancies of a loss of control, task 
instructions or contextual priming. According to Weary and Edwards (1996) chronically 
accessible causal uncertainty beliefs require less excitation from situational input to become 
active, and their activation in response to such information is automatic. Once activated, 
these beliefs induce meta-cognitive feelings of uncertainty such as surprise, bewilderment, or 
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confusion (Clore, 1992) that alert individuals that their knowledge is insufficient to cope with a 
situation or to achieve a goal. The goal to accurately understand causal relations is 
developed by social learning processes of effective and ineffective transactions with the 
social world. This accuracy goal is represented as a desired state in memory and is activated 
by the described cognitive feelings of uncertainty. A “comparator” determines the 
discrepancy between the current state and the desired state of causal certainty and 
activates, besides negative depressed, or anxious feelings, action plans to reduce 
uncertainty and the related negative affect. Affect is assumed to function as a cue for the 
degree of goal attainment and influence the comparator via a negative feedback loop. Action 
plans are designed to reduce uncertainty and involve an effortful, deliberative, intentional 
search for and processing of available social information that might render the social 
environment more understandable, predictable and controllable. Activation of these 
accuracy-motivated strategies can be conscious or relatively automatic depending on 
frequency of prior activation. Whether and which action plan will be actually undertaken is 
determined by an “outcome expectancy assessor”. This cognitive mechanism assesses the 
expectancies of action plans to be successful in regard of goal attainment by processing 
information about the current context and past actions in particular contexts. A simplified 
version of Weary and Edwards’ (1996) model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Chronic sources of uncertainty
Temporary sources of uncertainty
Uncertainty Beliefs
Cognitive Feelings of Uncertainty
Depressed/ 
Anxious Affect
Motive to Resolve Uncertainty
Goal Representation
Comparator
(Current and Desired State)
Action Plan
Assessor                          
(Outcome Expectancy)
Satisfaction?
Pleasant Affect
& Deactivation
of Goal
no
yes
 
Figure 1. Causal uncertainty model adapted by Weary and Edwards (1996, p.153).  
 
In accordance to the causal uncertainty model, Weary and Jacobson (1997) 
demonstrated that individuals who feel chronically uncertain process information more 
systematically than chronically certain individuals. In addition, Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, 
and Tobin (2001) found that chronic and temporarily induced causal uncertainty beliefs led to 
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more effortful processing of individuated information rather than stereotype usage on target 
judgments compared to control conditions. Thus, certainty promoted lower, whereas 
uncertainty promoted higher cognitive elaboration. 
2.3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Research demonstrated that uncertainty is mainly aversive and activates the motive of its 
resolution. Uncertainty can be elicited by a variety of contextual factors that challenge self-
certainty. As uncertainty often stems from the physical and social environment, nearly 
everyone is prone to subjective feelings of uncertainty. It has been argued that the need for 
security and uncertainty resolution are fundamental and primary. Reducing uncertainty can 
take many different forms such as the employment of secondary motives, the striving for 
social integration and group identification, or compensatory conviction. According to Weary 
and Edwards’ (1996) model which strategy is employed depends on the expectancy that it 
will be successful in uncertainty reduction. Drawing on this model, in the present dissertation 
it is assumed that uncertainty leads to a weighing process of the different expectancies of 
action plans to be successful in regard of uncertainty reduction. It is hypothesized that this 
process is responsible for the authoritarian reaction. 
2.4 Self-Esteem – The Individual Predisposition 
In section 2.1.2 it is proposed that threat does not increase everyone’s authoritarianism but 
interacts with individual predispositions to result in an authoritarian reaction. Stenner (2005) 
argues that in low threatening situations individuals should not differ in their democratic 
positions, but they will “sharply diverge” (p. 323) under threat. According to the sufficiency 
principle (Chaiken et al., 1989), individuals process information as extensively as necessary 
in a given situation. Under conditions of certainty there is no need to exhibit high cognitive 
elaboration and, therefore, individuals in general should rely on pre-existing standard beliefs 
and values. Under uncertainty, however, the motive to resolve uncertainty is activated and 
individuals engage in a process of weighing expectancies of different action plans to be 
successful in uncertainty resolution (Weary & Edwards, 1996).  It can be argued that this is 
the critical process in which individuals can differ from one another.  
This process can be generalized in an expectancy-value model (e.g., Vroom, 1964). 
The motivation (force) to perform a certain behavior (action plan) is determined by (a) the 
expectancy that one is able to perform a desired behavior and (b) the belief that this behavior 
leads, in turn, to a certain outcome (both considered by the outcome expectancy assessor), 
as well as by the value ascribed to this outcome (comparator of current and desired state). 
Thus, there are three questions to be answered: (a) Do I believe that I can successfully 
perform a behavior? (b) Will the successful performance of the behavior actually lead to 
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uncertainty reduction? and (c) How strong is my desire for uncertainty reduction? The first 
two of the three components (a) and (b) are beliefs regarding behavior and outcomes that 
are conceptually distinct but can be combined to the variable of “Expectancy”. The third 
component (c) describes the motivational “Value” of the outcomes associated with the 
behavior. The motivation (force) to perform a behavior (action plan), then, is a multiplicative 
function of the resulting expectancy and value: F = f[∑(E x V)].  
The expectancy (a) that one is able to perform a certain behavior is high when a 
person has a feeling of confidence that is the subjective sense of conviction about one’s 
beliefs, opinions and by this about one’s behaviors (Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995; Petty, 
Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007). The expectancy (b) that a behavior will elicit certain 
outcomes is high when a person has a feeling of control that is the belief that one can affect 
things and change outcomes or situations in predictable ways (Langer, 1975; Tan & Lipe, 
1997; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). The repeated 
exposure to uncontrollable outcomes can cause individuals to believe that action and 
outcome are independent -a belief that can lead to the phenomenon of learned helplessness 
(Seligman, 1975), that is individuals perceive that they also cannot control other important 
outcomes and show decreased effort in subsequent situations. Confidence and control are 
related in that both seem to be reassuring and to promote feelings of being an effective actor 
in one’s social context (Spreitzer & Mishra, 1999).  
The crucial individual difference variable for the perceived amount of confidence and 
control is self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Whereas individuals with high self-esteem 
(high SEs) perceive high levels of confidence in and control over their actions, individuals 
with low self-esteem (low SEs) perceive a lack of both (Brockner et al., 1998; Greenberg et 
al., 1997; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Koper, Van 
Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, & Vermunt, 1993; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Rosenberg, 1979;  
Smith & Tyler, 1997). In consequence, the expectancy that one is able to successfully 
perform an action plan and that this performance will actually reduce uncertainty should be 
stronger for high than low SEs. In the present dissertation it is hypothesized that these 
differential expectancies cause differential reactions to uncertainty reflected by changes in 
leadership evaluations. High SEs are assumed to become more democratic, whereas low 
SEs are expected to become more authoritarian.  
This section starts out by reviewing research on the general differences between high 
and low SEs (2.4.1). Second, research on differential reactions to voice of high and low SEs 
is addressed (2.4.2), and third, research that found differences on affective and cognitive 
measures due to different self-esteem levels is considered (2.4.3). The section closes with a 
summary and conclusions for the present research project (2.4.4). 
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2.4.1 High versus Low Self-Esteem 
One of the most significant personality dimensions in which individuals differ from one 
another is the trait of self-esteem. Although a variety of definitions of self-esteem exists, most 
agree that this trait refers to the individuals’ degree of liking or disliking of themselves. Thus, 
the essence of self-esteem is the evaluative component of the self and “a self-reflexive 
attitude that is the product of viewing the self as an object of evaluation” (Campbell & 
Lavallee, 1993, p.4). Individuals derive their self-views by observing how others behave 
towards them (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), their own behavior (e.g., Bem, 1972), and 
how others perform in comparison to them (e.g., Festinger, 1954).  
A number of studies demonstrated that differences in self-esteem have implications for 
various psychological, social, health, and well-being outcomes throughout the life span 
(Harter, 1999). Several prospective studies conducted with children, adolescents, and young 
adults found that low self-esteem increases the probability of a wide range of unfavorable 
outcomes and experiences such as depression, eating disorders, teenage pregnancy, 
victimization, problems with and in close relationships, antisocial behavior, substance use, 
and suicide (for reviews, see DuBois & Tevendale, 1999)(for reviews, see DuBois & 
Tevendale, 1999; Emler, 2001). Two recent longitudinal studies that controlled for 
methodological problems criticized in previous research (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & 
Vohs, 2003) showed that low self-esteem predicted depression, anxiety disorders, tobacco 
dependence, criminal convictions, dropping out of school, money and work problems 
(Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Trzesniewski et al., 2006).  
Similarly, intervention programs designed to improve self-esteem positively affected not only 
self-esteem but also standardized test scores, and negatively the number of disciplinary 
school reports, as well as the amount of drug and alcohol use (e.g., DuBois & Flay, 2004; 
Haney & Durlak, 1998)). Improvements in self-esteem also appear to contribute to the 
effectiveness of a range of other types of interventions, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy 
(Shirk, Burwell, & Harter, 2003), mentoring programs (Rhodes, 2002), and school reform 
initiatives (Cauce, Comer, & Schwartz, 1987). Thus, self-esteem is an important variable that 
predicts more problematic outcomes in various domains for low SEs than for high SEs. 
High SEs differ from low SEs in the way they think, feel, and behave. Whereas high 
SEs encompass a positive self-view (Baumeister et al., 2003; Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & 
Ross, 2001), are optimistic (e.g., Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
and believe that they are superior to others in many domains (Brown, 1986), low SEs hold a 
negative attitude toward themselves (Baumeister, 1993; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991;  
Rosenberg, 1979) . Their self-concepts are more uncertain, incoherent and fluctuating 
(Baumeister, 1993; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993) and they are less self-confident than high 
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SEs, especially following an initial failure (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). As low levels of 
perceived expertise, competence, or confidence in any domain substantially increase one’s 
susceptibility to external influence in that domain (e.g., Campbell, Tesser, & Fairey, 1986), 
Brockner (1983) argues that low SEs are more susceptible to external cues and social 
influence than high SEs.  
It is noteworthy that ratings on self-esteem scales typically show skewed distributions 
with average scores above the midpoint (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Thus, the 
majority of individuals classified as low SEs can only be interpreted as relatively but not 
absolutely low. Only a small minority (e.g., depressives) thinks of themselves as being 
worthless, most individuals describe themselves in intermediate or positive terms. 
2.4.2 Self-Esteem and Voice 
As already pointed out in chapter 2.2.2 the concept of voice is strongly related to the 
distinction of authoritarian and democratic leadership. Voice is defined as “the extent to 
which people are allowed to provide input in the decision process” (Brockner et al., 1998, 
p.394) and the main difference between authoritarian and democratic leadership is the 
amount of participation granted by the leader (Bass, 1990). 
Brockner and colleagues (1998) investigated whether high and low SEs are 
differentially influenced by perceived levels of voice. The authors found in four field studies 
and one laboratory experiment that voice was more positively related to various dependent 
variables among high SEs than low SEs. The field studies examined the interactional impact 
of voice and self-esteem on the organizational support of job layoffs’ survivors, on 
organizational identification after a major cost-cutting initiative, and on satisfaction with 
interpersonal encounters. In the laboratory experiment beliefs about one’s capability to 
provide meaningful input and the opportunity of voice were experimentally manipulated and 
their effect on the satisfaction with the decision reached was assessed. All five studies 
provided converging evidence that self-esteem had a moderating influence on voice 
perceptions. The laboratory study, in addition, suggests that the responsible factor for the 
moderating influence of self-esteem on voice is the belief about one’s capability of providing 
meaningful input.  
Brockner and colleagues (1998) draw on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) in order to 
explain their results. They argue that individuals who are more confident that they are 
capable of providing input in the decision making process and that their input will lead to 
important and valued outcomes should be more motivated to have voice. Brockner (1988) 
showed that high SEs are more confident about their viewpoints and their actions than low 
SEs who do not believe that their own behavior makes a difference. Consistently, Brockner 
and colleagues (1998) argue that high SEs are more confident in their capability to provide 
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meaningful input in a decision making process and that they are therefore more motivated to 
have voice. This motivation was reflected by the result that the perceived level of granted 
voice had a greater and more positive impact on high SEs than on low SEs.  
2.4.3 Self-Esteem and Affective and Cognitive Measures 
The study by Brockner and colleagues (1998) illustrates the important role of self-esteem as 
a moderating influence on voice that in turn is closely related to authoritarian and democratic 
leadership. Research on the motives of self-enhancement and self-verification demonstrated 
that the individual-difference variable of self-esteem not only influences reactions to voice but 
also leads to differential effects on different affective and cognitive measures.  
Self-enhancement theory argues that individuals wish to feel good about themselves 
and therefore seek positive evaluations from others (Jones, 1973; M. B. Smith, 1968). They 
desire to maintain, protect and enhance the positivity of their self-esteem (for an overview, 
see Baumeister et al., 1989; Leary, 2007). According to self-consistency theory, on the other 
hand, individuals are motivated to maintain consistent attitudes about themselves (Swann, 
1983). They seek evaluations that match and confirm their self-views (their thoughts and 
feelings about themselves) because self-views provide a means to organize experiences in a 
coherent way, to predict future events and to guide behavior (cf. Lecky, 1945).  
According to Blaine and Crocker (1993) the main difference between these two 
theories lies in their predictions regarding high and low SEs’ preferences for evaluative 
feedback. For high SEs, both self-enhancement and self-consistency coincide. As they hold 
a positive self-view, they prefer positive feedback that is simultaneously self-enhancing and 
self-consistent. In contrast, for low SEs these motives conflict. According to their self-
enhancement motive they desire and seek positive feedback, but as they hold a negative 
self-view they only believe in neutral or even negative feedback that is consistent with their 
self-view. Shrauger (1975) proposed that this conflict between feelings and thoughts is 
reflected on affective and cognitive measures. Consistently, both high and low SEs were 
found to show greater preference for positive than negative feedback on affective dependent 
variables such as liking for an evaluator. On cognitive measures such as causal attribution 
for, memory of, and credibility judgments of evaluative feedback, however, high SEs showed 
greater acceptance of positive than negative feedback, relative to low SEs (for an overview, 
see Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Thus, high SEs like 
and believe positive feedback more than negative feedback, whereas low SEs like favorable 
evaluations but do not believe that they are accurate and are therefore more inclined to 
accept negative feedback that is consistent with their self-views. 
Brockner and colleagues (1993) again draw an explanation for this phenomenon from 
expectancy theory (e.g., Vroom, 1964). They argue that low SEs perceive a discrepancy 
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between what they want and what they expect. Thus, although they desire to feel good and 
value outcomes that increase their self-esteem, they have low expectations that they will be 
able to perform these self-enhancing behaviors. Due to these differential motivational and 
cognitive processes, the desire to feel good leads to self-enhancing tendencies on affective 
measures, whereas negative expectations lead to self-consistency effects on cognitive 
measures. In contrast, for high SEs self-enhancement and self-consistency tendencies go 
together resulting in similar effects on both cognitive and affective measures regardless of 
the underlying processes. 
2.4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
Self-esteem is an important variable that predicts more problematic outcomes in various 
psychological, social, health and well-being domains for low SEs than for high SEs. Whereas 
high SEs hold positive self-views, are optimistic and self-confident, low SEs have negative 
attitudes toward themselves, hold uncertain self-concepts and are less confident of their 
abilities. Brockner and colleagues (1998) argue that this difference in self-confidence is also 
reflected in higher expectancies of high SEs than low SEs to provide meaningful input in 
decision making processes. Consistently, they found that voice had stronger effects on high 
SEs relative to low SEs. Interestingly, the studies by Brockner and colleagues (1998) were 
conducted in social contexts that encompass the potential of uncertainty, threat or conflict 
such as layoffs, cost-cutting initiatives and interpersonal encounters. Thus, high and low SEs 
might not have differed in their reactions to voice under conditions of certainty.  
From these results and Weary and Edwards’ (1996) model of uncertainty resolution 
taken together, it can be hypothesized that under uncertainty different action plans are 
activated and weight in regard of their expectancy to successfully reduce uncertainty. As 
uncertainty is aversive for high and low SEs they should both have a strong desire to reduce 
it. However, as high SEs are more self-confident and have a stronger feeling of control than 
low SEs, they have a higher expectancy that they can successfully perform the behavior and 
that their actions make a difference. Under uncertainty high SEs should therefore want to 
maximize their input and hence prefer a democratic leader. Low SEs, in contrast, do not 
believe that they can perform an action plan and that their behavior will lead to uncertainty 
reduction. They should therefore prefer to minimize their input and place the responsibility for 
decisions on someone else, hence prefer an authoritarian leader. Thus, in the present 
dissertation it is hypothesized that under uncertainty, high SEs stronger prefer democratic 
and low SEs stronger prefer authoritarian leadership than under certainty.  
Research on self-enhancement and self-consistency motives showed differences 
between high and low SEs on cognitive but not on affective measures. Both high and low 
SEs like positive evaluative feedback, but whereas high SEs also believe in such feedback 
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low SEs do not because it is inconsistent with their self-views. Democratic leadership (or 
voice) communicates appreciation and respect (see 2.2.2) and by this satisfies the desire for 
self-enhancement. On an affective dimension, therefore, both high and low SEs should like 
democratic leadership more than authoritarian leadership regardless of certainty or 
uncertainty. However, under conditions of uncertainty, only high SEs believe that they can 
successfully reduce uncertainty whereas low SEs do not. As the outcomes of democratic 
leadership depend per definition on the input of its group members (see 2.2.1), the 
association between democratic leadership and success should be consistent with the self-
view of high SEs, but inconsistent with the self-view of low SEs. Instead, low SEs should 
believe that it is better to place the whole responsibility on the leader. Due to their differential 
expectancies to provide meaningful input for uncertainty reduction, high SEs should believe 
democratic leadership (voice) and low SEs authoritarian leadership (no voice) to be more 
successful to reduce uncertainty reflected on cognitive success measures. Responses on 
affective measures are generated differently than responses on cognitive measures as the 
former draw on feelings and the latter on beliefs. As high and low SEs are not expected to 
differ in their feelings but in their expectancy beliefs, in line with previous research high and 
low SEs should differ on cognitive but not on affective measures. 
2.5 Power – The (Re-) Solution 
The first goal of the present dissertation is to unravel the conditions under which individuals 
prefer authoritarian over democratic leadership. In the sections outlined above, uncertainty 
and a low level of self-esteem were suggested as situational and individual risk factors for an 
authoritarian reaction. The next question is: How can the authoritarian reaction of low SEs be 
prevented? It seems difficult or even impossible to keep individuals from external threats so 
that anyone is prone to subjective feelings of uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty cannot be 
circumvented in all situations of life. Global self-esteem is a trait that is quite stable and, 
therefore, difficult to change (e.g., Baumeister, 1993). However, what might be changed is 
the process that leads to the authoritarian reaction, above formalized as an expectancy-value 
model: (a) Do I believe that I can successfully perform a behavior to reduce uncertainty? (b) 
Will the successful performance of the behavior actually lead to uncertainty reduction? and 
(c) How strong is my desire to reduce uncertainty?  
As uncertainty reduction is a primary motive (see 2.3.2), the desire to resolve 
uncertainty (value component) should be very strong. Thus, in order to prevent low SEs from 
their authoritarian reaction one has to enhance their expectancies (a) that they can perform 
an action plan and (b) that their behavior will lead to uncertainty reduction. In other words, 
one has to enhance their sense of (a) confidence and of (b) control (see 2.4). “Power may be 
defined as the production of intended effects” (Russel, 1938, p. 35) or can be understood as 
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“the basic energy needed to initiate and sustain action. …the capacity to translate intention 
into reality and sustain it.” (Bennis & Nanus, 1985, p. 17) and by this power provides both 
feelings of confidence and control. This capacity is not static, but can change from situation 
to situation (Ellyson & Dovidio, 1985; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and 
Magee (2003) suggest that “the concepts and behavioral tendencies associated with power 
are activated whenever the possession of power is implied, consciously or nonconsciously, in 
a new situation, or even when an experience with power is simply recalled” (p. 454). Thus, 
power seems to be a promising candidate for the present purpose of changing the 
individual’s reactions to uncertainty. In the following, research on effects of power on 
behavior (2.5.1) and on information processing (2.5.2) is reviewed. The section closes with a 
summary and conclusions for the present research project (2.5.3). 
2.5.1 Power and its Impact on Behavior 
Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) defined power “as an individual’s relative capacity 
to modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” 
(p. 265). Thus, power refers to the ability to influence others and to control their outcomes 
(Emerson, 1962; Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Lewin, 1951; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) through 
different sources, such as coercion, expertise, authority, referent power, and rewards 
(French & Raven, 1959). Power can be conceptualized as a continuum with the two 
opposing poles of lower and higher power relative to the power of others. Powerful 
individuals have access to resources and by this have control over their own outcomes. They 
perceive freedom from constraints and can act with their own free will without fearing serious 
social consequences. Powerless individuals, in contrast, have less access to resources and 
have to live with social threats, punishments, and the awareness of dependency and 
constraints (Keltner et al., 2003; Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006). Keltner and colleagues 
(2003), therefore, propose that power is an important determinant of approach and inhibition 
tendencies. They argue that high power is associated with positive affect, with attention to 
rewards and opportunities, with automatic information processing, and with disinhibited 
behavior. Low power, in contrast, is associated with negative affect, with attention to 
punishment, threat, the interests of others, with controlled, deliberative information 
processing, and with inhibited social behavior.  
Empirical evidence suggests that power increases confidence in one’s thoughts and 
perspectives. Anderson and Galinsky (2006), for example, showed that individuals with a 
higher sense of power were more optimistic in perceiving risks and showed more risky 
behavior. In three experiments Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) demonstrated that 
power increased action orientation. Compared to powerless individuals, powerful individuals 
were more likely to take a card in a simulated game of blackjack, to act against an annoying 
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stimulus (a fan), and to take action in a social dilemma regardless of consequences. In 
addition, Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, and Liljenquist (2008) showed that high-
power individuals were less influenced by situational and interpersonal pressures than low-
power individuals. That is, powerful relative to powerless individuals showed reduced 
recourse to salient examples during the generation of creative ideas, conformed less to the 
attitudes of others about a tedious task, were more influenced by their social values than by 
the reputation of an opponent in a negotiation, and perceived greater choice in making a 
counter-attitudinal speech and by this experienced higher levels of cognitive dissonance 
reflected by the change in their post-speech attitudes 
2.5.2 Power and Information Processing 
A growing body of research indicates that high power leads to less extensive information 
processing, relative to low power. Consistently, Weick and Guinote (2008) showed that a 
sense of power makes individuals more sensitive to their subjective experiences during 
judgmental processes. Across studies, powerful compared to powerless individuals relied 
more on the experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval in their judgments about such different 
targets as attitudes, leisure-time satisfaction, and stereotypes. These effects were persistent 
over time and were not mediated by mood, quality of content information, or number of 
counterarguments.  
Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, and Becerra (2007) demonstrated that having power 
increased general confidence in oneself and found that when power was induced prior to 
persuasive messages, powerful compared to powerless individuals showed reduced 
information processing and relied more on pre-existing views. When power was induced after 
information processing, powerful compared to powerless individuals relied more on the 
recently generated thoughts. Briñol and colleagues (2007) conclude that enhancing power 
increases self-confidence and that this self-confidence validates the mental contents that are 
accessible in a specific situation.  
In line with the assumption that power promotes a simplified processing orientation, it 
has been demonstrated that powerful individuals are more prone to stereotypical thinking 
(Fiske, 1993). Stereotypes are culturally defined beliefs that facilitate social perception 
because of highly accessible associations between a given social group and its members 
with specific traits or behaviors. Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, and Yzerbyt (2000) demonstrated 
that powerful individuals engage in two different stereotyping processes: increasing attention 
to stereotype-consistent information (stereotyping by design) and decreasing attention to 
stereotype-inconsistent information (stereotyping by default). However, Overbeck and Park 
(2001) found that although powerful individuals rely more on stereotypes (e.g., Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996) this is not the case when attention to individuating information is relevant for 
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goal pursuit. They demonstrated that powerful compared to powerless individuals were better 
at remembering information about interaction partners that was relevant for their interaction 
goals. In addition, Vescio, Snyder, and Butz (2003) showed that powerful individuals only rely 
on stereotypes about their subordinates when they were useful for social influence strategies 
towards these subordinates, that is, goal attainment. Thus, powerful individuals seem to 
process information efficiently and sufficiently in accordance with their predominant goals. 
Consistently, across three experiments employing basic cognition tasks, Guinote 
(Guinote, 2007a) demonstrated that powerful individuals were better at distinguishing 
relevant from irrelevant information and therefore showed greater attentional flexibility than 
powerless individuals that were more distracted by peripheral information. Guinote (2007b) 
argues that because power heightens the ability to focus attention and to inhibit distracting 
information, it promotes goal-directed behavior. In four studies she investigated the influence 
of power on the different phases of goal pursuit. Results showed that powerful compared to 
powerless individuals needed less time and information to make a decision regarding their 
preferred course of action, were faster at initiating goal-directed behavior, persisted longer 
and showed more flexible strategies in goal pursuit when confronted with obstacles, and 
responded more readily to good opportunities for goal pursuit. Overall, power facilitated 
prioritization of focal goals and their undisrupted pursuit resulting in goal-consistent behavior.  
2.5.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Power is an important means to influence and to get control over others. Powerful individuals 
are more confident of themselves, perceive more freedom from constraints and control over 
their outcomes. As a consequence, powerful individuals act more readily with their own free 
will without fearing serious social consequences in comparison to powerless individuals. In 
order to increase predictability and control powerless individuals have to pay attention to 
multiple sources of information and to engage in interpretative reasoning. Powerful 
individuals do not perceive these constraints and can devote their undivided attention to goal 
pursuit. They tend to rely more on general knowledge structures as stereotypes, subjective 
experiences, or pre-existing views and values, but it cannot be concluded that powerful 
individuals in general lack the capacity or motivation to process information more extensively. 
It is more plausible that powerful individuals distribute their attention according to a 
sufficiency principle, i.e. they elaborate as extensively as is necessary for goal attainment.  
As outlined in section 2.4 low SEs tend to like themselves less than high SEs and hold 
more uncertain and confused self-concepts. As a consequence, they perceive a lack of 
confidence in their beliefs and of control over situations and outcomes. In the present 
dissertation it is argued that it is this subjective lack that makes low SEs prone to the 
authoritarian reaction. Although it is possible to change global self-esteem this is difficult, 
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takes time and requires extensive intervention programs (DuBois & Flay, 2004; Haney & 
Durlak, 1998). Power provides both general confidence and a sense of control and by this 
promotes feelings of being an effective actor. Therefore, power should enhance the 
expectancy that one is able to perform a behavior and that this behavior will lead to the 
desired outcome. With regard to the present research question low SEs should become 
more democratic because they now believe that their voice is meaningful.  
Self-esteem and power are two different concepts. As outlined above, self-esteem is an 
attitude one holds towards oneself that can be expressed as liking or disliking of oneself (see 
2.4). Power, on the other hand, is conceived as a basic energy or capacity to produce 
intended effects (see 2.5). Although conceptually different, self-esteem and power have been 
shown to be related to perceived confidence and control. Low SEs perceive low levels of 
confidence and control, high power is a resource to restore this lack and by this can prevent 
low SEs from their authoritarian reaction. 
2.6 Implicit Processes – The Assessment 
Although there is a long tradition in the development of dispositional authoritarianism 
measures (see 2.1.1), previous research concentrated on authoritarian ideologies and 
politically conservative attitudes in general. Answers on such measures are always guided by 
general belief systems and, in consequence, authoritarianism scales often have the problem 
that they are not independent of conservative ideology. In addition, due to strong democratic 
values in Western societies expressing authoritarian attitudes conflicts with social desirability 
motivations. A problem that is also evident for explicit evaluations of authoritarian and 
democratic leaders. Implicit measures provide a means to assess the initial, unadulterated 
attitudes. In the following, implicit measures and, in particular, the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) are introduced (2.6.1). Theoretical models of the underlying implicit processes are 
presented (2.6.2), and research on changes in implicit attitudes is reviewed (2.6.3). 
2.6.1 Implicit Measures 
Attitudes cannot be directly observed. They are usually inferred from deliberative, self-report 
measures directly asking for evaluations or from indirect observations of responses assumed 
to be related to attitudes. These explicit attitudes are often assessed as summary 
evaluations typically measured by unidimensional scales assessing positivity or negativity of 
feelings, or on attitude scales containing a number of items. Responses to direct measures 
require interpretations of questions, retrieval, or construction of evaluations, and translations 
of responses into given answer formats. On all steps of this answering process the response 
can be influenced and biased. Verbal measures can represent many different aspects of 
attitudes, but they imply that individuals have accurate and complete access to their own 
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attitudes. This is not always the case (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and even when access is 
possible, individuals are not always motivated to reveal their opinions (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, 
& Saxe, 1980). Therefore, explicit measures have two main limitations. First, they are 
dependent on introspection. Second, they can be biased by self-presentational motivations 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
Implicit measures aim to assess processes that are automatically instigated by the 
attitude object and to circumvent correctional processes caused by social desirability. Thus, 
they try to tap mechanisms respondents are not willing to report directly, or of which they 
may not even be aware. Research on automatic processes has produced a large variety of 
measures (de Houwer, 2003a; Fazio & Olson, 2003) such as affective priming procedures 
(Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), semantic priming (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 
1997), the go/no-go association task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the extrinsic affective Simon 
task (de Houwer, 2003b), and the affect misattribution paradigm (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005). One of the most prominent representatives of implicit measures is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), developed by Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz (1998). 
2.6.1.1 Implicit Association Test 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) is an unobtrusive measure to 
assess the strength of associations between target concepts and attribute dimensions. 
Originally a measure developed in the field of social psychology (e.g., Rudman, Greenwald, 
Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999), the IAT has become relevant in a broad range of fields, i.e. in 
personality psychology (e.g., Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002), clinical psychology (e.g., 
Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001), consumer psychology (e.g., Maison, Greenwald, & 
Bruin, 2001), health psychology (e.g., Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong, 2002) 
developmental psychology (e.g., Skowronski & Lawrence, 2001), gerontology (e.g., 
Hummert, Garstka, O'Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002), and neuropsychology (e.g., Phelps 
et al., 2000). 
The IAT is a computer based discrimination task that requires participants to categorize 
stimuli as fast as possible to two dichotomous dimensions. The classic example is 
Greenwald and colleagues’ (1998) IAT assessing implicit preferences towards African and 
Caucasian Americans. Participants assigned names (e.g., “Latonya” or “Betsy”) presented on 
a computer screen via two response keys to the target categories “black” or “white”. 
Alternating to this task, they sorted positive and negative attribute stimuli (e.g., “gift” or 
“poison”) to the categories “pleasant” or “unpleasant”. Crucial for the IAT are two different 
combinations of these discrimination tasks: compatible or incompatible combinations in the 
sense of the associations to be measured. Thus, in the compatible block, participants used 
the same response key for typical white names and pleasant items, and the other key for 
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typical black names and unpleasant items (stereotype consistent). In the incompatible block, 
key assignments were exchanged so that responses to black names and pleasant stimuli 
were assessed with the same key and responses to white names and unpleasant stimuli with 
the other (stereotype inconsistent). The crucial dependent variable is the IAT effect, i.e. the 
difference of the mean response latencies between the compatible and the incompatible 
block. Greenwald and Nosek (2001) stated that “If two concepts are highly associated, the 
IAT’s sorting tasks will be easier when the two associated concepts share the same 
response than when they require different responses” (p. 85). Therefore, from the differences 
in response times the strength of the underlying associations between concepts is inferred. 
In the experiment by Greenwald and colleagues (1998), participants showed faster 
responses in the compatible than in the incompatible block and the resulting positive 
difference was interpreted as an associative preference for white over black persons.  
Research conducted since the classic study of Greenwald and colleagues (1998) has 
shown that the IAT meets relevant psychometric criteria (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2007; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; Rudman et al., 1999). IAT measures typically show 
high internal consistencies between .70 and .90 (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005; Nosek et al., 2007). The test-retest reliabilities, however, showed only a 
median of .56 across different studies (Nosek et al., 2007) and they seem to be relatively 
unaffected by the time span of retest. IAT measures are relatively insensitive to variations in 
the number of trials, the number of items per category, and the time interval between trials 
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Further advantages of the IAT are relatively high effect 
sizes (Greenwald et al., 1998), robustness, as well as relatively simple and flexible 
application. In addition, recent meta-analyses over various domains (including self-concept, 
attitude, and stereotypes) revealed average correlations between IATs and explicit self-
reports of r = .24 (Hofmann et al., 2005), r = .37 (Nosek et al., 2005), and r = .36 (Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji, manuscript submitted for publication). These small to 
moderate positive correlations speak against complete independence of the constructs 
assessed by explicit and implicit measures. However, effect sizes showed a high variability of 
correlations. Fazio and Olson (2003) argue that the degree of correspondence between 
implicit and explicit measures depends on the social sensitivity of the domain. They state that 
“The more sensitive the domain, the greater the likelihood that motivational factors will be 
evoked and exert some influence on overt responses to an explicit measure” (Fazio & Olson, 
2003, p. 304). Thus, the more socially controversial an attitude object is the lower are the 
correlations between implicit and explicit measures. 
Theoretical Part   
 
35
2.6.2 Theoretical Models of Implicit Processes 
2.6.2.1 Dual Attitude Model  
Explicit and implicit measures have been suggested to measure different underlying 
processes. In their dual attitude model, Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) distinguish 
between explicit and implicit attitudes that can coexist in memory. Drawing on Greenwald 
and Banaji’s (1995) definition of implicit attitudes as “introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) traces of past experiences” (p. 5), Wilson and colleagues (2000) 
referred to implicit attitudes as “evaluations that (a) have an unknown origin (i.e., people are 
unaware of the basis of their evaluation), (b) are activated automatically, and (c) influence 
implicit responses, namely, uncontrollable responses and ones that people do not view as an 
expression of their attitude and thus do not attempt to control.” (p. 104) Thus, they argue that 
explicit attitudes are expressed at conscious level whereas implicit attitudes are often outside 
awareness. Once formed, implicit attitudes are automatically activated when encountering an 
attitude object and by this represent stable default attitudes. In contrast, explicit attitudes are 
conceived as more recently acquired attitudes that coexist with the old implicit attitudes. 
More capacity and motivation is required to retrieve explicit attitudes from memory, but when 
retrieved the explicit attitude can override the implicit one. Nevertheless, the implicit attitude 
still exists and influences implicit responses. 
2.6.2.2 Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model 
In their associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
(2006) propose that implicit and explicit attitudes should be understood in terms of their 
underlying mental processes, namely associative and propositional evaluations. Associative 
evaluations are considered as the basis for implicit attitudes and are defined as “automatic 
affective reactions resulting from the particular associations that are activated automatically 
when one encounters a relevant stimulus” (p. 693). In contrast, propositional evaluations are 
considered as the basis for explicit attitudes, defined as “evaluative judgments that are based 
on syllogistic inferences” (p. 694) and are “generally concerned with the validation of 
evaluations and beliefs” (p. 694). 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argue that associative processes are mere 
activation processes, whereas propositional processes refer to the validation of evaluations 
and beliefs. The qualitative distinction refers to the dependency on truth values. Associative 
evaluations are translated into a propositional format creating the basis for an explicit 
judgment if the association is not invalidated. Rejection, however, takes place when the 
propositional evaluation implied by the associative evaluation is inconsistent with other 
momentarily considered propositions.  
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The authors consider associative evaluations as purely affective, thus, representing the 
affective component of attitudes. In their comment on the APE model, Petty and Briñol 
(2006) challenge this assumption and argue that evaluative associations can be based on 
affect and cognition. They propose that at least some of the implicit measures can tap not 
only affective but also cognitively based reactions. Likewise, Albarracín and colleagues 
(2006) argue for the existence of implicit beliefs. 
In regard of the authoritarian reaction the associative process can be understood as 
the automatic activation of the concepts “authoritarian” and “success” as well as “democratic” 
and “failure”. This activation is quite fast and is not controlled for appropriateness. The 
propositional process translates this activational pattern into the propositional 
representations: “Authoritarian leadership is successful, whereas democratic leadership is 
not successful”, “Success is better than failure”, therefore “Authoritarian leadership is better 
than democratic leadership”. This syllogistic inference, however, is inconsistent with other 
propositions such as “Democratic principles are important values” and “It is bad to evaluate 
authoritarian leadership positively”. This inconsistency then may lead to the rejection of the 
associative processes as a valid basis for an explicit judgment. 
2.6.3 Changes in Implicit Processes 
The key question of the present dissertation is whether and how feelings of uncertainty 
influence evaluations of authoritarian and democratic leaders. In section 2.2.2 it is argued 
that leadership evaluations can be conceived as attitudes and research is reviewed 
demonstrating that explicit attitudes are not invariable but can be changed. Wilson and 
colleagues’ (2000) dual attitude model posits that implicit attitudes are stable and resistant to 
change. Even if explicit attitudes change, the implicit ones are assumed to remain as they 
are and coexist with the explicit ones. The dual attitude model can explain changes in explicit 
attitudes without changes in implicit attitudes but has problems to account for changes in 
implicit attitudes without changes in explicit attitudes that have been shown in a number of 
studies (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2006; for a 
review, see Blair, 2002).  
Solving this problem, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) propose in their APE model 
possible ways of changes in both propositional (explicit) and associative (implicit) processes. 
Changes in the propositional evaluations can be evoked by changes in associative 
evaluations described below, by other propositions considered at the time of judgment, or by 
additional propositions generated to resolve present inconsistencies between propositions. 
Changes in associative evaluations can be caused by an “incremental change in the 
associative structure” or a “temporal change in the activation of pre-existing patterns”             
(p. 697). Incremental changes of associations can be caused by evaluative conditioning 
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(EC); i.e. repeated pairing of an attitude object with positive or negative stimuli. Mitchell and 
colleagues (2003), for example, showed that pairing non-words with evaluative stimuli led to 
positive or negative implicit valence of these non-words on an IAT depending on the valence 
of the paired stimuli. Thus, pairing with positive stimuli led to a positive, pairing with negative 
stimuli led to a negative implicit valence of the non-word.  
Of higher importance for the present dissertation, however, are temporal changes in 
pattern activation. The question is whether temporary feelings of uncertainty can lead to 
implicit changes of leadership evaluations. For most attitude objects there exist different 
associations, for example authoritarian leadership can be associated with success and 
failure. Different situational cues, then, can activate different associative patterns. Thus, in 
certain situations, the association authoritarian + failure predominates for both high and low 
SEs. In uncertain situations, the link between authoritarian + success might be activated in 
low SEs whereas high SEs keep to the link between authoritarian + failure. Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) posit that the “activation of particular associations in memory is 
determined by the relative fit between (a) the pre-existing structure of associations in 
memory and (b) the particular set of external input stimuli” (p. 693).  
2.6.3.1 Empirical Evidence for Implicit Attitudes as Constructions  
Wilson and colleagues’ (2000) model of dual attitudes conceived implicit attitudes as stable 
evaluative representations. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), in contrast, regard 
associative evaluations as constructed on the spot insofar that different input stimuli may 
activate different associative patterns for a given attitude object. Therefore, according to the 
APE model implicit attitudes are highly sensitive to the particular context in which an attitude 
object is encountered and are not more stable or genuine than explicit attitudes. An 
extensive and growing body of research provides empirical evidence for this notion. 
Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), for example, presented participants with pictures of either 
liked or disliked familiar African and Caucasian Americans and subsequently conducted an 
implicit prejudice task. Participants exposed to pictures of liked African Americans and 
disliked Caucasian Americans showed lower implicit prejudice compared to participants 
primed with disliked African Americans and liked Caucasian Americans. Wittenbrink and 
colleagues (2001) as well as Barden and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that associative 
evaluations of African Americans depended on the context (family barbeque versus gang 
incident) and the social role (prisoner versus lawyer) exemplars were presented in. 
Consistent with these findings, Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) found differential 
associative evaluations of African Americans depending on the category they were assigned 
to. For example, categorization in terms of race versus other applicable categories such as 
occupation led to less versus more positive associative evaluations of African Americans on 
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two different implicit measures (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; go/no-go 
associations task; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).  
Similarly, Kühnen and colleagues (2001), for example, demonstrated that a mere 
priming of the subcategories East and West Germans (that are associated with negative 
versus positive stereotypes) was sufficient to induce stronger implicit preferences of West 
over East Germans in both East and West Germans. Steele and Ambady (2006) reported 
that women exhibited stronger implicit gender-stereotypical preferences for arts over math 
when gender categories were made salient prior to assessment compared to a priming 
condition with gender-neutral categories. In addition, some studies demonstrated that 
associative evaluations depend not only on external input stimuli but also on transient 
motivational and emotional states. Ferguson and Bargh (2004) reported that associative 
evaluations of an attitude object were dependent on its relevance for goal pursuit. Attitude 
objects were evaluated more positively when relevant than when irrelevant for achieving 
goals. DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cajdric (2004) observed that anger but not sadness 
enhanced negative associative evaluations of out-groups.  
In their comment on the APE model Albarracín and colleagues (2006) argue that 
temporal stability of goals varies and which goal is pursued at a given time is a function of 
the person and the situation. Attitudes that are associated with a certain goal should be goal-
dependent insofar that when the goal is active also the relevant attitudes are activated. When 
the goal is achieved or inactive, however, relevant attitudes are inhibited (Albarracin et al., 
2006). In line with these assumptions, Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, and Chassin (2003) 
reported more positive associative evaluations of cigarettes in heavy smokers after nicotine 
deprivation.  
Uncertainty resolution can be conceived as the primary goal under conditions of 
perceived uncertainty. This goal might be associated with different attitudes for high and low 
SEs. Whereas in high SEs democratic attitudes may be activated, in low SEs authoritarian 
attitudes may predominate under uncertainty. Under conditions of certainty, these attitudes 
are inhibited and both high and low SEs rely on general democratic beliefs.  
2.6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The use of explicit measures can evoke deliberative thinking and subsequently social 
desirable responses, making it difficult to unravel the hypothesized authoritarian tendencies 
under uncertainty. Implicit measures might solve this problem. One main representative of 
implicit measures is the IAT that has been shown to be a robust, reliable instrument with high 
effect sizes in regard of many different research topics. Results on implicit and explicit 
measures do not always converge. Therefore, in their model of dual attitudes, Wilson and 
colleagues (2000) distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes and argue that implicit 
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attitudes are stable default attitudes that are often outside awareness but nevertheless can 
have an impact on explicit attitudes. This model, however, cannot explain changes in implicit 
attitudes whereas explicit attitudes remain unchanged. In their APE model, Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) distinguish between associative and propositional evaluations and 
argue that both can be changed independent of each other. Temporary changes in 
activational patterns of associations can result from specific situational cues.  
Drawing on the assumptions of the APE model, in the present dissertation it is 
hypothesized that temporary feelings of uncertainty activate different associative patterns in 
high and low SEs: authoritarian patterns in low SEs and democratic patterns in high SEs. In 
order to unravel these differential patterns and measure the initial, unadulterated valence and 
success associations linked to the authoritarian and democratic concept, a valence and a 
success IAT are developed and employed in the present research project. 
2.7 Delineation of General Hypotheses 
The main objective of the present dissertation is to find an explanation for the phenomenon 
of self-imposed subordination. When and why do individuals fail to be autonomous and flee 
in the security of authoritarian leaders? What are the specific circumstances that result in an 
authoritarian appeal? 
A growing body of research provides empirical evidence for the link between 
authoritarianism and threat (see 2.1.2). Submission to the authorities is one of the main 
components of authoritarianism (see 2.1.1) and Oesterreich (2005) proposes that individuals 
respond to emotionally overtaxing feelings of uncertainty by seeking the security provided by 
authorities (see 2.1.3). Leaders are persons who seem to have the power and means to 
satisfy the desire for shelter and guidance in uncertain situations. Therefore, the present 
research especially focuses on evaluations of authoritarian and democratic leaders. The 
main difference between authoritarian and a democratic leadership is the amount of 
participation (see 2.2.1). In its extremity authoritarian leadership represents a clear hierarchy, 
whereas democratic leadership is characterized by granting voice in important decisions.  
Most studies in the field focus on the impact of situational factors on authoritarianism 
such as economic and political crisis and by this neglect the internal complements to external 
threats. To the extent that an external threat is ambiguous, unpredictable and associated 
with potential harm, however, it can cause feelings of uncertainty (Kagan, 1972; see 2.3.1). 
Uncertainty is aversive and its resolution is a primary human motive that can be satisfied by 
different strategies (see 2.3.2). Which strategy is chosen depends on a deliberative process 
of weighing the expectancies that a strategy will be successful in uncertainty resolution. 
Consistently, Weary and Edwards (1996) propose in their causal uncertainty model that 
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uncertainty motivates higher, whereas certainty promotes lower cognitive elaboration (e.g., 
Weary & Jacobson, 1997; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001; see 2.3.3).  
2.7.1 Uncertainty – The Situational Precondition 
The present dissertation, therefore, argues that under certainty individuals do not elaborate 
information extensively, but rely on the most accessible information. In Western cultures 
democratic principles are predominant social values often activated in the socialization 
process, and should therefore be highly accessible. Due to low cognitive elaboration under 
certainty, this highly accessible information should be used in the judgmental process without 
deeper elaboration and should result in a general preference for democratic over 
authoritarian leadership. In the following this effect is referred to as “democratic standard 
attitude”. Thus, the first hypothesis of the present dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Under conditions of certainty, individuals will show a democratic standard 
attitude, thus, will clearly prefer democratic over authoritarian leadership. 
 
As uncertainty states a threat to the fundamental need for security the motivation to 
resolve it has priority over all other needs. Different action plans are considered in respect of 
their potential to reduce uncertainty. These processes can be formalized in an expectancy-
value model: The choice between democratic and authoritarian leadership can be conceived 
as a choice between the two different behavioral alternatives of voice and no voice (see 
2.2.2). Which alternative is chosen depends on (a) individuals’ belief that they can 
successfully perform voice behavior, (b) their perception that voice will lead to uncertainty 
reduction, and (c) their judgment that uncertainty reduction is strongly desired and valued. 
Most individuals should place a high value on this outcome, but in regard of the expectancy 
components (a) and (b) individual differences in self-esteem level should become relevant. 
2.7.2 Self-Esteem – The Individual Predisposition 
Low SEs perceive a lack of self-confidence and do not have the feeling of control over the 
outcomes of their actions. Therefore, they should have a low expectation that they can 
successfully perform voice and that their voice contributes to the process of uncertainty 
reduction. Instead they should prefer having a leader make all the decisions for them and 
believe that the leader can better reduce uncertainty without their participation. Thus, the 
force to exhibit their voice is lower than to relinquish their voice, resulting in a preference for 
authoritarian leadership. It follows that low SEs should show a stronger preference for 
authoritarian leadership under uncertainty than under certainty. In the following this effect is 
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referred to as “authoritarian reaction”. Thus, the second hypothesis of the present 
dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Under uncertainty, low SEs will show an authoritarian reaction, thus, will show 
a stronger preference for authoritarian (relative to democratic) leadership than under 
certainty. 
 
High SEs, in contrast, are confident in themselves and have the feeling that they have 
control over the outcomes of their behavior (see 2.4). Therefore, they should have a strong 
expectation that they can successfully perform voice and that their voice contributes to the 
process of uncertainty reduction. They do not expect that having no voice resolves 
uncertainty. Thus, the force to exhibit their voice is stronger than to relinquish their voice, 
resulting in a striving for more influence best realized by democratic leadership. It follows that 
high SEs should show an even stronger preference for democratic leadership under 
uncertainty than under certainty. In the following this effect is referred to as “democratic 
reaction”. Thus, the third hypothesis of the present dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Under uncertainty, high SEs will show a democratic reaction, thus, will show a 
stronger preference for democratic (relative to authoritarian) leadership than under certainty. 
 
Figure 2 shows a schematic overview of Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3. The different 
behavioral tendencies of low and high SEs under uncertainty formalized by an expectancy-
value function is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Certainty
Uncertainty
Democratic Standard 
Attitude
Democratic Reaction
Authoritarian Reaction
High SEs
Low SEs
Expectancy x 
Value Model
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic overview of the general research assumptions.  
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Uncertainty
Low SEs
Fdemocratic = Evoice low x Vuncertainty reduction high
Fauthoritarian = Eno voice high x Vuncertainty reduction high
Evoice low x Vuncertainty reduction high < Eno voice high x Vuncertainty reduction high
Fdemocratic < Fauthoritarian
High SEs
Fdemocratic = Evoice high x Vuncertainty reduction high
Fauthoritarian = Eno voice low x Vuncertainty reduction high
Evoice high x Vuncertainty reduction high > Eno voice low x Vuncertainty reduction high
Fdemocratic > Fauthoritarian
F = Force to perform a certain behavior
E = Expectancy that one can successfully perform a behavior
and that the behavior leads to a certain outcome
V = Valence of the behavioral outcome
 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral tendencies of low and high SEs under uncertainty formalized in an expectancy-
value function.  
2.7.3 Valence and Success – A Specification 
Regarding leadership evaluations it is useful to distinguish between the two dimensions of 
valence (pleasant/ unpleasant) and success (success/ failure). Valence judgments refer to 
the feelings one has towards a certain leadership style and can be therefore considered as 
the affective attitude component. Success evaluations refer to the beliefs about how effective 
a leadership style is and by this represent the cognitive attitude component. In general, at 
least in Western cultures there is a clear aversion towards authoritarian and a preference for 
democratic leadership (2.2.2). Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 can be specified as follows: 
 
Specification of Hypothesis 1: Under conditions of certainty, individuals will show a 
democratic standard attitude, thus, will clearly prefer democratic over authoritarian leadership 
and this on affective valence and cognitive success measures. 
 
Affective and cognitive attitude components are not necessarily consistent and non-
ambivalent (see 2.2.3). Research on self-enhancement and self-consistency motives showed 
differences between high and low SEs on cognitive but not on affective measures. This is 
explained by a discrepancy between feelings and thoughts of low SEs, between what they 
feel and what they believe (see 2.4.3). As high and low SEs do not differ in their desire of 
self-enhancement and democratic leadership can satisfy this desire, both high and low SEs 
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should like democratic leadership more than authoritarian leadership regardless of certainty 
or uncertainty. However, high and low SEs differ in the self-views they hold and the success 
of democratic leadership depends per definition in part on its group members. Therefore, 
consistent with their self-view low SEs should believe authoritarian leadership and high SEs 
democratic leadership to be more successful to reduce uncertainty reflected on cognitive 
success measures. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 can be specified as follows: 
 
Specification of Hypothesis 2: Under uncertainty, low SEs will show an authoritarian reaction, 
thus, will show a stronger preference for authoritarian (relative to democratic) leadership than 
under certainty and this on cognitive success but not on affective valence measures. 
 
Specification of Hypothesis 3: Under uncertainty, high SEs will show a democratic reaction, 
thus, will show a stronger preference for democratic (relative to authoritarian) leadership than 
under certainty and this on cognitive success but not on affective valence measures. 
 
2.7.4 Power – The (Re-) Solution 
Power is an important means to influence others and get control over others’ and one’s own 
outcomes. Being aware of high power makes individuals more confident of themselves, let 
them perceive more freedom from constraints, and let them act more readily at their free will. 
Therefore, the expectancy to successfully reduce uncertainty should be enhanced for 
individuals that are aware of having high power compared to individuals that are unaware of 
their power or that are aware of having low power. As the authoritarian reaction of low SEs 
should be due to a lack of perceived confidence and control and salience of high power 
induces both, their expectancy that voice makes a difference should increase and by this 
cancel out the authoritarian reaction. In regard of the expectancy value function, this means 
higher motivation (force) to exhibit voice behavior (Fdemocratic) than to relinquish voice 
(Fauthoritarian). Thus, one can argue that the salience of high power increases the expectancy 
that voice is successful and at the same time decreases the expectancy that no voice is 
successful in reducing uncertainty for both high and low SEs resulting in a democratic 
reaction. The sufficiency principle states that individuals elaborate information only as 
extensively as necessary for goal attainment and that the amount of elaboration is 
determined by the level of confidence. Therefore, another possibility is that high power 
induces such a high level of confidence that high and low SEs do not engage in the process 
of weighing potential uncertainty reduction strategies for their success expectancies but 
instead rely on the most accessible strategy, that is, their democratic standard attitude. In 
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both cases the salience of high power, however, should prevent individuals from an 
authoritarian reaction. Thus, the fourth hypothesis of the present dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Under conditions of uncertainty, when feelings of high power are induced, low 
SEs will not show an authoritarian reaction. Two different results are possible: 
a) both high and low SEs will show a democratic reaction (for high SEs an increased 
one), thus, will show a stronger preference for democratic (relative to authoritarian) 
leadership than under certainty, or 
b) both high and low SEs rely on their general belief system and show a democratic 
standard attitude regardless of uncertainty or certainty. 
 
In contrast, individuals unaware of their power or being aware of having low power 
should have to engage in the search for uncertainty reduction strategies and the weighing 
expectancies process. Depending on their self-esteem level they should or should not 
believe in their ability to successfully resolve uncertainty resulting in a democratic reaction for 
high SEs and an authoritarian reaction for low SEs. Thus, the fifth hypothesis of the present 
dissertation is: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Under uncertainty, when individuals are unaware of power or aware of having 
low power, low SEs will show an authoritarian and high SEs a democratic reaction (as stated 
in Hypotheses 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 4 depicts a schematic overview of Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
 
Uncertainty
Democratic Reaction
Authoritarian Reaction
High SEs
Low SEs
High Power Salient
Power Not Salient
Low Power Salient
Authoritarian Reaction
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic overview of the impact of power on the authoritarian reaction.  
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2.7.5 Explicit versus Implicit – The Assessment 
For the purpose of the present research explicit measures were developed that discriminate 
valence from success evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership. The use of 
explicit measures, however, taps propositional thinking and can lead to social desirable 
responses, especially regarding evaluations of authoritarian leadership. Authoritarian 
tendencies should be in conflict with general democratic values and, therefore, positive 
associative evaluations of authoritarian leadership should be rejected as inaccurate for 
explicit judgments. Implicit measures provide the means to measure the initial, unadulterated 
associations linked to democratic and to authoritarian leadership. Therefore, the authoritarian 
reaction should be more pronounced on implicit than on explicit measures. 
2.7.6 Study Overview 
Study 1 is designed to test Hypothesis 1 that in the absence of uncertainty democratic is 
clearly preferred over authoritarian leadership regarding both valence and success. For the 
purpose of the present research project newly developed implicit (IAT’s) and explicit 
leadership measures that discriminate valence from success are validated. Study 2 aims at 
providing evidence for Hypothesis 2 that low SEs show an authoritarian reaction to perceived 
uncertainty. For this purpose dispositional self-uncertainty is made salient and the differential 
reactions of high and low SEs are assessed via the new implicit and explicit leadership 
measures. The subsequent studies put the full model to the test. In order to replicate the 
finding that low SEs exhibit an authoritarian reaction to uncertainty (Hypothesis 2) and to 
show in addition that high SEs instead exhibit a democratic reaction (Hypothesis 3), 
uncertainty is manipulated experimentally. Moreover, it is investigated whether perceiving 
high power is sufficient to cancel out the authoritarian reaction (Hypothesis 4), whereas 
perceiving low power leads to the same effects as being not aware of power (Hypothesis 5). 
In Study 3a, a new semi-implicit measure to assess power -namely the Spatial Power 
Measure- is developed and validated. In Study 3b, dispositional power is assessed via this 
new measure prior to an experimental priming of uncertainty in order to make dispositional 
power salient and implicit as well as explicit leadership measures are employed. Study 4 
aims at replicating the findings of Study 3 via an experimental priming of power. In Study 4a, 
the effect of imagining being in a leader versus a follower position is tested as a power prime 
by assessing the new power measure after the manipulation. In Study 4b, this power prime is 
induced after the experimental manipulation of uncertainty and the resulting leadership 
preferences on implicit and explicit measures are assessed. 
 
Empirical Part   
 
46
3 Empirical Part 
3.1 Study 1 – The Democratic Standard Attitude 
It has been shown that in sensitive domains such as prejudice and stereotypes, the 
correlations between implicit and explicit measures tend to be quite low (e.g., Fazio et al., 
1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Fazio and Olson (2003) posit that this is due to motivational 
factors that influence one’s overt responses on explicit measures. Strong democratic values 
in Western societies should also lead to social desirability effects on evaluations of 
authoritarian leadership. In line with Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006) APE model, it 
can be argued that even if the associative evaluation favors authoritarian over democratic 
leadership this automatic response would be rejected as a valid basis for explicit judgments 
during propositional reasoning because it conflicts with the general belief system of 
democratic values. In order to measure the initial, unadulterated valence and success 
associations linked to authoritarian and democratic leadership, for the present dissertation 
project two new implicit association tests -a valence and a success IAT- have been 
developed. The valence IAT assesses the association of authoritarian and democratic 
leadership with valence (pleasant vs. unpleasant), the success IAT addresses the 
association of authoritarian and democratic leadership with success (success vs. failure).  
Study 1 aims at testing Hypothesis 1 that in the absence of uncertainty, individuals 
clearly prefer democratic over authoritarian leadership regarding both valence and success. 
As democratic values are prevalent in Western cultures, it is hypothesized that in general 
participants favor democratic over authoritarian leadership. Thus, on average the standard 
attitude is expected to be a preference for democratic leadership. As a democratic 
preference does not conflict with general values this standard attitude should be expressed 
on explicit as well as implicit measures. Consistently, implicit and explicit measures are 
expected to correlate at least to some extent.  
To further validate these measures, the relation of explicit and implicit leadership 
evaluations with individual difference measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO) are investigated. Both scales have been shown to 
predict social-political phenomena such as prejudice, intolerance, support of right-wing 
political parties, and antidemocratic sentiment (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). However, there is a growing body of research indicating that the 
RWA and SDO scale tap different and relatively independent dimensions (Altemeyer, 1998; 
Duckitt, 2001). RWA items express beliefs in traditional norms, obedience to authorities and 
coercive social control. SDO represents a “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup 
relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus 
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hierarchical” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742) and assesses beliefs in social and economic 
inequality and the right of status high groups to dominate weaker ones. Thus, RWA rather 
refers to submissiveness towards authorities whereas SDO rather refers to dominance over 
others (Altemeyer, 1998).  
3.1.1 Method 
3.1.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and fifty participants completed the online survey. Nine participants were 
excluded from data analyses because of higher error rates than 21% on IAT completion 
(e.g., Bluemke & Friese, 2006) resulting in a total sample size of 141 participants. 
Participants were recruited by an online pool from the University of Mannheim. The 
advertisement informed them that they would take part in a 20 minute study that aims at 
validating new attitude and personality measures and would in return receive the chance to 
win one of 10 book coupons (worth 10 Euro each). 39 (28%) participants were male, 102 
(72%) female, aged 19 to 66 with an average age of 25.4 years (SD = 7.7). In the main part, 
students (121; 86%) of various disciplines participated. They were on average in the 5.4 
semester with a range from 1 to 22. The remaining 20 participants (24%) were employed or 
else. For the main part the fist language was German (130, 92%).  
3.1.1.2 Design 
In a within-subject design, participants were randomly assigned to different order conditions 
(Table 2). Half of the participants first completed the implicit and afterwards the explicit 
leadership measures, the other half first completed the explicit and then the implicit 
leadership measures. The order of valence and success evaluations within explicit and 
implicit measures was counterbalanced. Subsequently, all participants completed the RWA 
and the SDO scale. 
 
Table 2. Order conditions of implicit and explicit leadership measures in Study 1 
 
Valence IAT – Success IAT Success IAT – Valence IAT 
 Explicit Valence – 
Explicit Success 
Explicit Success- 
Explicit Valence 
Explicit Valence – 
Explicit Success 
Explicit Success- 
Explicit Valence 
Explicit - Implicit     
Implicit - Explicit     
 
 
3.1.1.3 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
Participants entered the experiment via the internet. The welcome page informed participants 
that the purpose of the study was to validate new attitude measures and asked for serious 
completion of questions. After agreeing to informed consent, participants provided standard 
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demographic information and stated their political orientation. Political orientation was 
assessed by one item that was adopted from Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, and 
Ostafin (2007) and translated into German. Participants were asked to locate themselves on 
a 9-point scale of political orientation (1 = extremely liberal to 9 = extremely conservative). 
The mean political orientation score for the sample was M = 3.71 (SD = 1.46), that is more 
liberal than conservative. The actual survey began with implicit and explicit measures 
assessing the valence and success evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership. 
As implicit measures, the newly developed valence and success IATs were employed. As 
explicit measures, participants evaluated authoritarian and democratic items used in the IATs 
for their valence and success and answered two scales measuring general valence and 
success of authoritarian and democratic leadership. The item-based evaluations always 
preceded the general evaluations and the order of valence and success was the same within 
both measures for one participant. Subsequently, participants completed the RWA and the 
SDO scale and finally, they got a chance to take part in the lottery. On the last page they 
were debriefed following APA suggestions and thanked for their participation. Explicit 
measures were employed in Globalpark (2007), implicit measures were assessed via a 
specifically programmed Java Applet that allowed client based response time measurement. 
The different measures administered in the present study are described in detail below.  
 
Implicit Leadership Measures - Valence and Success IAT: Implicit evaluations were assessed 
via the newly developed valence and success IATs. Each task required participants to 
categorize authoritarian and democratic target items together with either (a) pleasant and 
unpleasant attributes or (b) success and failure attributes. Aside from training trials, within 
each IAT the categorization of target and attribute items occurred in two critical blocks. In the 
compatible block (i.e., consistent with democratic values) the same response key was used 
for authoritarian and unpleasant/ failure stimuli, and the other key for democratic and 
pleasant/ success stimuli. In the incompatible block (i.e., inconsistent with democratic 
values), key assignments were exchanged so that responses to authoritarian and pleasant/ 
success stimuli were assessed with the same key and responses to democratic and 
unpleasant/ failure stimuli with the other. Both IATs applied the same 5 authoritarian and the 
same 5 democratic stimuli. Whereas the valence IAT used 5 pleasant and 5 unpleasant 
words, the success IAT employed 5 success and 5 failure words. The full set of stimuli is 
presented in Table 3, the German IAT stimuli are provided in Appendix D. 
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Table 3. Target and attribute stimuli used for the valence and the success IAT 
 
Target Stimuli 
Valence & Success IAT 
 
Attribute Stimuli  
Valence IAT 
 
Attribute Stimuli  
Success IAT 
 
authoritarian democratic pleasant unpleasant success failure 
decisive 
directive 
resolute 
patriarchic 
dominant 
sensitive 
team-player 
liberal 
integrative 
companionable 
jewel 
fragrances 
angel 
sea 
diamond 
lice 
measles 
slime 
pocks 
dirt 
victory 
rise 
triumph 
gain 
achievement 
miscarriage 
failing 
crisis 
loss 
flop 
 
 
Although stimulus confounds within the diagnostic measurement procedures do not 
pose a big problem for the interpretation of experimental treatment effects on these 
measures, the influence of irrelevant associations between target and attribute dimensions 
was reduced as far as possible (Bluemke & Friese, 2006; Steffens & Plewe, 2001). A set of 
potential target items was pre-tested on 7-point rating scales (N = 16). Following Bluemke 
and Friese (2006) stimuli were selected in a way such that (a) a clear differentiation between 
authoritarian and democratic leadership items was guaranteed, (b) democratic and 
authoritarian target items were equally related to positive vs. negative valence (almost 
neutral on average), and (c) target items were equally related to success vs. failure (on 
average). Reducing the perception of associations to the authoritarian/ democratic dimension 
turned out to be more difficult for the attribute items. While assuring a clear distinction 
between positive and negative valence, or between success and failure items, stated no 
problem, the generally positive explicit attitude towards democratic leadership prevented a 
full elimination of cross-category associations (Bluemke & Friese, 2006): When asking the 
same participants to indicate the relation of attribute stimuli to the authoritarian/ democratic 
dimension on 7-point rating scales, they perceived positive items to be more strongly in line 
with the democratic side of the scale and located negative items more often on the 
authoritarian side. Likewise, success rather than failure items were related to democratic 
leadership (both already indicating a strong preference for democratic and an aversion to 
authoritarian leadership; see 2.2.2). Nevertheless, attribute stimuli were selected so as to 
reduce these asymmetries as much as possible. Additionally, the average word length and 
number of syllables of complementary target categories and attribute categories was kept 
constant per dimension.  
Participants were informed that reaction times would be measured during a task about 
authoritarian and democratic leadership in which they were to sort words appearing in the 
middle of the screen into one of several categories. Correct responses were to be given as 
quickly but also as reliably as possible by pressing one of two response keys. In analogy to 
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previous IAT studies (Greenwald et al., 2002; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), the IATs 
were administered according to a 7-block structure. For each IAT, the tasks comprised 
training the categorization of authoritarian versus democratic target items (Block 1: 10 trials); 
sorting pleasant versus unpleasant (alternatively: success versus failure) attribute items 
(Block 2: 10 trials); practicing to respond to democratic + pleasant (success) stimuli and 
authoritarian + unpleasant (failure) stimuli (Block 3: 20 trials); 40 critical trials of the same 
kind as in Block 3 in Block 4; reversing the response key assignment for authoritarian and 
democratic stimuli (Block 5: 10 trials); practicing the categorization of authoritarian + pleasant 
(success) and democratic + unpleasant (failure) stimuli (Block 6: 20 trials); repeating the 
aforementioned trials as a critical test (Block 7: 40 trials). Each of the 4 x 5 = 20 stimuli were 
presented twice in the critical blocks. The compatible task was performed first. Response 
accuracy was displayed on the screen by means of a green circle or a red cross for correct 
and incorrect responses, respectively. The red cross remained on the screen until the correct 
answer was provided. The inter-stimulus interval was set to 300 ms. Following each block, 
participants received feedback about the percentage of correct answers (Bluemke & Friese, 
2006; e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998) The crucial dependent variable, the IAT effect, was 
calculated as the mean latency difference between the compatible and incompatible 
condition (Blocks 4 and 7, respectively). Positive difference scores reflected a faster 
tendency to associate pleasantness (success) with a democratic rather than with an 
authoritarian leadership concept. In contrast, negative scores can be interpreted as a 
stronger association between pleasantness (success) and authoritarian rather than 
democratic leadership. Thus, a positive score represented an implicit preference for 
democratic leadership, whereas a negative score indicates a subject's implicit preference for 
authoritarian leadership. Reliability statistics revealed that both the valence and the success 
IAT showed satisfying internal consistencies (valence IAT: Cronbach’s α = .74; success IAT: 
Cronbach’s α = .64). 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures – Item-based Evaluation: In accordance with implicit measures, 
participants judged each of the 10 authoritarian and democratic items used in the valence 
and the success IAT (e.g., dominant or liberal) explicitly.  
Regarding the valence dimension, participants were asked: “How pleasant or 
unpleasant do you think the following leadership characteristics are?” and rated the items on 
a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = extremely pleasant to 7 = extremely unpleasant). Regarding 
the success dimension, the question was: How strongly do you link the following leadership 
characteristics to success or failure?” and answers were given on a 7-point scale (ranging 
from 1 = extreme success to 7 = extreme failure). The explicit valence and success 
evaluations of these items were combined into four different subscales: valence of 
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democratic items (Cronbach’s α =.54), valence of authoritarian items (Cronbach’s α =.74), 
success of democratic items (Cronbach’s α = .50), and success of authoritarian items 
(Cronbach’s α = .76).  
In order to replicate the findings of pre-testing participants were asked: “How 
democratic or authoritarian do you think are the following leadership characteristics?” and 
rated the items on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = extremely democratic to 7 = extremely 
authoritarian). The 5 items that should assess democratic leadership were combined to a 
democratic item scale (Cronbach’s α = .51) and the 5 items that should assess authoritarian 
leadership were combined to an authoritarian item scale (Cronbach’s α = .56). Exact German 
wording of explicit item-based leadership evaluations are provided in Appendix E. 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures – General Evaluation: General explicit valence and success 
evaluations of authoritarian and democratic leadership were assessed each with three items. 
The general valence scale asked, “How positive (pleasant/ enjoyable) do you think 
authoritarian (democratic) leadership is?” (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). On the general 
success scale subjects indicated, “How successful (efficient/ profitable) do you think 
authoritarian (democratic) leadership is?” Answers were in both cases given on a 7-point 
scale (ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). The resulting 12 items were combined 
into four subscales: general valence of democratic leadership (Cronbach’s α =.93), general 
valence of authoritarian leadership (Cronbach’s α =.91), general success of democratic 
leadership (Cronbach’s α = .85), and general success of authoritarian leadership 
(Cronbach’s α = .85). Exact German wording of explicit general leadership evaluations are 
provided in Appendix E. 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA): As described in section 2.1.1, Altemeyer (1988) 
proposes three underlying dimensions of RWA: authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggressiveness and conventionalism. In previous RWA scales, however, items were often 
not clearly differentiated between these three dimensions (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Funke, 
2005). Duckitt and Bizumic (unpublished manuscript) developed and validated a 36 item 
scale of RWA in which they carefully distinguish between these three dimensions. The 
authors introduced new terms for the three dimensions. In the following they are presented 
but to make things clearer the original terms are used in the results section. A subscale of 12 
items assesses “conservatism” (new term), i.e. submission (original term). A sample item is: 
“The real keys to the “good life” are respect for authority and obedience to those who are in 
charge”. A second subscale consisting of 12 items assesses “authoritarianism” (new term), 
i.e. aggression (original term). A sample item is: “What our country really needs is a tough, 
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harsh dose of law and order”. The third subscale with 12 items assesses “traditionalism” 
(new term), i.e. conventionalism (original term). A sample item is: “It is important that we 
preserve our traditional values and moral standards”. For the purpose of the present study 
the scale was translated into German and items were presented in random order. Answers 
were given on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The 
36 items of the RWA scale were highly interrelated (Cronbach’s α = .92). The sample mean 
was M = 3.00 (SD = 0.79). Also, internal consistency of the three subscales was high 
(submission: Cronbach’s α = .85, aggression: Cronbach’s α = .88, conventionalism: 
Cronbach’s α = .83). Sample means were as follows: Msubmission = 2.74 (SD = 0.85), and 
Maggression = 3.38 (SD = 1.07), Mconventionalism = 2.78 (SD = 0.88).  
 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO): As a second individual difference measure, participants 
completed a 14 item version of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994). SDO is conceptualized as 
a measure of the degree to which individuals desire hierarchy among social groups. 
Research findings indicate that the SDO and the RWA scale predict similar phenomena, 
such as prejudice, intolerance, right-wing political party support, and anti-democratic 
sentiment (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). However as 
stated above, RWA and SDO seem to be quite independent dimensions of “submission” and 
“dominance”, respectively (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Consequently, RWA and SDO 
scales correlate quite differently with important external variables (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 
2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). RWA is 
associated with religiosity and valuing order, structure, conformity, and tradition, while SDO 
is associated with valuing power, achievement, and hedonism and being male. A sample 
item of the 14 items assessing SDO is: “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other 
groups”. A German version of the scale adopted from Keller (2005) was administered. 
Answers were given on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree). The SDO scale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .85), with participants’ 
mean degree of SDO being M = 2.54 (SD = 0.92).  
3.1.2 Results 
3.1.2.1 Data Preparation 
The data for each trial block included mean response latency to correct response (in ms) and 
error rates. As in previous research, error rates of the IAT completion were typically low 
(about 6%). Only latencies from correct trials were included in the following analyses. Prior to 
aggregation, IAT response latencies higher than 3,000 ms or lower than 300 ms were 
recoded as 3,000 and 300 ms, respectively. The first two trials of each block were dropped 
because of their typically extended latencies (Greenwald et al., 1998, 2002, 2003). Latencies 
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were individually z-transformed by subtracting a participant's latency grand mean and 
dividing the result by a participant's overall standard deviation (Bluemke & Friese, 2006). 
This procedure of trimming data before analyses was employed in all IAT studies of the 
present dissertation. 
3.1.2.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 
Democratic and Authoritarian Items: As in pretests, the 10 leadership items used in the 
valence and success IAT differed significantly from the scale midpoint in the predicted 
directions. The sample means of the democratic item scale and the authoritarian item scale 
differed both significantly from the scale midpoint 4 in the expected direction (democratic 
item scale: t(140) = -34.15, p <.001; authoritarian item scale: t(140) = 23.19, p <.001). The 
sample means of democratic items were all significantly lower than 4 (all p < .001), the 
sample means of authoritarian items were all significantly higher than 4 (all p < .001), 
implying that, as intended, the former were judged as democratic and the latter as 
authoritarian. 
 
Implicit Leadership Measures - Valence and Success IAT: Hypothesis 1 of the present 
dissertation states that under conditions of certainty and in the absence of uncertainty, 
individuals will in general show a democratic standard attitude, thus, clearly prefer 
democratic over authoritarian leadership on valence and success measures. Consistently, on 
average participants showed positive IAT effects that differed significantly from zero for the 
valence IAT (t(140) = 20.03, p <.001) and for the success IAT (t(140) = 17.12, p <.001; 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4). 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures – Item-based Evaluation: In order to compare item evaluations 
with the IAT-effects, leadership items were reverse coded and a difference measure of 
relative favoritism was computed by subtracting authoritarian from democratic item scores 
such that positive values indicated more ascribed pleasantness or success for democratic 
and negative values more ascribed pleasantness or success for authoritarian leadership. On 
average participants showed positive difference scores that differed significantly from zero 
(item-based valence difference: t(140) = 14.00, p <.001; item-based success difference: 
t(140) = 2.01, p <.05; means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4).  
 
Explicit Measures – General Leadership Evaluation: Since the relation of democratic and 
authoritarian leadership was the focus of interest, again a difference score of relative 
favoritism was computed by subtracting authoritarian from democratic scores such that 
positive values indicate a preference for democratic and negative values a preference for 
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authoritarian leadership. On average participants showed positive difference scores that 
differed significantly from zero (general valence difference score: t(140) = 20.21, p <.001; 
general success difference: t(140) = 4.98, p <.001; means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Mean IAT effects expressed as z-differences and mean difference scores for explicit item-
based and general leadership measures. 
 
 
Mean SD 
Valence IAT Effect 0.61 0.36 
Success IAT Effect 0.51 0.35 
Item-Based Valence Difference 1.64 1.40 
Item-Based Success Difference 0.23 1.32 
General Valence Difference 3.59 2.11 
General Success Difference 0.90 2.14 
 
 
Summary of results in regard of Hypothesis 1: As evident in Table 4, all implicit and explicit 
leadership measures showed a positive difference score that differed significantly from zero, 
indicating a clear implicit and explicit preference for democratic compared to authoritarian 
leadership on both the valence and the success dimension. Moreover, the mean differences 
on the valence measures (valence IAT effect, item-based valence difference, and general 
valence difference) were much stronger than the mean differences on the success measures 
(success IAT effect, item-based success difference, and general success difference) 
implying valence attitudes to be more extreme than success attitudes.  
3.1.2.3 Validation of Implicit and Explicit Leadership Measures 
All correlations are presented in Table 5. Fischer’s r-to-z transformations showed no 
significant differences between correlations due to order of implicit and explicit or valence 
and success measures. Therefore, only combined correlations are reported below.  
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Table 5. Correlations between explicit and implicit measures of Study 1 
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T 
Political Orientation -           
RWA – Total .49** -          
RWA – Submission .43** .86** -         
RWA – Aggression .39** .85** .60** -        
RWA – Conventionalism .42** .82** .62** .49** -       
SDO .33** .50** .42** .55** .26** -      
Item-Based Valence Difference 
-.34** -.42** -.37** -.36** -.34** -.32** -     
Item-Based Success Difference 
-.06 -.21** -.24** -.22** -.08 -.23** .45** -    
General Valence Difference 
-.28** -.40** -.40** -.25** -.36** -.27** .43** .32** -   
General Success Difference 
-.13 -.32** -.30** -.29** -.22** -.31** .37** .52** .54** -  
Valence IAT -.11 -.11 -.12 -.07 -.11 -.04 .19** .14 .14 .15 - 
Success IAT -.12 -.17* -.12 -.10 -.21* -.05 .10 .25** .09 .21** .25** 
 
 
Note. *p < .05, ** p< .01 
3.1.2.4 Correlations of Implicit Leadership Evaluations  
Intercorrelations of IATs: The correlation between the valence and the success IAT was 
positive and significant (r = .25, p < .01). That is, stronger IAT effects on the valence IAT 
were related to stronger IAT effects on the success IAT implying that an implicit democratic 
valence preference was related to an implicit democratic success preference. 
 
Correlations with Explicit Leadership Measures: The valence IAT showed a significant 
correlation with the explicit item-based valence difference (r = .19, p < .05), and marginal 
significant correlations with the difference scores of general valence (r = .14, p < .10). Thus, 
the stronger the valence IAT effects were the greater was the difference between valence of 
authoritarian and democratic leadership evaluations indicating a democratic valence 
preference on both implicit and explicit measures. The success IAT showed significant 
positive relations to the item-based success difference (r = .25, p < .01) and general success 
Empirical Part   
 
56
evaluations (r = .21, p < .05) implying congruence of responses on implicit and explicit 
leadership success measures. 
 
Correlations with Political Orientation, RWA and SDO: The valence and the success IAT were 
uncorrelated with political orientation (all p > .15). Analyses revealed no relation between the 
valence IAT and the full RWA scale or one of the subscales (all p > .16). The success IAT, 
however, showed a significant negative correlation with the overall RWA scale                      
(r = -.17, p < .05) that was mainly driven by a significant negative correlation with 
conventionalism (r = -.21, p < .05). Thus, the more conventional the participants were, the 
lower was their implicit democratic success preference. The correlations with the remaining 
two subscales were non-significant (all p > .16). Neither the valence nor the success IAT was 
correlated with SDO. 
3.1.2.5 Correlations of Explicit Leadership Measures 
Intercorrelations of Explicit Leadership Measures: Correlational analyses revealed that the 
item-based valence and the item-based success differences were highly correlated               
(r = .45, p < .01). Both were positively related to the general valence difference                     
(r = .43, p < .01; r = .32, p < .01 respectively), and the general success difference                 
(r = .37, p < .01; r = .52, p < .01, respectively). The general valence difference showed a 
highly positive correlation with the general success difference (r = .54, p < .01). Thus, explicit 
leadership measures showed moderate to high positive intercorrelations. 
 
Correlations with Political Orientation, RWA and SDO: Item-based valence differences 
showed negative correlations with political orientation (r = -.34, p < .01), the full RWA scale  
(r = -.42, p < .01), all of its subscales (all r > .34, all p < .01), and the SDO scale                    
(r = -.32, p < .01). Thus, the more unpleasant democratic and the more pleasant authoritarian 
items were evaluated the higher were political conservatism, RWA and SDO scores. Item-
based success differences were negatively correlated with the full RWA scale                       
(r = -.21, p < .01), with the submission (r = -.24, p < .01) and the aggression                         
(r = -.22, p < .01), but not with the conventionalism subscale (r = -.08, p > .36). In addition, a 
negative relation between the item-based success difference and SDO yielded significance  
(r = -.23, p < .01). The general valence difference was negatively related to political 
orientation (r = -.28, p < .01), RWA (r = -.40, p < .01) with all its subscales                             
(all r > -.25, all p < .01) and SDO (r = -.27, p < .01). The general success difference showed 
significant negative correlations with the full RWA scale (r = -.32, p < .01), its subscales      
(all r > -.22, all p<.01), and SDO (r = -.27, p < .01). 
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Summary of results in regard of measurement validation: As intended, implicit and explicit 
leadership measures correlated at least to some extent with each other. Explicit valence 
measures correlated higher with the valence IAT, and explicit success measures correlated 
higher with the success IAT, indicating two different underlying dimensions of valence and 
success. In addition, the success IAT was related to RWA, the explicit valence measures 
were correlated with political conservatism and all explicit leadership measures were related 
to RWA and SDO. 
3.1.3 Discussion 
In Study 1 newly developed implicit and explicit measures were introduced assessing 
valence and success evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, on both implicit and explicit measures democratic leadership was clearly 
preferred over authoritarian leadership regarding valence and success, that is, the average 
standard attitude was democratic. Moreover, ratings on the general explicit leadership scales 
indicated higher extremity for valence than for success evaluations. 
Reliabilities of the valence and the success IAT as well as of the general explicit 
valence and success scales were satisfying and correlations between implicit and explicit 
measures -though moderate- were substantial arguing for the validity of the new measures. 
These correlations are in line with previous meta-analyses that showed small to moderate 
correlations between implicit and explicit measures in various domains  (Hofmann, 
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji, manuscript submitted for publication; see 2.6.1). 
Importantly, the correlation between the valence and the success IAT was only moderate 
and whereas the valence IAT was more strongly associated with explicit valence measures, 
the success IAT showed stronger relations to explicit success measures of leadership styles.  
The success IAT was negatively related to RWA and in particular to conventionalism. 
That is, the more conventional the attitudes of participants were the weaker were the 
associations between democratic + success and authoritarian + failure. Correlations of the 
subscales assessing submission and aggression, however, failed level of significance. It 
seems reasonable that judgments regarding items of these subscales are subject to stronger 
social desirability effects than conventionalism items resulting in higher discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit evaluations. SDO showed no relation to the implicit measures 
and seems to tap a different dimension. These results indicate that the success IAT 
measures rather facets that are related to RWA (convergent validity) than to SDO (divergent 
validity). 
Explicit leadership evaluations, both general and item-based, were highly correlated 
with political orientation, RWA and its subscales as well as with SDO, implying that all of 
Empirical Part   
 
58
these measures share a general conservative belief and value system as an underlying 
dimension. 
In sum, it can be argued that the implicit and explicit leadership measures developed 
for the purpose of the present dissertation are reliable and valid and can be used in the 
following studies. 
3.2 Study 2 – The Authoritarian Reaction 
Study 1 demonstrates that in majority democratic leadership is favored over authoritarian 
leadership on the valence and on the success dimension. As this democratic preference is in 
line with democratic values of Western cultures, it is expressed on both explicit and implicit 
measures reflecting a democratic standard attitude in the absence of certainty. Hypothesis 2 
of the present dissertation posits that under uncertainty low SEs show an authoritarian 
reaction. As authoritarian tendencies are, however, in conflict with general democratic 
beliefs, they should be rejected as an invalid basis for explicit judgments and only 
assessable via implicit measure, namely the IAT. 
Previous research findings suggest that low SEs are more uncertain and less confident 
about themselves than SEs (e.g., Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; see 2.4.1). In 
the present dissertation, however, it is argued that low SEs are not always aware of their 
self-uncertainty. It would be quite unadaptive to be chronically uncertain and this would lead 
to depressiveness (Edwards & Weary, 1993, see 2.3.3). Although low self-esteem is related 
to depression, not all low SEs are depressive. In the present dissertation it is argued that low 
SEs normally suppress thoughts about their self-uncertainty as far as they can and by this 
prevent themselves from becoming depressive. However, when filling out questionnaires 
about themselves, they are forced to think about their self-uncertainty and this should lead to 
awareness of and feelings of uncertainty. The salience of this trait self-uncertainty should be 
aversive and low SEs should be highly motivated to reduce the perceived feelings of 
uncertainty. Therefore, the main question investigated in Study 2 is whether for low SEs 
introspection and by this awareness of their own self-uncertainty would be sufficient to 
induce an authoritarian reaction. Dispositional uncertainty is made salient by presenting 
participants with questionnaires assessing trait uncertainty. It is expected that low SEs would 
become aware of their self-uncertainty by answering items of this sort and should, in 
consequence, strive to reduce the felt uncertainty. Doubting, however, to be able to resolve 
uncertainty themselves, they should exhibit an authoritarian reaction. 
Salience of trait self-uncertainty is manipulated by varying the order of uncertainty and 
leadership measures. It is expected that assessing questionnaires of trait uncertainty prior to 
leadership measures functions as an introspective uncertainty manipulation for low SEs 
causing the authoritarian reaction. In contrast, assessing trait uncertainty after leadership 
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measures should leave leadership judgments unaffected. Without feelings of uncertainty 
there is no problem to solve and, in consequence, expectancies about one’s own capability 
should be irrelevant for leadership evaluations. Low SEs not aware of their trait self-
uncertainty should, therefore, rely on their democratic standard attitude.  
Whereas the assessment of trait uncertainty should make self-uncertainty salient for 
low SEs, no such effect is expected for high SEs. They are assumed to be dispositionally 
self-certain (e.g., Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993) and trait uncertainty 
questionnaires should, therefore, leave them rather unaffected. Consequently, high SEs are 
expected to exhibit a democratic standard attitude. 
As outlined in section 2.7, the expected authoritarian reaction of low SEs should be due 
to cognitive success expectations. Regarding valence judgments, it has been argued that 
democratic leadership communicates appreciation and respect (Tyler & Lind, 1992), whereas 
authoritarian leadership is linked to strong negative emotions (Bass, 1990; De Cremer, 2007; 
Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004; see 2.2.2). It is plausible that the affective preference for 
democratic over authoritarian leadership is independent of expectancy considerations and 
should be, therefore, less affected by uncertainty resolution attempts. As in previous 
research high and low SEs should differ on cognitive but not on affective measures (see 
2.4.3). In addition, Study 1 provides empirical evidence that individuals hold more extreme 
valence than success attitudes towards democratic and authoritarian leaders and more 
extreme attitudes have been shown to be more resistant to change (see 2.2.3). Thus, high 
and low SEs are both expected to associate democratic leadership with positive and 
authoritarian leadership with negative emotions. As this democratic valence preference is 
clearly in line with general values and beliefs, it should be expressed on implicit and explicit 
measures. In contrast, whereas under uncertainty high SEs also associate democratic 
leadership with success and authoritarian leadership with failure, low SEs should evaluate 
democratic leadership –though pleasant- as less successful and authoritarian leadership –
though the latter being clearly unpleasant- as more successful than under certainty. Thus, 
the authoritarian reaction should be expressed on success but not on valence measures. As 
the authoritarian reaction is inconsistent with general democratic values stronger effects on 
implicit than on explicit success measures are expected. 
Authoritarianism and conservatism have been shown to play an important role in the 
reactions to threat and uncertainty (e.g., Jost et al. 2003; McCann, 2008; see Chapter 2.1.2). 
In order to show that the hypothesized moderating effects of self-esteem are independent of 
participant’s political orientation it is included in the relevant statistical analyses as a 
covariate. In Study 1, the one item measure of political orientation (Jost et al., 2007) was 
strongly related to RWA and SDO and was, therefore, used in the present study as substitute 
for the much longer scales of RWA and SDO. 
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3.2.1 Method  
3.2.1.1 Participants 
One hundred participants completed the online survey. Seven participants were excluded 
from data analyses because of higher error rates than 21% on IAT completion (3 participants 
on the valence IAT, 4 participants on the success IAT) resulting in a total sample size of 93 
participants. Participants were recruited by an online pool of the University of Mannheim. The 
advertisement informed them that they would take part in a 20 minute study that aims at 
validating new attitude and personality measures and would in return receive the chance to 
win one of 10 book coupons (worth 10 Euro each). 37 (40%) participants were male, 56 
(60%) female, aged 18 to 47 with an average age of 22.5 years (SD = 4.3). In the main part, 
they were students (81, 87%) of various disciplines. They were on average in the 3.08 
semester with a range from 1 to 14. The remaining 12 participants (13%) were employed or 
else. For the main part the fist language was German (87, 94%). Those with a different first 
language stated to have learned German at least for 6 years (M = 12.83, SD = 5.53).  
3.2.1.2 Design 
In a between-subject design, participants were randomly assigned to the order and IAT 
conditions (Table 6). Half of the participants at first completed the personality questionnaires 
assessing self-esteem and trait self-uncertainty, whereas the other half started with the 
implicit and explicit evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership. Participants 
completed either the valence or the success IAT. Subsequently, both explicit valence and 
success evaluations of authoritarian and democratic leadership were assessed in 
counterbalanced order. 
 
Table 6. Between-subject design of Study 2 
 
Valence IAT  Success IAT  
 High SEs Low SEs High SEs Low SEs 
Trait Uncertainty assessed after      
Trait Uncertainty assessed before     
 
 
3.2.1.3 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
Participants entered the experiment via the internet. They were informed that the study 
aimed at validating new personality measures and that they would take part in a reaction 
time task. All participants agreed to informed consent and were asked for demographic 
standard information and their political orientation (9-point scale ranging from 1 = extremely 
liberal and 9 = extremely conservative; Jost et al., 2007). On average, participants stated to 
be more liberal than conservative in their political orientation, the sample mean was M = 4.15 
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(SD = 1.40). In the salience condition, participants at first completed the personality 
questionnaires assessing self-esteem and self-uncertainty to make low SEs aware of their 
trait uncertainty. The implicit and explicit leadership measures validated in Study 1 were 
administered afterwards. In the no salience condition, participants at first completed the 
implicit and explicit leadership measures and afterwards filled out the personality 
questionnaires. In both conditions the implicit leadership measures preceded the explicit 
ones. For all participants the last pages provided the possibility to take part in the lottery and 
a careful debriefing following APA suggestions.  
 
Self-Esteem: In order to assess global self-esteem, a German version of the Rosenberg’s 
(1965) Self-Esteem Inventory (Ferring & Filipp, 1996) was administered. A sample item is     
“I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others“. Participants 
responded to each of the 10 items on a 4-point scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to  
4 = strongly agree). After reverse coding the negatively worded items, each individual’s 
scores on the 10 items were averaged to create a total score whereby high scores indicated 
high self-esteem. The internal consistency of the scale was high (Cronbach’s α = .92), and 
the sample mean of self-esteem was M = 3.24 (SD = 0.62). 
 
Self-Uncertainty: Following De Cremer and Sedikides (2005), trait self-uncertainty was 
operationalized in terms of self-esteem instability. This concept is defined as “the magnitude 
of short term fluctuations in individuals’ contextually based current self-esteem” (Kernis et al., 
1998, p. 658). The Labile Self Esteem Scale (Dykman, 1998) assesses the perceived 
instability of self-esteem level; that is the extent to which self-esteem is fluctuating or stable 
over time. A sample item is “Compared to most people, my self-esteem shifts rapidly from 
feeling good about myself on one day to feeling bad about myself the next day”. Items were 
translated into German and responses were given on a 5-point scale (ranging from               
1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The five items were highly interrelated 
(Cronbach’s α = .92), and the sample mean of self-esteem instability was M = 2.45                
(SD = 1.02). 
Greco and Roger (2001) introduced the Uncertainty Response Scale for measuring 
styles of coping with uncertainty. The Emotional Uncertainty subscale assesses to what 
extent participants experience uncertainty as emotionally threatening. The subscale consists 
of 15 items. A sample item is “When uncertain about what to do next, I tend to feel lost”. 
Items were translated into German and answers were given on 7-point scale (ranging from   
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Items were combined to a single measure of 
emotional uncertainty with higher values indicating higher levels of emotional uncertainty. 
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The subscale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = 93), with participants’ mean degree 
of emotional uncertainty being M = 3.48 (SD = 1.20). 
Expecting that answering the trait uncertainty questionnaires would lead to higher 
momentary uncertainty in low SEs compared to high SEs, the momentary thoughts of 
uncertainty were assessed afterwards by the following two questions: “Have you just thought 
of uncertainty?” (ranging from 1 = by no means to 9 = by all means) and “How intensely did 
you think of uncertainty?” (ranging from 1 = very weakly to 9 = very strongly). The two items 
assessing momentary thought of uncertainty were strongly intercorrelated (r = .86, p < .01) 
and thus combined into a single index. The sample mean was M = 4.80 (SD = 2.36). 
 
Leadership Measures: In order to unravel the different reactions in the evaluation of 
leadership styles, the newly developed implicit and explicit measures that discriminate 
valence from success evaluations were employed (see Study 1). Participants either 
completed the valence or the success IAT. Reliability was satisfying (valence IAT: 
Cronbach’s α = .74; success IAT: Cronbach’s α = .75). The average z-standardized valence 
IAT effect was M = 0.65 (SD =0.35). The average z-standardized success IAT effect was     
M = 0.50 (SD =0.39).  
Subsequently, participants were asked to indicate their general explicit valence and 
success evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership resulting in four subscales 
with high internal consistencies: general valence of democratic leadership (Cronbach’s         
α =.86), general valence of authoritarian leadership (Cronbach’s α =.82), general success of 
democratic leadership (Cronbach’s α = .86), and general success of authoritarian leadership 
(Cronbach’s α = .86). Difference scores were calculated to determine relative leadership 
preferences for valence and success. On average, the difference score of general valence 
was M = 4.04 (SD = 1.74) and the difference score of general success M = 1.36 (SD = 2.25). 
3.2.2 Results 
Self-Esteem and Self-Uncertainty: Importantly, the experimental conditions did not differ in 
self-esteem, self-esteem instability, emotional uncertainty, or momentary thoughts of 
uncertainty (all p > .19). In order to investigate the hypothesis that low SEs report higher trait 
uncertainty and think more of uncertainty when answering questionnaires regarding 
uncertainty than SEs, correlations were calculated between self-esteem level and measures 
of uncertainty. As expected, the negative correlations of self-esteem level with self-esteem 
instability (r = -.58, p < .001), emotional uncertainty (r = -.63, p < .001), and momentary 
thoughts of uncertainty (r = -.32, p < .001) yielded significance regardless of order condition, 
thus low SEs reported in general stronger uncertainty than high SEs. 
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Self-esteem instability, emotional uncertainty and momentary thoughts of uncertainty 
were included in all subsequent analyses as covariates in order to control for possible 
general effects of self-uncertainty. However, no such effects emerged (all p > .21) and 
therefore self-esteem instability, emotional uncertainty and momentary thoughts of 
uncertainty were dropped from the analyses reported below. 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures: Two independent hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted in which relative leadership favoritism on the valence and on the success 
dimension were predicted by order of measures and self-esteem level in Step 1 and by their 
interaction in Step 2. Political orientation was included as a covariate. Following Aiken and 
West (1991), self-esteem and political orientation scores were centered (i.e., by subtracting 
the general mean from the score) and the interaction term was based on the centered 
values. Centering was used in all hierarchical regression analyses reported in the present 
dissertation. 
For the valence dimension, the difference score of leadership preferences was 
negatively related to the covariate, β = -.29, t(89) = -2.97, p < .01, such that higher 
conservatism implied lower preferences for democratic leadership. The order of measures 
was unrelated to the explicit valence evaluations, β = -.07, t(89) = -0.73, p > .47. Self-esteem 
level was positively related to leadership preferences, β = .24, t(89) = 2.47, p < .05, thus the 
higher the self-esteem level, the stronger the preference for democratic leadership was (this 
is in line with Brockner et al., 1998, see 2.4.2). The interaction between order conditions and 
self-esteem was non-significant, β = .17, t(88) = 0.55, p > .59, (overall F(4,88) = 4.18,           
p < .01, ∆R2 = 0.12). 
For the success dimension, there was a marginal significant main effect for political 
orientation, β = -.18, t(89) = -1.75, p < .10, thus the more conservative participants were, the 
lower were their success evaluations of democratic compared to authoritarian leadership. 
Order of measurement, β = .08, t(89) = 0.76, p > .45, and self-esteem, β = .10, t(89) = -0.92, 
p > .37, however, were unrelated to explicit leadership preferences. The interaction term was 
also non-significant, β = .09, t(88) = 0.28, p > .78 (overall F(4,88) = 1.32, p < .27, ∆R2 = 0.01).  
 
Implicit Leadership Measures: Hierarchical regression analyses for the valence and the 
success IAT were conducted separately, including order of measures, self-esteem and 
political orientation as covariate in Step 1 and the interaction term in Step 2. 
For the valence dimension, political conservatism was not significantly related to 
implicit leadership preferences, β = -.10, t(44) = -0.67, p > .50. IAT effects were uncorrelated 
with order of measures, β = -.01, t(44) = -0.05, p > .96, and self-esteem level, β = .15,         
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t(44) = 0.98, p > .33. As expected, the interaction between order of measures and self-
esteem was also non-significant, β = .64, t(43) = 1.22, p > .22 (overall F(4,43) = 0.80, p > .53, 
∆R2 = -0.02). IAT effects were positive in both order conditions and for high and low SEs, 
implying that the strong associations between democratic + pleasant and authoritarian + 
unpleasant were unaffected by uncertainty considerations of low SEs. Simple slopes are 
depicted in Figure 5A. 
For the success dimension, the political orientation was unrelated to IAT effects,          
β = .03, t(41) = .22, p > .82. There was a significant main effect for order of measures,          
β = -.30, t(41) = -2.08, p < .05, and leadership preferences were in tendency positively 
related to level of self-esteem, β = .29, t(41) = 2.00, p < .10. Importantly and in line with 
hypotheses these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between order of 
measures and self-esteem, β = .42, t(40) = 2.42, p < .05 (overall F(4,40) = 3.48, p < .05,       
∆R2 = .18). Simple slopes analyses revealed that the relationship between IAT effects and 
order of measures was much stronger for low SEs (one standard deviation below the mean, 
see Aiken & West, 1991), β = -.55, t(40) = -3.27, p < .01, than for high SEs (one standard 
deviation above the mean), β =.03, t(40) = 0.18, p > .86. Thus as expected, when self-
uncertainty was made salient, low SEs showed stronger associations of democratic + failure 
and authoritarian + success as well as weaker associations between democratic + success 
and authoritarian + failure compared to low SEs in the no salience condition and high SEs in 
both conditions. Simple slopes are depicted in Figure 5B. 
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B) Success IAT 
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Figure 5. Z-standardized IAT effects as a function of self-esteem and uncertainty salience (no 
salience: IAT assessed before personality questionnaires vs. uncertainty salience: IAT assessed after 
personality questionnaires) for (A) implicit valence and (B) implicit success associations in Study 2.  
3.2.3 Discussion 
Study 2 investigated whether the mere awareness of one’s own trait self-uncertainty can 
induce an authoritarian reaction in low SEs. In line with the assumption that low SEs would 
report more trait uncertainty than high SEs, correlations between self-esteem and measures 
of uncertainty were significantly negative, that is, higher self-esteem was related to lower 
reported levels of trait uncertainty and vice versa. As high SEs had no reason to feel 
uncertain, they, consistently, exhibited a democratic standard attitude on explicit and implicit 
leadership measures of success. In contrast, low SEs showed the expected drop in their 
success preference for democratic leadership when trait uncertainty was made salient prior 
to leadership evaluations relative to low SEs in the no salience condition and high SEs in 
both conditions. In addition, this effect emerged only on the implicit but not on explicit 
success measure. As positive associative success evaluations of authoritarian leadership are 
in conflict with general democratic values and social desirability motivations, it is likely that 
they were rejected as invalid for explicit judgments, explaining why the authoritarian reaction 
was only found on implicit and not on explicit measures. 
Supporting the assumption of an authoritarian reaction, success IAT effects were 
significantly lower for low SEs in the salience condition than for all other groups, but they still 
remained positive indicating a drop in the implicit democratic preference but not a reversal to 
an authoritarian preference. One could argue whether this is really an authoritarian reaction. 
Success IAT effects are the difference of the mean IAT response latencies to democratic + 
success and authoritarian + failure subtracted by democratic + failure and authoritarian + 
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success. Thus, a drop in IAT effects indicate weaker associations between democratic + 
success and authoritarian + failure and stronger associations between democratic + failure 
and authoritarian + success. As IAT effects are always relative, lower IAT effects in the 
salience condition imply a decrease in the preference for democratic leadership on the one 
hand and an increase in the preference for authoritarian leadership on the other.  
IAT effects in the remaining conditions are interpreted as the democratic standard 
attitude. Standard means the democratic attitude that is stored in the general belief system 
and accessed when the situation indicates no otherwise processing. Divergence from this 
standard is seen as a reaction due to specific context cues. Following Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) the lower IAT effects for low SEs in the salience condition can be 
interpreted as temporal changes in pattern activation, in this case, the link between 
authoritarian + success becomes activated. Therefore, divergence in the downward direction 
can be interpreted as an authoritarian reaction as it is less democratic for the benefit of 
authoritarian leadership. Taking into account that participants were university students mainly 
liberal in their political orientation, the found drop in democratic success preferences of low 
SEs is remarkable. 
Evaluations on the valence dimension were not significantly affected by the 
assessment order of trait uncertainty and leadership measures, that is, the awareness of 
one’s trait self-uncertainty had no significant effect on implicit or explicit valence evaluations 
of leadership. This is in line with prior research that showed differences between high and 
low SEs only on cognitive but not on affective measures (see 2.4.3). Nevertheless, this does 
not necessarily mean that valence evaluations will not change in the long run in order to 
dissolve the attitude ambivalence (see 2.2.3) produced by the conflicting valence and 
success  components. This will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.1. As the effects 
were much stronger on the success IAT and changes on the valence IAT are supposed to be 
a consequence of attitude ambivalence rather than due to primary changes on the valence 
dimension the following studies will only employ the success IAT but not the valence IAT.  
In summary, the results of Study 2 indicate that mere introspection processes are 
sufficient to induce an authoritarian reaction in low SEs. This authoritarian reaction seems to 
have an impact on cognitive success but not on affective valence evaluations and is only 
expressed on implicit but not on explicit success measures of leadership styles. Due to their 
self-certainty, introspection had no effect on high SEs. This leaves open the question what 
impact feelings of uncertainty would have on them and their leadership evaluations. 
Therefore, in Study 3b and 4b (presented below) uncertainty is manipulated experimentally 
via a priming procedure in order to examine the reactions of both low and high SEs to 
feelings of uncertainty.  
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3.3 Power as (Re-) Solution 
Study 1 and Study 2 already demonstrated that in the absence of uncertainty, most of the 
participants clearly preferred democratic over authoritarian leadership on the valence and on 
the success dimension as well as on explicit and implicit measures. This is in line with prior 
research showing a strong aversion to authoritarian leadership in Western societies (see 
2.2.2). The preference for democratic leadership seems to be well-established in Western 
cultures and can, therefore, be defined as the democratic standard attitude the majority holds 
explicitly and implicitly. Study 2 provides empirical evidence that making trait self-uncertainty 
salient induces an authoritarian reaction in low SEs. In order to replicate this finding and 
additionally test Hypothesis 3 that high SEs show a democratic reaction to uncertainty, 
uncertainty is induced experimentally in Study 3b and Study 4b by the manipulation 
introduced by Van den Bos (2001, see 2.3.1). 
Moreover, Study 3b and 4b investigate whether the salience of high power is a means 
to prevent low SEs from their authoritarian reaction to uncertainty (Hypothesis 4). The two 
alternative effects of high power salience proposed in Hypothesis 4 are tested against each 
other. That is, high and low SEs show a democratic reaction or both show a democratic 
standard attitude. However, in both cases it is expected that the authoritarian reaction of low 
SEs is cancelled out. In contrast, under salience of low power the authoritarian reaction of 
low SEs and the democratic reaction of high SEs should remain as if the power was not 
salient (Hypothesis 5). 
To test Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, two different manipulations of power are 
employed. One manipulation (Study 3a & 3b) involves making the dispositional power of 
individuals salient. The other manipulation of power involves letting participants imagine 
being in a leader versus a follower position (Study 4a & 4b). To date only few and complex 
measures of power exist (e.g., the Thematic Apperceptation Test (TAT); Morgan & Murray, 
1935). Therefore, in a first step, a new measure – the Spatial Power Measure – has been 
developed. Study 3a aims at validating this new instrument as a power measure. In Study 3b 
individuals’ power is assessed and made salient via the Spatial Power Measure and the 
reactions to uncertainty of high and low power individuals regarding explicit and implicit 
leadership evaluations are examined. In Study 4a the effects of the experimental power 
manipulation on the Spatial Power Measure is tested. Study 4b employs the experimental 
power manipulation and investigated its impact on leadership measures after uncertainty 
induction.  
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3.4 Study 3a – Dispositional Power 
Drawing on a social embodiment perspective, Schubert (2005) argues that differences in 
power are in part represented as differences in vertical position in space. He presented 
participants with propositions describing an agent as more powerful than (e.g., “● has 
influence on ○”), as more powerless than (e.g., “● is weaker than ○”), or as power-neutral 
(e.g., “● points toward ○”) to a patient. The agent was represented by a black circle, the 
patient by a white circle (or reversed). These propositions were each arranged above eight 
pictures depicting eight possible angles between the two circles representing agent and 
patient (see Figure 6). The task was to select the picture that best fitted the proposition. As 
hypothesized, powerful and powerless propositions were associated with vertical angles. For 
high power the agent was above and for low power the agent was below the patient. Equal 
propositions were associated with horizontal depictions.  
Following this perspective, for the development of the new Spatial Power Measure it 
was assumed that individuals mentally represent differences of power by vertical differences 
(high and low positions) in space. Study 3a sets out to demonstrate that differences in 
vertical positions individuals ascribe to themselves exist and can be interpreted as perceived 
differences in power. Specifically, the goal is to show that the Spatial Power Measure is 
internally consistent and correlated with constructs related to power, but not with constructs 
unrelated to power.  
3.4.1 Method  
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Seventy four participants from the University of Mannheim participated in return for a 
chocolate bar (value approximately 1.50 USD) in an experiment labeled “Self-perception and 
Personality”. 30 (41%) participants were male, 44 (59 %) female, aged 19 to 43 with an 
average age of 23.7 years (SD = 3.7). In the main part, they were students (72, 97%) of 
various disciplines. They were on average in the 5.53 semester with a range from 1 to 13. 
The remaining 2 participants (3%) were employed or else. For the main part the fist language 
was German (62, 84%). Those with a different first language stated to have learned German 
for at least 2 years (M = 14.71, SD = 8.45). Participants completed the experimental 
materials individually. 
3.4.1.2 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
Participants were approached in the university library. After reading and signing informed 
consent, each participant was given a questionnaire packet and asked to complete the 
booklet following the order of questions. The packet started with demographic information 
and participants stated their political orientation on a 9-point scale (ranging from                    
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1 = extremely liberal to 9 = extremely conservative; Jost et al., 2007). On average, 
participants stated to be more liberal than conservative in their political orientation, the 
sample mean was M = 4.23 (SD = 1.50). Participants, then, completed the Spatial Power 
Measure. Subsequently, they filled out questionnaires regarding general values, leadership 
motivation, dominance and self-esteem. Finally, participants were debriefed following APA 
suggestions, remunerated and thanked for their participation. The different measures 
administered in the present study are described in detail below.  
 
Spatial Power Measure (SPM): Following Schubert (2005), it was hypothesized that higher 
power can be represented by higher vertical positions in space. Adopted from him, eight 
different pictures with a black and a white circle arranged in different angles (see Figure 6) 
were arranged in pairs of 56 different combinations. These 56 pairs encompassed all 
possible combinations and presentation orders. The instruction asked participants to imagine 
them being the black, another person being the white circle (or reversed) and to choose that 
picture of a pair that matched them better. Half of the participants were asked to imagine 
being the black, the other half being the white circle. In total, participants made 56 decisions 
between all possible combinations of these eight pictures. To compute a mean score of 
power each answer was scored as seen in Figure 6: Vertical angles with the circle 
representing oneself at the bottom were scored as 1 and vertical angles with the circle 
representing oneself at the top were scored as 5. Horizontal angles were scored as 3, 
diagonal angles above the horizontal were scored as 4 and diagonal angles below as 2, 
resulting in a continuum ranging from 1 to 5. As vertical differentials were the main focus, 
whether the circle representing oneself was on the left or right side was not taken into 
account although horizontal information can also reflect differences in power (e.g., Maass, 
Pagani, & Berta, 2007). Responses were averaged over all 56 choices. The internal 
consistency of the SPM was high (Cronbach’s α = .90) and the sample mean was M = 3.09 
(SD = 0.44). Full details on the SPM and the German instructions are provided in Appendix 
B. 
 
   1               2                  2               3               3                 4               4                5  
Figure 6. Depictions of eight different angles between the black and the white circle adopted from 
Schubert (2005), and values scored for each picture when imagining being the black circle (values are 
not shown in the original questionnaire).  
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Demographic Variables: Previous research reported differences in levels of power between 
men and women due to their different social roles (Keltner et al., 2003), also suggesting a 
correlation between the SPM and gender. Regarding the study subject it was assumed that 
participants studying economics or a related subject would more strongly strive for a 
leadership position and have a higher power motive than participants of non-economic 
subjects. Therefore, for analyses participants were divided into two major groups, economics 
and non-economics. As political orientation has been shown to correlate with SDO (Pratto et 
al., 1994) that assesses hierarchical relations, also a relation between political orientation 
and SPM was expected. 
 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ): The PVQ was designed to assess basic values which 
are conceived as general attitudes and goals guiding behavior (Schwartz, 1994). The 
questionnaire comprises 40 items, each item consisting of a description of a person 
(“portrait”) with two sentences. Participants were presented with a German version of the 
scale (Hinz, Brähler, Schmidt, & Albani 2005) and asked to state how similar they were to the 
portrayed person on a 6-point scale (ranging from 1 = very similar to 6 = very dissimilar). The 
40 items belonged to the following 10 scales (2-6 items per scale): power, achievement, 
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and 
security.  
According to Schwartz’ (1992, 1994) model (see Figure 7), these value constructs are 
more or less related to each other and can be combined to four different underlying 
motivations. Power and achievement both motivate self-enhancement and oppose to 
universalism and benevolence that motivate self-transcendence. Stimulation and self-
direction values, both reflecting the motivation of openness to change, oppose to tradition, 
conformity and security values with the underlying motivation of conservatism. Hedonism 
shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement.  
Of main interest in the present study were the values power, achievement, and 
universalism. First of all, the power value should be correlated with SPM which is aimed to 
be a power measure itself. The PVQ conceptualizes power as social status and prestige as 
well as control over others and resources. A sample item was “He/she likes to be in charge 
and tell others what to do. He/she wants people to do what he/she says.” As power and 
achievement share the same underlying motive of self-enhancement, a correlation between 
the achievement value and SPM was expected. In the PVQ, achievement is characterized by 
the wish to demonstrate personal success and competence. A typical item is “Being very 
successful is important to him/her. He/she likes to stand out and to impress other people”. 
According to Schwartz’ (1992, 1994) model, universalism opposes power. Therefore, a 
negative relation between universalism and SPM was predicted. Universalism is conceived 
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of as appreciation and tolerance for others and is measured by items like “He/she thinks it is 
important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He/she wants justice for 
everybody, even for people he/she doesn’t know”. The three subscales power (Cronbach’s   
α = .68), achievement (Cronbach’s α = .77), and universalism (Cronbach’s α = .78) of the 
PVQ were internally consistent. The sample mean for power was M = 3.78 (SD = 0.93), for 
achievement M = 4.44 (SD = .81), and for universalism M = 4.61 (SD = 0.74). 
According to Schwartz’ (1994) model all other values of the PVQ, namely hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, tradition, conformity, and security are much less related to power 
and should therefore yield no substantial correlation with the SPM.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 .Theoretical model of relations between the 10 values adopted from Schwartz et al. (2001).  
 
Leadership Motivation and Dominance: The leadership motivation subscale of the German 
Business-Focused Inventory of Personality (Hossiep & Paschen, 2003) consists of 15 items 
assessing the motive to influence others, the preference for leadership tasks and the self-
reported judgment that one represents a standard for others. A sample item was “I like to 
have the responsibility for important decisions”. Answers were given on a 7-point scale 
(ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The subscale was internally 
consistent (Cronbach’s α = 87), with participants’ mean degree of leadership motivation 
being M = 4.27 (SD = 0.88). The dominance subscale of the German Achievement 
Motivation Inventory (Schuler & Prochaska, 2001) presented participants with 10 items 
assessing the tendency to have power over and influence on others. A sample item was       
“I like to decide what others have to do“. Answers were given on a 7-point scale (ranging 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The 10 items were also highly interrelated 
Empirical Part   
 
72
(Cronbach’s α = .78), and the sample mean of dominance was M = 4.97 (SD = 0.74). As 
leadership and dominance are related concepts of power, both scales were expected to 
correlate with the SPM.  
 
Self-Esteem: The level of self-esteem was assessed via the German version of Rosenberg’s 
(1965) Self-Esteem Inventory (see Study 2). The internal consistency of the scale was high 
(Cronbach’s α = .85), and the sample mean of self-esteem was M = 3.38 (SD = 0.46). Both 
self-esteem and power are expected to induce self-confidence and may therefore have 
comparable impact on various outcome variables. However, they are conceived as different 
constructs and are not necessarily correlated.  
3.4.2 Results 
Correlations with Demographic Variables and Political Orientation: The correlation between 
the SPM and gender failed significance (r = -.18, p >.12), but was in the direction that men 
showed higher power scores than women. Participants were of various disciplines. Divided 
into economics and non-economics, both groups differed significantly from each other. As 
hypothesized economics (M = 3.22, SD = 0.43) scored higher on the SPM than non-
economics (M = 2.95, SD = 0.42, F(72) = 7.46, p < .01). There was a marginally significant 
positive correlation between the SPM and political orientation (r = .22, p < .10), that is, the 
more conservative participants were the higher were their power ratings.  
 
Correlations with Portrait Values: As expected, both power and achievement yielded a 
significant positive correlation (r = .54, p < .001, and r = .31, p <.01, respectively), whereas 
universalism showed a significant negative correlation (r =-.29, p < .05) with the SPM. In line 
with hypotheses, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, tradition, conformity, and security 
were not significantly related to the SPM (all p >.19). 
 
Correlations with Leadership Motivation and Dominance: Both the leadership motivation and 
the dominance subscale yielded a significant positive correlation with the SPM (r = .28,           
p <.05, and r = .26, p <.05, respectively). 
 
Correlation with Self-Esteem: The correlation between self-esteem and the SPM was not 
significant (r = .11, p >.34). 
 
Partial Correlations: Strikingly, when controlling for the power subscale of the PVQ, none of 
the correlations between the SPM and all other assessed variables remained significant     
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(all p > .12). In contrast, the correlation between power and the SPM remained substantial 
and significant, even when all other variables were partialled out (rpar = .43, p < .01).  
 
Correlations summarizing convergent and discriminant validity of the SPM are presented in 
Table 7 and Table 8.  
 
Table 7. Coefficient alphas, correlations with SPM, and partial correlations controlling for power (PVQ) 
of convergent measures 
 
Convergent Validity 
Measures Coefficient alphas Correlations Partial Correlations 
Gender - -.18 -.18 
Political Conservatism -  .22  .07 
Study Subject -  -.31** -.14 
Power (PVQ) .68   .54** - 
Achievement (PVQ) .77   .31** -.11 
Universalism (PVQ) .78 -.29* -.12 
Leadership Motivation (BIP) .87  .28* -.13 
Dominance (LMI) .78  .26* -.14 
 
 
Notes. Negative correlations with gender and study subject indicate that men scored higher on the 
SPM than women and economics higher than non-economics. The positive correlation with political 
conservatism indicates that conservatives scored higher than liberals. 
 
*p < .05, ** p< .01 
 
 
Table 8. Coefficient alphas, correlations with SPM, and partial correlations controlling for power (PVQ) 
of discriminant measures 
Discriminant Validity 
Measures Coefficient alphas Correlations Partial Correlations 
Hedonism (PVQ) .85  .09  .04 
Stimulation (PVQ) .60  .05  .08 
Self-Direction (PVQ) .61 -.03 -.03 
Benevolence (PVQ) .76 -.15 -.08 
Tradition (PVQ) .62 -.13 -.15 
Conformity (PVQ) .67 -.02 -.09 
Security (PVQ) .74  .07 -.13 
Self-Esteem (RSE) .85  .11  .11 
 
Note. *p < .05, ** p< .01 
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3.4.3 Discussion 
Study 3a was designed to validate the SPM as a power measure and results are in line with 
hypotheses. Emphasizing convergent validity the SPM correlated with power and the related 
value of achievement. Universalism, in Schwartz’ model (1992) conceived as the opposite of 
power, consistently showed a negative relation to the SPM. In addition, the SPM correlated 
with leadership motivation and dominance. Men exhibited higher scores on the SPM than 
women. The negative correlation, however, failed the level of significance. Thus, in contrast 
to other power measures, the SPM seems to be less influenced by traditional gender roles. 
Participants studying economics scored higher on the SPM than non-economics and political 
conservative individuals differed in tendency from their political liberal counterparts. Most 
importantly, when the value of power was partialled out none of these correlations remained 
significant. Evidence for discriminant validity can be drawn from the result that the SPM 
yielded no significant correlation with the values of hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, 
benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. In addition, self-esteem was unrelated to the 
SPM. This was important because Study 3b aimed at investigating the independent impact of 
self-esteem and power on leadership evaluations under uncertainty. Taken together, these 
findings strongly argue for the validity of the SPM as a measure of power.  
3.5 Study 3b – Salience of Dispositional Power as (Re-)Solution 
Study 2 demonstrated that the mere assessment of personality questionnaires was sufficient 
to induce an authoritarian reaction in low SEs due to their high level of trait uncertainty. As 
Study 2 focused on the impact of dispositional uncertainty, high SEs’ reactions to feelings of 
uncertainty could not be examined. Study 3b set out to extend the findings of Study 2 by 
experimentally manipulating feelings of uncertainty. Self-certainty and self-uncertainty are 
induced in both high and low SEs via a priming procedure adopted from Van den Bos (2001, 
see 2.3.1). It is hypothesized that under certainty participants would rely on their democratic 
standard attitude because they perceived no threat and the goal of uncertainty reduction was 
not activated (Hypothesis 1). Under uncertainty, however, it is expected that low SEs would 
show the same drop in their implicit success evaluations of democratic leadership as in 
Study 2 due to doubts in their own abilities to resolve the uncertainty (Hypothesis 2). In 
contrast, high SEs are expected to react with an increase in their democratic success 
preferences due to their belief that they are capable of providing a meaningful input in the 
uncertainty resolving process (Hypothesis 3).  
In addition, the influence of the salience of dispositional power is examined by 
assessing the SPM at the beginning of the experiment. It is expected that the awareness of 
being powerful enhances general self-confidence, by this counteracts to the authoritarian 
reaction and leads to either a democratic reaction or a democratic standard attitude 
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(Hypothesis 4). Being aware of having low power, in contrast, should lead to the same 
pattern as being unaware of one’s power activating an authoritarian reaction in low SEs and 
a democratic reaction in high SEs (Hypothesis 5). 
Study 2 already demonstrated that the affective evaluations of leadership were not 
significantly influenced by uncertainty. Therefore, as the assessment of the implicit 
leadership evaluations is extensive and time consuming, in Study 3b only the success IAT 
but not the valence IAT is employed. Again, social desirability effects are expected to lead to 
stronger effects on implicit than explicit leadership measures. 
3.5.1 Method  
3.5.1.1 Participants  
One hundred and sixty students from the University of Mannheim volunteered to take part in 
an experiment labelled ‘Leadership and Personality’ in return for 2 EUR and a chocolate bar. 
Twelve participants were excluded from further analyses because of higher error rates than 
21% on IAT completion resulting in a total sample size of 148 participants. 74 (50%) 
participants were male, 74 (50%) female, aged 18 to 33 with an average age of 21.6 years 
(SD = 2.9). They were all students (100%) of various disciplines. On average participants 
were in the 3.79 semester with a range from 1 to 16. For the main part, the fist language was 
German (135, 91%). Those with a different first language (12, 8%) stated to have learned 
German for at least 11 years (M = 16.55, SD = 3.56). The study was run with up to eight 
participants at a time. 
3.5.1.2 Design 
In a between-subject design, participants were randomly assigned to the uncertainty priming 
conditions (Table 9). Half of the participants were primed with state self-uncertainty; the other 
half were primed with state self-certainty. Levels of participants’ self-esteem and power were 
assessed via questionnaires. 
 
Table 9. Between-subject design of Study 3b 
 
Salience of High Power Salience of Low Power 
 High SEs Low SEs High SEs Low SEs 
Certainty Manipulation      
Uncertainty Manipulation      
 
 
3.5.1.3 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
On arrival to the laboratory, participants signed informed consent, were escorted to a 
computer and stated standard demographic information as well as their political orientation 
Empirical Part   
 
76
(7-point scale ranging from 1 = extremely left to 7 = extremely right). In order to rule out that 
effects were merely due to political conservatism the variable was included as a covariate in 
the analyses reported below. On average, participants were more left than right in their 
political orientation, the sample mean was M = 3.50 (SD = 1.04). The order of measures and 
experimental manipulations was as follows. First, dispositional power was made salient for all 
participants. Second, state self-uncertainty was experimentally induced via a priming 
procedure. Third, in order to control for potential mood effects positive and negative affect 
was assessed. Fourth, all participants completed the implicit and explicit leadership 
measures. Fifth, participants completed a packet of personality questionnaires regarding self-
esteem and self-uncertainty. This time, the questionnaires were administered at the end of 
the experiment and not at the beginning as in Study 2 in order to investigate the pure impact 
of the experimental uncertainty manipulation without the salience of trait uncertainty. Study 2 
already demonstrated that the questionnaires themselves can induce uncertainty. Finally, 
participants were debriefed following APA suggestions, remunerated, and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Power Measure: The dispositional power participants attributed to themselves was made 
salient by administering the SPM validated in Study 3a. The internal consistency of the SPM 
was high (Cronbach’s α = .88), and the sample mean was M = 3.15 (SD = 0.39). 
 
Uncertainty Manipulation: In order to experimentally manipulate uncertainty participants 
responded to the following two questions that were adopted from Van den Bos (2001): 
“Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of you being self-uncertain arouses in 
you” and “Please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think will physically 
happen to you as you feel self-uncertain.” Participants in the certainty condition answered to 
the same questions, except that they were asked to think about their emotions and physical 
reactions when self-certain. The German instructions are presented in Appendix A.  
 
Mood: All participants completed a translated German short version of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). On twelve items they 
reported how they felt momentarily, half of the items measuring Positive Affect and the other 
half assessing Negative Affect. Both subsets of the PANAS were averaged to form subscales 
with satisfying internal consistencies (Positive Affect: Cronbach’s α = .78; Negative Affect: 
Cronbach’s α = 72). The sample mean for Positive Affect was M = 2.96 (SD = 0.69), the 
sample mean for Negative Affect was M = 1.42 (SD = 0.46). 
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Leadership Measures: All participants completed the success IAT already used in Study 1 
and Study 2. Internal consistency was satisfying (Cronbach’s α = .76). The average             
z-standardized IAT effect was M = 0.56 (SD = 0.41). As explained above, the valence IAT 
was not employed because the relevant attitude changes were expected on the cognitive 
success dimension.  
Subsequently, the same explicit measures of general valence and success as in Study 
2 were administered. Internal consistencies were high for all four scales: general valence of 
democratic leadership (Cronbach’s α =.83), general valence of authoritarian leadership 
(Cronbach’s α = .90), general success of democratic leadership (Cronbach’s α = .72), 
general success of authoritarian leadership (Cronbach’s α = .77). Difference scores were 
calculated in order to determine the preferences between leadership styles. On average, the 
difference score of general valence was M = 3.89 (SD = 1.76) and the difference score of 
general success M = 1.51 (SD = 2.02). 
 
Self-esteem: Participants completed the German version of the Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-
Esteem Inventory (see Study 2). The internal consistency was high (Cronbach’s α = .88), 
and the sample mean of self-esteem level was M = 3.31 (SD = 0.52).  
 
Self-Uncertainty: Participants completed the German translation of the Labile Self Esteem 
Scale (Dykman, 1998; see Study 2). The five items of the scale were highly interrelated 
(Cronbach’s α = .92), and participants showed a sample mean of M = 2.77 (SD = 0.97). In 
addition, participants were presented with the German translation of the Emotional 
Uncertainty subscale of the Uncertainty Response Scale (Greco & Roger, 2001; see Study 
2). The subscale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .92), with participants’ mean 
degree of emotional uncertainty being M = 3.54 (SD = 1.04). 
3.5.2 Results 
Mood: The Positive and Negative Affect scales were separately subjected to hierarchical 
regression analyses, including uncertainty, self-esteem and power in Step 1, the two-way 
interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3. Positive affect was 
unrelated to uncertainty, self-esteem, and power (all p > .11). Only the two-way interaction 
between uncertainty and power was marginally significant, β = .20, t(139) = 1.83, p < .10. 
None of the other interaction terms yielded significance (all p > .14). Negative affect was 
unrelated to the uncertainty and power manipulations (all p > .14). There was, however, a 
significant negative relation to self-esteem, β = -.18, t(139) = -2.19, p < .05. In Step 2 and 
Step 3, none of the interaction terms yielded significance (all p > .17). Importantly, controlling 
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for the PANAS scales did not affect any of the results of Study 3b. Therefore, they were not 
included in the analyses reported below. 
 
Covariantes: Participants in the experimental conditions (certainty vs. uncertainty) did not 
differ in their level of dispositional power or in their political orientation (all p > .37). In the 
analyses reported below, power was included as a moderator variable and political 
orientation as a covariate. Importantly, there were also no differences between the 
experimental conditions regarding self-esteem, self-esteem instability and emotional 
uncertainty (all p > .29). Self-esteem instability and emotional uncertainty were included in all 
subsequent analyses as a covariate in order to control for possible general effects of 
dispositional uncertainty. However, no such effects were found and therefore these 
covariates were dropped from the analyses reported below. 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures: Explicit leadership preferences were entered in two 
independent hierarchical regression analyses, including uncertainty, self-esteem, and power 
as predictors as well as political orientation as covariate in Step 1, the two-way interaction 
terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3. 
Regarding valence, the relative preference for democratic leadership was in tendency 
negatively correlated with political orientation, β = -.15, t(140) = -1.82, p < .10, such that 
higher conservatism implied lower preferences for democratic leadership. The uncertainty 
manipulation, level of self-esteem, and power were unrelated to the explicit valence 
evaluations (all p > .28). In Step 2, none of the two-way interactions were significant           
(all p > .71). In Step 3, a marginally significant three-way interaction of uncertainty, self-
esteem level, and power occurred, β = -.26, t(136) = -1.87, p < .10, (overall F(8,136) = 1.15, 
p > .33, ∆R2 = 0.008). Following Aiken and West (1991), simple slope analyses to clarify the 
interaction revealed no significant slopes. The pattern, however, was as follows. Under 
salience of high power, low SEs (one standard deviation below the mean) showed a positive 
slope, β = .18, t(136) = 0.93, p > .36, whereas high SEs (one standard deviation above the 
mean) yielded a negative slope, β = -.13, t(136) = -0.82, p > .41. Under salience of low 
power, low SEs (one standard deviation below the mean) showed a negative slope, β = -.17, 
t(138) = -1.12, p > .26, whereas high SEs (one standard deviation above the mean) yielded a 
positive slope, β = .12, t(136) = 0.67, p > .50. All main and interaction effects are presented 
in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and power predicting explicit 
valence evaluations 
 
Explicit Valence β t p 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Power (P) 
-.15 
-.05 
-.06 
 .09 
-1.82 
-0.56 
-0.70 
 1.09 
.07 
.58 
.48 
.28 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
 .05 
 .04 
-.03 
 0.37 
 0.34 
-0.34 
.71 
.74 
.74 
U x SE x P -.26  1.87 .06 
 
 
Regarding success, in Step 1 neither uncertainty, self-esteem level, power nor the 
covariate were significantly related to the explicit leadership preference (all p > .13). In Step 
2, none of the two-way interactions were significant (all p >.36). The three-way interaction of 
uncertainty, self-esteem and power was marginally significant, β = -.24, t(136) = -1.74,           
p < .10 (overall F(8,136) = 1.22, p > .29, ∆R2 = 0.012), but none of the simple slopes yielded 
significance. The pattern, however, was as follows: Under salience of high power, low SEs 
(one standard deviation below the mean) showed a positive slope, β = .19, t(136) = 1.00, p > 
.32, whereas high SEs (one standard deviation above the mean) yielded a negative slope, β 
= -.22, t(136) = -1.40, p > .16. Under salience of low power, low SEs (one standard deviation 
below the mean) showed a negative slope, β = -.16, t(136) = -1.09, p > .28, and high SEs 
(one standard deviation above the mean) also yielded a negative slope, β = -.02,              
t(136) = -0.08, p > .93. All main and interaction effects are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and power predicting explicit 
success evaluations 
 
Explicit Success β t p 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Power (P) 
-.12 
-.10 
-.07 
.12 
-1.40 
-1.14 
-0.85 
 1.52 
.16 
.26 
.40 
.13 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
-.05 
 .05 
 .08 
-0.38 
 0.47 
 0.92 
.71 
.64 
.36 
U x SE x P -.24  1.74 .08 
 
 
Empirical Part   
 
80
Implicit Leadership Measure: A hierarchical regression analysis for the success IAT was 
conducted, including uncertainty, self-esteem, power and the covariate political conservatism 
in Step 1, the two-way interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 
3.  
Step 1 revealed no significant main effects (all p > .12). In Step 2, the interaction of 
self-esteem and power was marginally significant, β = -.15, t(137) = -1.78, p < .10. 
Importantly, the interaction of uncertainty and self-esteem yielded significance, β = .33,  
t(137) = 2.44, p < .05. Simple slope analyses revealed a negative slope for low SEs (one 
standard deviation below the mean), β = -.41, t(137) = -2.21, p < .05, and a positive slope for 
high SEs (one standard deviation above the mean), β = .43, t(137) = 2.30, p < .05. Thus, low 
SEs showed weaker associations between democratic + success and authoritarian + failure 
relative to stronger associations between democratic + failure and authoritarian + success in 
the uncertainty compared to the certainty condition. High SEs showed stronger associations 
between democratic + success and authoritarian + failure relative to weaker associations 
between democratic + failure and authoritarian + success in the uncertainty compared to the 
certainty condition. These results are in line with Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 and imply 
an authoritarian reaction for low SEs and a democratic reaction for high SEs. Simple Slopes 
are depicted in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Z-standardized success IAT effects as a function of uncertainty and self-esteem in Study 3b.  
 
The two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, β = -.36, 
t(136) = -2.72, p < .01, (overall F(8,136) = 2.78, p < .01, ∆R2 = 0.09). Following Aiken and 
West (1991) simple slopes were calculated for low and high power individuals. Under 
salience of high power, simple slopes for both low SEs, β = .14, t(136) = 0.76, p < .45,  and 
high SEs, β = .05, t(136) = 0.36, p < .72, were not significant. Simple slopes are depicted in 
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Figure 9A. Thus, when power was salient for high power individuals, their implicit success 
evaluations did not change under uncertainty. Under salience of low power, however, for low 
SEs (one standard deviation below the mean), a negative slope occurred, β = -.39,                 
t(136) = -2.70, p < .01, implying an authoritarian reaction. Conversely, for high SEs (one 
standard deviation above the mean), a positive slope emerged, β = .35, t(136) = 2.06,            
p < .05, indicating a democratic reaction. Simple slopes are depicted in Figure 9B. All main 
and interaction effects are presented in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and power predicting implicit 
success evaluations 
 
Implicit Success β t p 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Power (P) 
-.13 
-.001 
 .09 
 .03 
-1.58 
-0.008 
 1.05 
 0.35 
.12 
.99 
.29 
.73 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
 .33 
 .07 
-.15 
 2.44 
 0.64 
-1.78 
.02 
.53 
.08 
U x SE x P -.36 -2.72 .007 
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B) Low Power 
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Figure 9. Z-standardized success IAT effects as a function of uncertainty and self-esteem for 
participants with (A) high power and (B) low power in Study 3b.  
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The findings of Study 3b are consistent with hypotheses. In line with Hypothesis 1, under 
certainty participants clearly preferred democratic over authoritarian leadership regardless of 
self-esteem and power on implicit and explicit leadership measures, implying a democratic 
standard attitude. In line with Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, under uncertainty low SEs 
exhibited less and high SEs exhibited more positive success IAT effects in the uncertainty 
compared to the certainty condition, implying an authoritarian reaction for low SEs and a 
democratic reaction for high SEs. In line with Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, this two-way 
interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction. That is, the differential effect for high and 
low SEs only emerged for low power individuals. High power individuals, in contrast, showed 
positive success IAT effects, thus, strong implicit associations between democratic + success 
and authoritarian failure regardless of uncertainty priming condition and self-esteem level. 
Thus, they adhered to their democratic standard attitudes even under uncertainty 
(Hypothesis 4b). On explicit leadership measures there were no significant differences 
between the certainty and uncertainty condition indicating the higher sensitivity of the 
success IAT to uncertainty reactions. 
These results indicate that when dispositional low power is salient, individuals 
elaborate their expectancies more extensively than high power individuals and come to 
differential conclusions depending on self-esteem level. Whereas high SEs strive to heighten 
their input in the decision making processes by calling for democratic procedures and 
thereby voice, low SEs are less convinced that their contribution to the decision making helps 
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coping with the problem and therefore try to minimize their input. In contrast, under salience 
of high power leadership evaluations were unaffected by uncertainty or level of self-esteem. 
In line with Hypothesis 4b, it can be argued that the salience of high power induces such a 
high level of general confidence that extensive elaboration seems not necessary for the goal 
attainment of uncertainty reduction and both high and low SEs rely on their democratic 
standard attitude as they do in the certainty condition. Thus, salience of high power seems to 
be an effective means to prevent individuals from their uncertainty reactions and in particular 
low SEs from their authoritarian reaction.  
 
3.6 Study 4a – Situational Power 
Study 3b showed that when dispositional low power was salient individuals reacted 
differentially to feelings of uncertainty depending on their level of self-esteem. That is, low 
SEs exhibited an authoritarian and high SEs a democratic reaction on the implicit success 
measure. In contrast, when dispositional high power was salient leadership evaluations 
remained unaffected by the priming of uncertainty. While Study 3b investigated the impact of 
making dispositional power salient, the goal of the following studies is to replicate and extend 
these findings by experimentally manipulating the level of felt power and investigating its 
impact on leadership evaluations under uncertainty. Study 4a examines whether imagining 
being in a leader compared to a follower position leads to heightened power levels 
individuals ascribe to themselves.  
Power is not synonymous with leadership, but both concepts are naturally intertwined 
(Goodwin, 2003). Whereas power provides the ability to influence others (Galinsky et al., 
2003; Keltner et al., 2003) leadership can be conceived as the process of influencing others 
(Chemers, 2001). Thus, power is the means of leadership and, therefore, being a leader 
implies and requires power (Berlew & Heller, 1983; Goodwin, 2003). Consistently, Giessner 
and Schubert (2007) showed that vertical information influences judgments of leaders' power 
and, conversely, that information about a leader's power influences vertical positioning of a 
leader on a computer screen. Previous research induced power successfully via a role 
playing task in which the roles of employer (high power) and an employee (low power) were 
assigned to participants (Briñol et al., 2007; Overbeck & Park, 2001). In addition, it has been 
shown that the mere thought of having power is sufficient to induce differential levels of 
perceived power (Galinsky et al., 2003). Drawing on this research the present study 
examined whether imagining being in a leader versus a follower position leads to high versus 
low levels of perceived power. Power is assessed via the SPM validated in Study 3a and 
already successfully employed in Study 3b.  
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3.6.1 Method  
3.6.1.1 Participants  
Sixty students from the University of Mannheim participated in a study labeled ‘Self-
Perception and Leadership’ in return for 1 Euro and a chocolate bar. Three participants failed 
to complete the power measure, the main dependent variable, and were therefore excluded 
from further analyses resulting in a total sample of 57 participants. 20 (35%) participants 
were male, 37 (65%) female, aged 18 to 42 with an average age of 25.0 years (SD = 4.0). In 
majority, participants were students (55, 97%) of various disciplines. On average participants 
were in the 7.8 semester with a range from 2 to 14. The remaining 2 participants (3%) were 
employed or else. For the main part, the fist language was German (44, 77%). Those with a 
different first language (13, 23%) stated to have learned German at least for 3 years           
(M = 14.81, SD = 8.97). Participants completed the experimental materials individually. 
3.6.1.2 Design 
In a between-subject design, half of the participants were primed with a leader position, the 
other half were primed with a follower position (Table 13). Counterbalanced, they were either 
instructed to imagine being the black or the white circle. 
 
Table 13. Between-subject design of Study 4a 
 
 Black Circle White Circle  
Follower Position    
Leader Position   
 
 
3.6.1.3 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
Individuals were approached in the university library. After reading and signing informed 
consent, each participant was given a questionnaire packet and asked to complete the 
booklet following the order of questions. The packet started with demographic variables. The 
order of experimental manipulations and measures was as follows. First, the leader or 
follower position was manipulated. Second, the power individuals ascribe to themselves was 
administered. Third, participants completed a packet of personality questionnaires regarding 
self-esteem, self-uncertainty and leadership motivation. Finally, participants were debriefed 
following APA suggestions, remunerated, and thanked for their participation. 
 
Power Priming: In the high power condition participants were asked to remember and write 
down an event when they themselves were in a leadership position towards another person. 
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In the low power condition participants described an event when another person was in a 
leadership position towards them. The exact German wording is presented in Appendix C. 
 
Power Measure: In order to assess the level of perceived power participants completed the 
SPM with its 56 pairs of circles. As in Study 3a and Study 3b, the instruction was to imagine 
oneself being the black versus the white circle and another person being the circle of the 
opposite color. Internal consistency was high (Cronbach’s α = .92) and the sample mean of 
power was M = 3.13 (SD = 0.44). 
 
Self-Esteem: Participants completed the German version of the Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-
Esteem Inventory (see Study 2). The internal consistency was high (Cronbach’s α = .89) and 
the sample mean of self-esteem was M = 3.26 (SD = 0.50). 
 
Self-Uncertainty: Self-uncertainty was assessed by the translated German Labile Self-
Esteem Scale (Dykman, 1998; see Study 2). The scale was internally reliable (Cronbach’s   
α = .91) and the sample mean of labile self-esteem was M = 2.59 (SD = 0.87). 
 
Leadership Motivation: In order to assess the leadership motivation the respective subscale 
of the German Business-Focused Inventory of Personality was employed (Hossiep & 
Paschen, 2003; see Study 3a). The internal consistency of leadership motivation was high 
(Cronbach’s α = .80) and the sample mean was M = 3.43 (SD = 0.73). 
3.6.2 Results 
Covariates: Scores of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory, the Labile Self-Esteem Scale, 
and the leadership motivation scale did not differ between the position priming conditions (all 
p >.25). Thus, position priming had no effect on the personality measures and random 
assignment to conditions was successful. Self-esteem, self-uncertainty, and leadership 
motivation were no significant covariates (all p > .20) and did not change the pattern of 
results. They were therefore dropped from the analyses reported below. 
 
Power Measure: Participants’ scores on the power measure were subjected to a 2 (leader 
position vs. follower position) x 2 (black vs. white circle color) factorial analysis of variance, 
resulting in a significant main effect for position (F(1, 53) = 6.48, p < .05). Participants primed 
with the leader position exhibited significantly higher scores on the power measure (M = 
3.27, SD = 0.43) than participants primed with the follower position (M = 2.98,            SD = 
0.41). This difference between conditions is presented in Figure 10. Neither the main effect 
nor the interaction effect for color of circle yielded significance (all p > .33). 
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Figure 10. Mean ratings on the SPM (and standard errors) as a function of position (leader vs. 
follower) in Study 4a. Scores range from 2.2 to 3.8, with higher values indicating more power.  
3.6.3 Discussion 
The goal of Study 4a was to show that priming participants with a leader versus a follower 
position leads to differences in the power individuals ascribe to themselves. As expected, 
priming leadership led participants to score higher on the SPM as compared to the follower 
condition. Thus, thinking of leadership involves more vertical schematization in space and by 
this individuals ascribe themselves more power than when they think of being in a follower 
position. Hence, the SPM was significantly influenced by the leadership manipulation. It is 
noteworthy that individuals in the follower condition exhibited ratings on the power measure 
with average scores near the scale midpoint. Thus, low power is only relatively low and only 
a minority is clearly submissive in their relation to others. Nevertheless, the results of Study 
4a confirm the hypothesis that being a leader implies more power and being a follower 
implies less power. Importantly, self-esteem was not influenced by the manipulation of 
position making it possible to determine the independent effects of self-esteem and 
experimentally induced power on leadership evaluations under uncertainty in Study 4b. 
3.7 Study 4b – Priming of Situational Power as (Re-) Solution 
The design of Study 4b is basically the same as in Study 3b. However, instead of the mere 
assessment of dispositional power, level of power is manipulated experimentally via the 
position priming tested in Study 4a. It is hypothesized that the power prime has comparable 
effects on leadership evaluations as the salience of dispositional power.  
Study 4b is designed to replicate the pattern of results reported in Study 3b. Again, 
uncertainty is induced by a priming procedure. In addition, trait uncertainty is made salient at 
the beginning of the experiment by assessing personality questionnaires as in Study 2. This 
procedure is chosen in order to investigate whether high power can even cancel out the 
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combined impact of the two uncertainty inductions. Instead of assessing dispositional power 
individuals ascribe to themselves, this time, the level of power is manipulated experimentally 
by asking participants to imagine being in a leader or being in a follower position. Study 4a 
successfully showed that this manipulation indeed leads to different levels of perceived 
power. Individuals that imagined being a leader felt more powerful than individuals that 
imagined being a follower. In Study 4b, power is induced just before the completion of the 
success IAT. Results similar to Study 3b are expected. It is hypothesized that under certainty 
participants rely on their standard democratic attitude (Hypothesis 1), whereas under 
uncertainty low SEs show an authoritarian (Hypothesis 2) and high SEs a democratic 
reaction (Hypothesis 3). It is expected that the high power manipulation (leader position) 
cancels these differential reactions to uncertainty out and replaces them with the standard 
democratic attitude (Hypothesis 4b). In contrast, the low power manipulation (follower 
position) should result in differential reactions to the uncertainty priming depending on level 
of self-esteem, thus in an authoritarian reaction for low SEs and a democratic reaction for 
high SEs (Hypothesis 5). As in Study 2 and Study 3b effects should be most pronounced on 
the implicit success measure.  
In order to assess possible differences in the level of felt uncertainty this time a 
manipulation check of the uncertainty priming was employed at the end of the study. In Study 
1-3 the influence of political conservatism was controlled only by a one item measure. In 
order to ensure that potential effects are not found due to methodological shortcomings, in 
the present study right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance are additionally 
assessed.  
3.7.1 Method  
3.7.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and sixty students from the University of Mannheim participated in a study 
labeled “Leadership” in return for 2.50 EUR and a chocolate bar. Three participants failed to 
complete the IAT and 18 participants exhibited higher error rates than 21% on IAT 
completion. These participants were therefore excluded from further analyses resulting in a 
total sample size of 139 participants. 51 (37%) participants were male, and 88 (63%) female, 
aged 18 to 40 with an average age of 23.0 years (SD = 3.6). Most of participants were 
students (132, 95%) of various disciplines. They were on average in the 5.2 semester with a 
range from 1 to 19. The remaining 7 participants (7, 5%) were employed or else. For the 
main part, the fist language was German (118, 85%). Those with a different first language 
(21, 15%) stated to have learned German for at least 3 years (M = 11.9, SD = 6.8). 
Participants were run in groups of up to ten at a time. 
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3.7.1.2 Design 
In a between-subject design, participants were randomly assigned to the uncertainty and 
position conditions (Table 14). Half of the participants were primed with self-certainty, the 
other half with self-uncertainty. Orthogonal to the uncertainty priming and directly before IAT 
completion half of the participants were instructed to imagine being in a leader position while 
the other half were told to think of being in a follower position. Level of self-esteem was 
assessed. 
 
Table 14. Between-subject design of Study 4b 
 
High Power (Leader Position) Low Power (Follower Position) 
 High SEs Low SEs High SEs Low SEs 
Certainty Manipulation      
Uncertainty Manipulation      
 
 
3.7.1.3 Experimental Procedure and Materials 
After entering the laboratory, participants were assigned to one of the computers and were 
asked to consent to their participation. Before starting with the experiment, participants 
stated standard demographic information and their political orientation (9-point scale ranging 
from 1 = extremely liberal to 9 = extremely conservative). On average, participants were 
more liberal than conservative in their political orientation, the sample mean was M = 4.12 
(SD = 1.26). The order of experimental manipulations and measures was as follows. First, 
participants completed the personality questionnaires assessing self-esteem and self-
uncertainty to make trait uncertainty salient. Second, state self-uncertainty versus state self-
certainty was experimentally induced by a priming procedure. Third, positive and negative 
affect were assessed in order to rule out mood effects. Fourth, the leader versus follower 
position was primed. Fifth, implicit and subsequently explicit leadership measures were 
administered. Sixth, participants completed scales assessing political conservatism. Finally, 
the manipulation check for the uncertainty priming was assessed. Participants were 
debriefed following APA suggestions, remunerated and thanked for their participation. 
 
Self-Esteem: Participants completed the German version of Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem 
Inventory (see Study 2). The internal consistency was high (Cronbach’s α = .87), and 
participants exhibited a sample mean of M = 3.33 (SD = .48). 
 
Self-Uncertainty: Participants completed the German translation of the Labile Self Esteem 
Scale (Dykman, 1998; see Study 2). The five items of the scale were highly interrelated 
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(Cronbach’s α = .93), and participants showed a sample mean of M = 2.54 (SD = 0.93). In 
addition, participants were presented with the German translation of the Emotional 
Uncertainty subscale of the Uncertainty Response Scale (Greco & Roger, 2001; see Study 
2). The subscale was internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .91), with participants’ mean 
degree of emotional uncertainty being M = 3.45 (SD = 1.06).  
 
Uncertainty Manipulation: In order to experimentally manipulate uncertainty participants 
responded to questions as in Study 3b (Van den Bos, 2001). The questions were slightly 
altered. Participants were asked to describe one’s feelings and physical reactions to 
uncertainty versus certainty. The exact German wording is presented in Appendix A.  
 
Mood: All participants completed a translated German short version of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988), five items measuring positive affect 
and five items measuring negative affect. Both subsets of the PANAS were averaged to form 
subscales with satisfying internal consistencies (positive affect: Cronbach’s α = .67; negative 
affect: Cronbach’s α =.79). The sample mean for positive affect was M = 2.69 (SD = 0.64), 
the sample mean for negative affect was M = 1.37 (SD = 0.54). 
 
Power Manipulation: In order to manipulate the level of perceived power experimentally half 
of the participants were instructed: “During the completion of the following task, please 
imagine another person that is in a leadership position towards you”, while the other half was 
told: “During the completion of the following task, please imagine another person towards 
that you are in a leadership position”. The exact German wording is provided in Appendix C. 
 
Leadership Measures: All participants completed the success IAT already used in Study 1, 
Study 2, and Study 3b. Internal consistency was satisfying (Cronbach’s α = .81). The 
average z-standardized IAT effect was M = 0.52 (SD = 0.44). As in Study 3b, the valence IAT 
was not employed because the relevant attitude changes were expected on the cognitive 
success dimension.  
Subsequently, the same explicit measures of general valence and success as in Study 
2 and Study 3b were administered. Internal consistencies were high for all four scales: 
general valence of democratic leadership (Cronbach’s α =.89), general valence of 
authoritarian leadership (Cronbach’s α = .82), general success of democratic leadership 
(Cronbach’s α = .87), general success of authoritarian leadership (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Difference scores were calculated in order to determine the preferences between leadership 
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styles. On average, the difference score of general valence was M = 3.85 (SD = 1.59) and 
the difference score of general success M = 1.15 (SD = 2.12). 
 
RWA and SDO: Participants completed a German 12-item version of Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA 
scale and the German version of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994) already used in Study 1. 
The intercorrelation of the twelve items assessing right-wing authoritarianism was satisfying 
(Cronbach’s α = .77), and the sample mean was M = 3.28 (SD = 0.87). The SDO scale was 
internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .86) with a sample mean of M = 2.85 (SD = 0.91). 
 
Uncertainty Manipulation Check: The experiment finished with a manipulation check for the 
uncertainty manipulation, asking participants to remember and indicate how they felt during 
completion of the uncertainty task on 10 items adapted from McGregor and colleagues 
(2001). The manipulation check of felt uncertainty was scaled such that higher values 
indicated higher uncertainty. Certainty items were recoded and given that internal 
consistency was high (Cronbach’s α = .92) all items were combined to form a single index. 
The sample mean was M = 2.81 (SD = 1.10).   
3.7.2 Results 
Uncertainty Manipulation Check: The uncertainty manipulation check was subjected to a 
hierarchical regression analysis, including self-esteem level, uncertainty and position in Step 
1, the two-way interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3. As 
intended, perceived uncertainty was positively related to the manipulation of uncertainty,       
β = .20, t(135) = 2.34, p < .05, that is, participants in the uncertainty condition (M = 3.03,    
SD = 1.22) as compared to the certainty condition (M = 2.59, SD = 0.90) reported having felt 
significantly more uncertain. In addition, there was a significant main effect for self-esteem,   
β = -.21, t(135) = -2.47, p < .05, that is, regardless of conditions low SEs reported higher 
levels of felt uncertainty than high SEs. The power manipulation (leader vs. follower position) 
had no significant effect on the manipulation check, β = -.03, t(135) = -0.35, p > .73, and 
none of the interactions were significant (all p > .36). Thus, the manipulation of uncertainty 
was successful. 
 
Mood: The Positive and Negative Affect scales were separately subjected to hierarchical 
regression analyses, including uncertainty, self-esteem level and position in Step 1, the two-
way interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3. Positive affect 
was in tendency negatively related to the manipulation of uncertainty, β = -.14, t(135) = -1.73, 
p < .10. In addition, there was a marginally significant main effect for self-esteem, β = .16, 
t(135) = 1.93, p < .10. All interaction terms in Step 2 and Step 3 were non-significant           
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(all p > .29). Negative affect was unrelated to the uncertainty and power manipulations       
(all p > .13). There was, however, a significant negative relation to self-esteem, β = -.38, 
t(135) = -4.77, p < .01. In Step 2 and Step 3 only the two-way interaction between self-
esteem and power yielded significance, β = .77, t(132) = 3.09, p < .01 (all other p > .13). 
Importantly, however, controlling for the PANAS scales did not affect any of the results of 
Study 4b. Therefore, they were not included in the analyses reported below. 
 
Covariates: The experimental conditions did not differ in self-esteem, self-esteem instability 
or emotional uncertainty (all p > .19). Self-esteem instability and emotional uncertainty were 
included in all subsequent analyses as a covariate in order to control for possible general 
effects of dispositional uncertainty. However, no such effects were found and therefore self-
esteem instability and emotional uncertainty were dropped from the analyses reported below. 
There were also no differences between conditions in regard of political orientation, right-
wing authoritarianism or social dominance orientation (all p > .15). All of these scales were 
included as covariates in order to control for possible general effects but no such effects 
occurred. Only political orientation was a significant predictor and the analyses including this 
variable are reported below. 
 
Explicit Leadership Measures: Explicit leadership preferences regarding valence and success 
were entered in two independent hierarchical regression analyses, including uncertainty, self-
esteem, and position as well as political conservatism as a covariate in Step 1, the two-way 
interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction term in Step 3.  
Political orientation was a significant predictor of explicit valence, β = -.36,             
t(132) = -4.32, p < .01, and success evaluations, β = -.25, t(132) = -2.90, p < .01. Thus, 
participants with higher political conservatism showed lower preferences for democratic 
leadership on both dimensions. All other predictors and interactions remained insignificant 
(all p > .12). All main and interaction effects predicting explicit valence evaluations are 
presented in Table 15. All main and interaction effects predicting explicit success evaluations 
are presented in Table 16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Part   
 
92
Table 15. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and position predicting explicit 
valence evaluations 
 
Explicit Valence β t P 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Position (P) 
-.36 
 .26 
 .03 
-.03 
-4.23 
 0.22 
 0.37 
 0.35 
.00 
.83 
.71 
.73 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
 .03 
-.27 
 .30 
 0.21 
-1.00 
 1.11 
.83 
.32 
.27 
U x SE x P -.39 -0.95 .35 
 
 
Table 16. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and position predicting explicit 
success evaluations 
 
Explicit Success β t p 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Position (P) 
-.25 
-.10 
 .14 
-.08 
-2.90 
-1.23 
 1.59 
-0.96 
.004 
.22 
.12 
.34 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
 .05 
-.25 
-.07 
 0.40 
-0.90 
-0.26 
.69 
.37 
.79 
U x SE x P -.54 -1.30 .20 
 
 
Implicit Leadership Measure: Success IAT effects were subjected to a hierarchical regression 
analysis, including uncertainty, self-esteem, position and political conservatism as a 
covariate in Step 1, the two-way interaction terms in Step 2, and the three-way interaction 
term in Step 3.  
Implicit leadership success associations were significantly related to the political 
orientation, β = -.22, t(134) = -2.52, p < .05, implying that the more conservative participants 
were, the weaker were their associations between democratic leadership + success and 
authoritarian leadership + failure. There were no other significant main effects (all p > .69). In 
Step 2, the interaction of uncertainty and self-esteem, β = .27, t(131) = 2.05, p < .05, as well 
as the interaction of self-esteem and position, β = -.57, t(131) = -2.10, p < .05, were 
significant. In order to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, simple slope analyses for the 
interaction between uncertainty and self-esteem were calculated (Aiken & West, 1991). For 
low SEs (one standard deviation below the mean) analyses yielded a negative, β = -.43, 
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t(131) = -2.26, p < .05, and for high SEs (one standard deviation above the mean) analyses 
yielded a positive slope, β = .43, t(131) = 2.23, p < .05. Thus, low SEs exhibited weaker 
associations between democratic + success and authoritarian + failure relative to stronger 
associations between democratic + failure and authoritarian + success in the uncertainty 
compared to the certainty condition. High SEs showed stronger associations between 
democratic + success and authoritarian + failure relative to weaker associations between 
democratic + failure and authoritarian + success in the uncertainty compared to the certainty 
condition. These results imply an authoritarian reaction for low SEs and a democratic 
reaction for high SEs. Simple slopes are depicted in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Z-standardized success IAT effects as a function of self-esteem and uncertainty of Study 
4b. 
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, β = -.88, 
t(130) = -2.18, p < .05 (overall F(8,130) = 2.87, p < .01, ∆R2 = .10). Thus, two hierarchical 
regression analyses for the leader and follower condition were conducted separately, 
including uncertainty, self-esteem, and political conservatism as covariate in Step 1 and the 
interaction term in Step 2. It was expected that the two-way interaction between uncertainty 
and self-esteem would be non-significant in the leader, but significant in the follower 
condition. 
In the leader condition, Step 1 only revealed a significant main effect for the covariate 
of political orientation, β = -.25, t(68) = -2.11, p > .05. In Step 2 the interaction between 
uncertainty and self-esteem was, indeed, not significant, β = .003, t(67) = .02, p > .98 (overall 
F(4,67) = 2.08, p < .10, ∆R2 = .06). Simple slopes are depicted in Figure 12A. 
In the follower condition, the covariate of political orientation showed no significant 
effects. Uncertainty was unrelated to reactions on the success IAT. Implicit success 
evaluations, however, were positively related to self-esteem, β = .24, t(63) = 2.00, p < .05, 
thus participants with higher self-esteem showed stronger implicit associations between 
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democratic + success and authoritarian + failure. Importantly, the interaction of uncertainty 
and self-esteem yielded significance, β = .67, t(62) = 3.26, p < .01, (overall F(4,62) = 4.16,    
p < .01, ∆R2 = .16). Following Aiken and West (1991) simple slopes were calculated. For 
participants with low self-esteem (one standard deviation below the mean), a negative slope 
occurred, β = -.76, t(62) = -2.78, p < .01, implying an authoritarian reaction. In contrast, for 
high SEs (one standard deviation above the mean), a positive slope emerged, β = .72, t(62) 
= 2.60, p < .05, implying a democratic reaction. Simple slopes are depicted in Figure 12B. All 
main and interaction effects predicting implicit success evaluations are presented in Table 
17. 
 
Table 17. Main and Interaction Effects of uncertainty, self-esteem and position predicting explicit 
success evaluations 
 
Implicit Success β t p 
Political Orientation 
Uncertainty (U) 
Self-Esteem (SE) 
Position (P) 
-.22 
 .01 
 .01 
-.03 
-2.52 
 0.14 
 0.16 
-0.40 
.01 
.89 
.87 
.69 
U x SE 
U x P 
P x SE 
 .27 
 .03 
-.57 
 2.05 
 0.11 
-2.10 
.04 
.91 
.04 
U x SE x P -.88 -2.18 .03 
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B) Low Power (Follower Position) 
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Figure 12. Z-standardized success IAT effects as a function of self-esteem and uncertainty in (A) the 
leader and (B) the follower condition of Study 4b.  
3.7.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 4b are in line with hypotheses. Under certainty, participants clearly 
preferred democratic over authoritarian leadership on explicit as well as implicit leadership 
measures (Hypothesis 1). Under uncertainty low SEs showed an authoritarian reaction 
(Hypothesis 2), whereas high SEs exhibited a democratic reaction (Hypothesis 3). This two-
way interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction. That is, only participants that 
imagined being in a follower position exhibited a differential reaction to uncertainty depending 
on their level of self-esteem (Hypothesis 5). In contrast, uncertainty did not affect the 
reactions of participants that thought of being in a leader position. As under certainty, they 
exhibited a democratic standard attitude regardless of level of self-esteem (Hypothesis 4b). 
Thus, imagining being in a leader position is sufficient to cancel out an authoritarian reaction 
to uncertainty even if uncertainty is induced by a combined manipulation. The manipulation 
check indicated that the uncertainty priming induced feelings of uncertainty in high and low 
SES as well as in high and low power individuals. Thus, the differential effects of self-esteem 
and power under uncertainty were not due to different levels of perceived uncertainty. In 
addition, the present study employed the RWA and the SDO scale beside the one item 
measure of political orientation. The impact of uncertainty, self-esteem and power on the 
implicit success measure, however, were independent of conservatism and authoritarianism. 
Again, the expected reactions were found on the implicit success measure but not on the 
explicit leadership evaluations indicating that the implicit measure is more sensitive to such 
effects. In summary, Study 4b could replicate and extent of the findings of Study 3b. 
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4 General Discussion 
The present dissertation set out to specify the circumstances under which individuals tend to 
show a self-imposed subordination under authorities. In a series of studies the hypotheses 
were tested that individuals under certainty prefer democratic over authoritarian leadership, 
but that under uncertainty low SEs exhibit an authoritarian reaction, whereas high SEs show 
a democratic reaction. In line with previous research this differential pattern was only 
assumed on the cognitive-based success, but not on the affect-related valence dimension. 
Moreover, due to social desirability effects implicit measures were expected to be more 
sensitive for the authoritarian reaction. Going one step further, it was investigated whether 
salience of high power is an effective means to cancel out the reactions to uncertainty. In the 
following, the main findings are summarized (4.1) and the postulated theoretical framework is 
reconsidered in this regard (4.2). Relations to other approaches are identified and discussed 
(4.3). Implications for future research (4.4) are outlined and the section closes with a 
conclusion on whether uncertainty states a risk for democracy (4.5).  
4.1 Summary of findings 
For the purpose of the present research new explicit and implicit measures discriminating 
between perceived valence and success of leadership were developed and validated in 
Study 1. Participants strongly preferred democratic over authoritarian leadership regarding 
valence and success on both implicit and explicit leadership measures supporting the 
assumption of a democratic standard attitude (Hypothesis 1). As expected, implicit 
leadership measures (valence and success IAT) were related to their explicit counterparts 
(item-based and general leadership evaluations) and the assessed authoritarianism scale, 
but unrelated with social dominance orientation that seems to be conceptually independent.  
Employing these new measures in Study 2, 3b and 4b revealed a clear and consistent 
pattern of results. The present findings strongly suggest that perceived uncertainty has 
differential effects on leadership evaluations of high and low SEs. While under neutral or 
certain conditions high and low SEs clearly preferred democratic over authoritarian 
leadership, that is, exhibited a democratic standard attitude (Hypothesis 1), low SEs showed 
a decrease (Hypothesis 2) and high SEs an increase (Hypothesis 3) in their democratic 
preference when uncertain. Moreover, the former democratic and the latter authoritarian 
reaction were specific for the cognitive-based success, but not for the affect-related valence 
dimension of leadership evaluation and were only expressed on implicit but not on explicit 
measures.  
The reliability and validity of results are underscored by the fact that the hypothesized 
pattern was replicated across studies with differences in the operationalizations of 
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uncertainty. Study 2 examined the reactions of low SEs to introspective thoughts of their own 
self-uncertainty induced by the assessment of personality questionnaires, Study 3b 
manipulated self-uncertainty experimentally via a priming procedure and Study 4b combined 
both manipulations.  
Study 3a/b and Study 4a/b investigated the moderational influence of a second 
individual-difference variable, namely power (Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5). In Study 3a/b 
perceived power was manipulated by making dispositional power salient. Drawing on social 
embodiment research a new non-verbal measure was constructed in order to assess 
dispositional levels of power. This measure was successfully validated in Study 3a 
demonstrating correlations with power-related concepts such as power, achievement, 
leadership motivation and dominance but not with power-unrelated concepts such as 
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, or self-
esteem. Study 3b employed the Spatial Power Measure to make dispositional power salient. 
In Study 4a/b level of power was manipulated experimentally via a priming procedure. Study 
4a showed that priming a leader position led to higher scores on the Spatial Power Measure 
than priming a follower position supporting the notion that leadership implies power. 
Therefore, in Study 4b power was manipulated experimentally by this position prime.  
Study 3b and 4b showed a consistent pattern of results that was in line with Hypothesis 
4b that awareness of having high power promotes reliance on general belief structures 
instead of high cognitive expectancy elaborations. That is, even under uncertainty, both the 
salience of dispositional high power and the priming of leader position led to a democratic 
standard attitude comparable to that under neutral or certain conditions. 
Taken together, the present studies revealed a highly consistent and reliable pattern of 
results. Regardless of operational and methodological differences, the reaction to uncertainty 
was democratic for high SEs and authoritarian for low SEs and high power was sufficient to 
neutralize these reactions resulting in a democratic standard attitude.  
It has been shown that threat interacts with dispositional authoritarianism to influence 
authoritarian attitudes and behavior (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005; see 2.1.2). In the 
present research, also a polarization effect occurred under uncertainty, but the moderating 
individual-difference variable was self-esteem and not authoritarianism. That is, low SEs 
showed an authoritarian, whereas high SEs exhibited a democratic reaction to uncertainty. In 
the present studies, the results were independent of varying levels of political conservatism, 
authoritarianism or social dominance orientation. In showing that under uncertainty self-
esteem and power have a moderating influence on leadership evaluations, therefore, the 
present dissertation offers an important extension to the previous authoritarianism research.  
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4.2 The Theoretical Framework Reconsidered 
Beyond the empirical level of analysis, the theoretical framework outlined in the delineation of 
hypothesis (see 2.7) can be reconsidered in the light of the present results. The following 
section is intended to address some issues that deserve particular mention. That is, why has 
the deliberative process of uncertainty resolution an impact on implicit measures that are 
assumed to assess automatic processes (4.2.1)? Are the found effects due to high power or 
rather low power (4.2.2)? Why is the differentiation between the two dimensions success and 
valence important (4.2.3)? Why is the differentiation between the implicit and explicit 
processes important (4.2.4)? And do implicit processes have an effect on behavior (4.2.5)? 
4.2.1 Deliberation and Automaticity – a Paradox? 
Strack and Deutsch (2004) as well as Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) assumed 
associative processes to encompass characteristics of automaticity as operating fast, 
efficiently, and independent of intention. As the authoritarian and democratic reactions were 
only found on implicit measures that are assumed to reflect associative processes, they 
should, at least to a certain degree, be automatic. The theoretical framework of the present 
dissertation is based on deliberative expectancy-value considerations caused by the motive 
of uncertainty reduction. At first sight, automaticity and deliberation seem to be contradicting 
as they are assumed to be conceptual different processes. This is, however, only the case if 
both kinds of processes are expected to take place simultaneously. In the present studies, 
participants were always at first confronted with an uncertainty manipulation and thought 
about self-uncertainty at least for a few minutes. Drawing on Weary and Edwards’ (1996) 
causal uncertainty model the following processes can be assumed during that time slot. The 
“comparator” identifies a discrepancy between the current state of uncertainty and the 
desired state of certainty and activates potential action plans, that is, thoughts of “What to 
do?” in order to reduce the perceived discrepancy. These action plans are analyzed by the 
“outcome expectancy assessor” that assesses the respective success expectancies, that is, 
thoughts of “Can I successfully perform this behavior?” Whether an action plan is expected to 
be successful is determined by taking the current context and past actions into account. 
These assumptions were formalized in an expectancy-value model (see 2.4). The crucial 
point that differentiates high and low SEs from each other is whether they believe themselves 
to be able to efficiently contribute to uncertainty reduction. Whereas high SEs do, low SEs do 
not. Thus, high SEs are prepared to act, whereas low SEs doubt their abilities. Presented 
with two leadership styles that differ in the degree of granted participation this differential pre-
activation, in turn, results in a democratic reaction for high SEs and an authoritarian reaction 
for low SEs. The responses on the implicit measure themselves are non-deliberative and 
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show characteristics of automaticity, but they are the consequence of a deliberative process 
of weighing expectancies that took place beforehand.  
In summary, uncertainty is expected to activate the deliberation about potential action 
plans and their respective success expectancies that, in turn, differentially predispose high 
and low SEs to respond automatically with a democratic or authoritarian reaction. These 
assumptions are depicted in Figure13. 
 
Uncertainty
High SEs
Low SEs
What to do?
Can I do it?
Deliberation
Democratic Reaction
Authoritarian Reaction
Automatic Response
yes
no
 
 
Figure 13. Schematic overview of hypothesized deliberative and automatic processes. 
4.2.2 Are the effects driven by powerfulness or powerlessness? 
In Study 3b and 4b differential reactions of high and low SEs to uncertainty only occurred 
under conditions of low power. High power, in contrast, led to the exhibition of democratic 
standard attitudes for both high and low SEs. The present findings are in line with previous 
research that reported powerful individuals to be more focused on goal pursuit, more ready 
to act, and less distractable by irrelevant information than powerless individuals (Galinsky et 
al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a). They are also consistent with literature showing that powerful 
individuals exhibit a simplified processing orientation and rely on pre-existing belief structures 
and values if the situation does not require more extensive deliberation (Briñol et al., 2007; 
Keltner et al., 2003). However, one could argue that the differential effects of high and low 
power are mainly driven by powerlessness instead of powerfulness in the present studies. 
Thus, only high SEs that feel powerless strive to increase their influence and show a 
democratic reaction and only powerless low SEs shy away from having influence and exhibit 
an authoritarian reaction. A closer look at the data of Study 3b shows that the distribution of 
power is skewed with an average score above the midpoint 3.00 (M = 3.15, SD = 0.39). The 
instruction to imagine being in a follower position in Study 4a also led to average power 
scores near the midpoint 3.00 of the scale (M = 2.98, SD = 0.41). Thus, only a few 
participants saw themselves as being absolutely powerless and, therefore, low power is not 
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low in an absolute sense but only in comparison to high power. According to this data it 
seems more plausible that median power is the normal case for the majority of students who 
participated in the present studies. Salience of high power, however, induces higher 
confidence and serves as a buffer against the reactions to uncertainty. Once induced the 
salience of dispositional high power (Study 3b) or the manipulation of leader position (Study 
4b) provide high and low SEs with the means to circumvent extensive deliberation of 
expectancies and to rely on their democratic standard attitude. The hypothesized processes 
are presented in Figure 14. 
 
Certainty
Uncertainty
Democratic Standard Attitude
Democratic Reaction
Authoritarian Reaction
High SEs
Low SEs
High Power Salient
Power Not Salient
Low Power Salient
 
 
Figure 14. Schematic overview of the full model including the hypothesized effect of power on the 
reactions to uncertainty.  
4.2.3 Why is the differentiation between success and valence 
important? 
Deviations from the democratic standard attitude were only observed for the success but not 
for the valence dimension (Study 2). That is, under uncertainty high SEs showed an increase 
and low SEs a decrease in their implicit democratic success preferences but no significant 
changes in their democratic valence preferences. Regardless of conditions and type of 
measurement, democratic leadership was evaluated as pleasant and authoritarian leadership 
as unpleasant.  
Valence evaluations were conceived as the affective and success evaluations as the 
cognitive component of leadership attitudes. Regarding valence judgments, it has been 
argued that democratic leadership communicates appreciation and respect (Tyler & Lind, 
1992), whereas authoritarian leadership is linked to strong negative emotions (Bass, 1990; 
De Cremer, 2007; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004). Research on attitude extremity proposed 
that extreme attitudes have a higher resistance to change than more indifferent attitudes 
(Abelson, 1995). Affective valence evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership 
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seem to be more extreme than cognitive success evaluations because ratings on the explicit 
valence scale tended to the poles, whereas ratings on the success scale were nearer to the 
midpoint (see Study 1, 2, 3b, and 4b). It can be suggested that whereas valence evaluations 
of democratic and authoritarian leadership are strong and characterized by extremity, and 
intra-component non-ambivalence, success evaluations encompass more intra-component 
inconsistency and ambivalence what makes them more pliable and unstable (e.g., Armitage 
& Conner, 2000), because they elicit greater cognitive elaboration (Hänze, 2001). In addition, 
previous research on attitude components provided evidence that the cognitive component is 
more affected by cognitive and the affective component is more affected by affective 
influence attempts (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999). The weighing of 
expectancies is a cognitive process and should, therefore, have a much stronger impact on 
success than on valence evaluations.  
Under certainty, the fundamental need for security is satisfied and evaluations of 
leadership are independent of the goal to resolve uncertainty. Consequently, individuals do 
not have to engage in weighing processes of expectancies and can rely on their democratic 
standard attitude regarding both valence and success. Previous research indicates that 
under normal conditions leadership evaluations are mainly influenced by valence judgments. 
Factor analytic studies, for example, consistently found that a single dimension accounts for 
most of the variance in leadership ratings (Bass, 1990; Russell, 2001; Scullen, Mount, & 
Goff, 2000), indicating a large impact of an affective component, i.e. how raters feel towards 
the leader (Brown & Keeping, 2005). Consistently, field studies demonstrated that 
performance appraisals were a function of how well the evaluator liked the person being 
evaluated (Varma, Denisi, & Peters, 1996). 
The formalization of the uncertainty reduction motivation in an expectancy-value model 
takes only the expectancy whether participation is successful in resolving uncertainty and the 
value of uncertainty resolution into account. The valence of participation itself plays no role in 
these considerations. The certainly positive valence of uncertainty reduction does not 
necessarily imply that the means with which it is attained is evaluated as pleasant itself. If the 
weighing processes take place under uncertainty and if participation is linked to democratic 
and no participation to authoritarian leadership, then the choice between the two leadership 
styles should depend more strongly on success than on valence evaluations.  
In conclusion, under certainty both valence and success evaluations –with an 
advantage of the valence dimension- should influence the choice between democratic and 
authoritarian leadership resulting in a clear democratic preference. Under uncertainty, goal-
directed considerations especially take success expectancies into account. High SEs hold 
high expectancies and show a democratic reaction, low SEs have low expectancies and 
exhibit an authoritarian reaction. As the motive to resolve uncertainty is primary under 
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conditions of uncertainty, the judgment whether a leadership style is successful in uncertainty 
reduction should be most important. Pleasantness, in contrast, should play a minor role. 
Moreover, Lewin (1935) stated that the valence of an object is derived from the fact that the 
object is a means to need satisfaction (p.78) and consistently it has been shown that need 
related objects are judged more positively under deprivation (Drobes et al., 2001; Lavy & van 
den Hout, 1993), whereas the value of objects irrelevant for the activated need decreases 
(Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003). This could be explained as follows: The evaluation on 
the cognitive success dimension changes under uncertainty and is then in conflict with the 
affective valence dimension producing inter-component ambivalence. As explicated in 
section 2.2.3, ambivalence however promotes the desire to resolve the evaluative tension 
and the attitude is more prone to changes. First evidence for the assumption that success 
evaluations precede valence evaluations is provided by Study 1. There, leadership measures 
were administered in two order conditions: success-valence and valence success. 
Interestingly, although not significant, the order condition success-valence yielded a nearly 
twice as high correlation between the success and the valence IAT (r = .41, p < .001) than 
the order condition valence-success (r = .24, p < .05). Thus, in the long run also the valence 
evaluations of democratic and authoritarian leadership might change. 
4.2.4 Why is the differentiation between implicit and explicit important? 
Across studies, the present research found that uncertainty led in low SEs to more 
authoritarian and in high SEs to more democratic implicit success evaluations compared to 
conditions of certainty. Explicit success evaluations of high and low SEs, however, remained 
largely unaffected by the employed uncertainty manipulations. In their APE model Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen’s (2006) explain differences of explicit and implicit evaluations by 
validation processes during propositional reasoning. They argue that associative evaluations 
are examined in respect of their consistency with activated propositions and are rejected as a 
valid basis for explicit judgments in case of inconsistency. The present dissertation 
hypothesized that the associations between authoritarian + success and democratic + failure 
should conflict with propositions belonging to a general system of democratic values most 
individuals hold in Western cultures. Thus, the authoritarian reaction expected for low SEs 
under uncertainty should only be expressed on implicit measures assessing the automatic 
evaluations of leadership success. Results were consistent with this hypothesis (see Study 2, 
3b, & 4b). On the other hand, the associations between democratic + success and 
authoritarian + failure should be in line with predominant democratic values. Increased 
democratic preferences should therefore be regarded as valid and the democratic reaction of 
high SEs should be expressed on implicit and explicit measures. Actually, not only the 
authoritarian but also the democratic reaction was only found on implicit but not on explicit 
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leadership measures (see Study 3b & 4b). The finding that even associative evaluations that 
are consistent with existing propositional networks are not expressed in explicit judgments 
also occurred in a previous study. Baccus, Baldwin and Packer (2004) reported an increase 
in implicit self-esteem after a repeated pairing of self-relevant information and smiling faces. 
Explicit self-esteem measures, however, remained unaffected by this conditioning procedure. 
In their assumptions Gawronski and Bodenhausen drew on Strack and Deutsch’s 
(2004) reflective-impulsive model. A closer look at this model might help to explain the 
present finding that differences in leadership evaluations only emerged on implicit measures. 
The impulsive system is conceived of as a simple associative network (see also, Anderson & 
Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981) in which spreading activation is induced by perceptual input or 
reflective processes. Elements in this network are connected via associative links with 
different strengths and the activation of an element spreads to other elements in proportion 
to the strength of the links between them. Activation varies and information is only retrieved 
for further elaboration if the activation level exceeds a certain threshold. Thus, elements in 
this network require activation potential (Higgins, 1996) and the closer the activation level is 
to the threshold the less additional activation is necessary for retrieval or further processing. 
Without frequent and recent activation, however, the activation level decays and in 
consequence the information becomes less accessible. Information that is well connected 
with other nodes is more likely to be activated by spreading activation and, in turn, more 
accessible than isolated information. Links between elements are created or strengthened by 
the principle of temporal or spatial similarity (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Smith & DeCoster, 
2000). The resulting structures form associative clusters of frequently co-occurring 
environmental aspects and affective, cognitive, or behavioral reactions. They do not carry 
semantic meaning or a truth value by themselves, but reflect correlations between elements 
of mutual activation. 
The reflective system retrieves the elements from the impulsive system and generates 
declarative knowledge by assigning truth values to the concept and the relation. It is driven 
by the principle of consistency and if a proposition is not consistent with other propositions 
momentarily considered as relevant, it is invalidated by reversing the truth value. 
The impulsive system is fast and requires little cognitive capacity or intention for 
evaluation. It is independent of the assignment of truth values, i.e. activation occurs 
irrespective of whether an evaluation is considered as valid or invalid. The reflective system 
transforms input from the associative store into propositions that are then considered as 
accurate or inaccurate if sufficient processing time, capacity and information are available. 
Both systems are supposed to operate in parallel, but whereas the impulsive system is 
always engaged in information processing of stimuli, the engagement of the reflective system 
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depends on the pre-activation of associations. Whether an element enters the reflective 
system depends on its accessibility, that is, its excitation level. 
As explicit measures are supposed to tap knowledge structures and belief systems and 
implicit measures associative structures, these assumptions can be applied to the findings of 
the present research. Associative evaluations require a certain activation potential to be 
considered for propositional reasoning. Activation patterns of the democratic and the 
authoritarian reaction may not have reached the threshold for further processing and were, 
therefore, only exhibited on implicit but not on explicit measures. This can be explained by 
the circumstance that awareness of self-uncertainty is an exceptional state that occurs rarely 
in everyday life because individuals avoid thoughts of self-uncertainty if possible. Assuming 
that both certainty and uncertainty serve as stimuli activating different patterns of 
associations, the associative pattern related to certainty should have been activated more 
frequently and should be more strongly interconnected than that of uncertainty. Therefore, 
one could argue that the authoritarian reaction of low SEs and the democratic reaction of 
high SEs to uncertainty were only found on implicit measures because the excitation level of 
these activation patterns was not sufficient in order to enter the reflective system. Instead, for 
the explicit judgment an associative pattern was retrieved that had a higher excitation level 
due to its frequent activation and connectedness, that is, the democratic standard attitude.  
However, an influence of the democratic and authoritarian reaction on explicit 
judgments seems likely when awareness of self-uncertainty is not exceptional as in the 
present studies but a frequent state. Thus, the more often external stimuli induce self-
uncertainty and resultant feelings of uncertainty cannot be avoided, the more frequently are 
goal-related associative patterns activated and by this the higher become their excitation 
levels. Serious external threats can induce much stronger feelings of uncertainty than in the 
present studies and by this the goal of uncertainty reduction should also become more 
important. Thus more enduring and stronger states of self-uncertainty should heighten the 
accessibility of matching associative patterns, that is, the democratic reaction for high SEs 
and the authoritarian reaction for low SEs.  
4.2.5 Do implicit processes influence behavior? 
The research interest in attitudes is to a great extent determined by the goal to predict 
behavior. According to Strack and Deutsch (2004) behavioral schemata are localized in the 
impulsive system but can be activated by both associative links and reflective processes. As 
with other elements in the impulsive system also behavioral schemata have to be activated 
above a certain threshold in order to initiate the actual behavior. Whereas the reflective 
system elicits behavior through a deliberative process of decision-making and intending, the 
impulsive system operates through the associative spreading of activation. The two systems 
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can have synergistic and antagonistic effects. They can jointly activate the same behavioral 
schemata and by this heighten the activation level and, in turn, the likelihood of execution. 
Being independent of each other, the systems can also compete if they have an impact on 
different incompatible behavioral schemata or if the reflective system inhibits an impulsively 
activated behavior. Whether and which schema will then be executed depends on the 
respective activation level. A strong precursor of impulsive behavior is the deprivation of 
basic needs. Under these circumstances behavioral schemata that were previously related to 
need satisfaction will be activated and are likely to be predominant.  
Oesterreich (2005) claims that during childhood the flight into the security of persons in 
charge is the normal reaction to threat and uncertainty. It can be hypothesized that high SEs 
efficiently replaced their originally authoritarian strategies to cope with uncertainty by more 
autonomous reactions, whereas low SEs never developed useful alternatives to replace their 
authoritarian reaction to uncertainty. Drawing on the expectancy-value model one could 
argue that high and low SEs believe different strategies to be successful. Due to differential 
expectancy levels that can be influenced by prior experiences, high SEs believe acting 
themselves and low SEs believe placing the responsibility on someone else to be the best 
solution of uncertainty. Consequently, in high SEs the primary goal of uncertainty reduction 
should activate autonomous behavior, in low SEs, however, tendencies to flee into the 
security of authorities, resulting in democratic behavior of the former and authoritarian 
behavior of the latter. 
4.3 Relations to Other Approaches  
In the following two other research approaches are introduced that can be linked to the 
present research project. First, whether the authoritarian and democratic reaction found on 
the implicit success measure could be interpreted as an ascription to authoritarian or 
democratic leadership prototypes is discussed (4.3.1). Second, how the effects are related to 
research on mood and information processing is outlined (4.3.2).  
4.3.1 Leadership Prototypes 
Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 
1987), Hogg (2000) proposes that ascription to a group prototype is an effective way to 
reduce uncertainty (see 2.3.2). Social identity theory states that one’s self-concept is, in part, 
defined in terms of group membership, such that positive evaluations of one’s group lead to a 
positive self-concept. Individuals strive for a positive evaluation of their group and, hence, for 
a positive social identity. In turn, the desire for positive distinctiveness promotes favoritism of 
the in-group and discrimination of the out-group (Turner, 1975). Whereas social identity 
theory focuses on intergroup behavior as a function of intergroup beliefs and the pursuit of 
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positive social identity, self-categorization theory explicates the process of social 
categorization itself. It is assumed that individuals cognitively represent social groups or 
categories as prototypes. According to Hogg (2000), prototypes are context-specific fuzzy 
sets defining and evaluating attributes that characterize one group and distinguish it from 
another. They are constructed to the principle of meta-contrast, thus maximizing the ratio of 
perceived intergroup differences to intragroup differences. In other words, similarities within 
the group and differences between groups are emphasized. Identification with a group 
operates via social categorization and depersonalization. Individuals categorize themselves 
to a salient social category, redefine themselves in terms of the group and by this assign the 
prototypical attributes of the group to themselves (Turner et al., 1987). During the process of 
depersonalization they cognitively and behaviorally assimilate to these features and their 
self-conception is transformed such that all aspects of their feelings, beliefs, and behaviors 
are assimilated to the in-group prototype. Others are perceived through the lens of features 
defined by the in- or out-group prototype resulting in stereotypical homogenization. By this, 
depersonalization affixes evaluative group attributes to self and positive self-evaluation is 
derived from group membership because the self is evaluated in terms of the usually positive 
in-group prototypes.  
According to Hogg’s (2000) uncertainty reduction hypothesis, under uncertainty 
individuals identify with groups and via a process of depersonalization assimilate to the in-
group prototype. Due to a gradient of prototypicality within groups, some group members are 
more prototypical than others. In his social identity theory of leadership, Hogg (2001) 
postulates that if prototypicality is relevant (e.g., under uncertainty), prototypical group 
members are more influential and more likely to become a leader. If leaders, however, are 
prototypical and prototypical members best embody the group’s attributes, assimilation to the 
in-group prototype means assimilation to the group’s leader.  
Whilst interpreting the present findings in line with these assumptions, the results 
suggest that uncertainty has differential effects on the preferred leadership prototype of high 
and low SEs. While high SEs subscribe to a democratic prototype, low SEs assimilate to an 
authoritarian prototype in order to reduce uncertainty. Prototypes are seen as 
multidimensional sets that are stored in memory, but can be modified to varying degrees by 
the social context. In the present research the use of implicit measures was crucial for 
demonstrating the differential reaction to uncertainty by high and low SEs. It could be argued 
that prototypes are represented as associative activation patterns and as activation patterns 
can change in response to contextual cues (see 2.6.3) also activated leader prototypes do. 
Under uncertainty the prototype that best fits and satisfies the activated need to reduce this 
aversive state becomes salient. Whereas a democratic prototype may seem to be more 
successful in reducing uncertainty for high SEs, an authoritarian prototype may be more 
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promising in need satisfaction for low SEs. As the search for the best fitting prototype “is a 
fast and relatively automatic cognitive perceptual interactive process that stabilizes when fit 
is optimized” (p. 188, Hogg, 2001), implicit measures might be more sensitive than explicit 
measures to assess this underlying mechanism.  
Following this reasoning, completing the success IAT per se should reduce feelings of 
uncertainty. The following hypothetical experiment could put this hypothesis to a test. Self-
uncertainty versus self-certainty is induced experimentally as in Study 3b and 4b, IAT 
completion follows and felt uncertainty is directly assessed afterwards. Half of the 
participants respond to the success IAT used in the present research, the other half works on 
a parallel IAT version with success as attribute category but a target category that is 
independent of leadership or social information. As Hogg (2000) proposed that ascription to a 
prototype should reduce felt uncertainty, completion of the leadership success IAT should 
cause lower levels of reported uncertainty compared to the neutral success IAT.  
4.3.2 Mood 
The present dissertation investigated the circumstances that lead to an authoritarian reaction 
and identified the interplay of uncertainty, self-esteem, and power as important influencing 
factors of leadership preferences. It was hypothesized that uncertainty activates the goal of 
uncertainty resolution and higher cognitive elaboration of behavioral alternatives and related 
expectancies in order to attain this goal were assumed. Under certainty, in contrast, reliance 
on the democratic standard attitude was expected. Accordingly, uncertainty led to differential 
reactions in high and low SEs that have been shown to hold different expectancies about 
their capabilities in previous studies, whereas under certainty the attitudes of high and low 
SEs did not differ systematically, indicating that expectancies did not play a role in this case. 
These assumptions are similar to previous research on effects of emotion, mood, and affect. 
In a number of studies, individuals have been shown to engage in more systematic 
processing under conditions of negative affect, and more heuristic processing under 
conditions of positive affect (Batra & Stayman, 1990; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 
1990; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989, 1991; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, 
& Sujan, 1990; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & 
Mark, 1992; Worth & Mackie, 1987; however, see Isen, 1993; Parrott & Sabini, 1990; 
Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995, for exceptions). 
It could be argued that the present findings are due to general mood effects and are 
not specific for uncertainty reduction motives. However, several findings oppose this 
postulation. First of all, in the present studies the effects of uncertainty on leadership 
evaluations were not affected by positive or negative affect. Moreover, although most 
approaches argue that the valence of an affective state is responsible for the effects of mood 
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on cognitive processing, contradictory findings have been reported with regard to negative 
affective states. For example, while sadness activated systematic processing, anger 
motivated heuristic processing (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 
1994; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). Appraisal theories differentiate emotions not only 
along a valence dimension but also along a certainty-uncertainty dimension. Certain feelings 
such as anger, disgust, happiness, or contentment indicate an understanding of what is 
happening and induce a feeling of being able to predict what will happen. More uncertain 
feelings such as hope, surprise, fear, worry, or sadness, in contrast, indicate that one does 
not understand what is happening and induce feelings of being unsure about what will 
happen (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Deconfounding the valence and certainty dimension of emotions, Tiedens and Linton (2001) 
showed in four experiments that -regardless of valence- emotions that are associated with 
uncertainty led to systematic and emotions associated with certainty led to heuristic 
processing. These findings strongly argue for the importance of the certainty–uncertainty 
dimension in emotions. 
To the extent that emotions are negative and uncertain they might have similar effects 
on leadership preferences as reported in the present dissertation. However, following the 
presented argumentation these effects should be due to the motivation of uncertainty 
reduction because it seems difficult to explain the differential effects between high and low 
SEs under uncertainty alone with the negative valence of mood. As unambiguous negative 
affect does not serve as any cue to the goal of uncertainty reduction the assumed 
motivational processes of expectancy-value considerations are not required. 
4.4 Implications for Future Research 
The goal of the present dissertation was to determine the circumstances under which 
democratic leadership –though pleasant- is judged as less successful, whereas success 
evaluations of authoritarian leadership –though unpleasant- increase. Personal uncertainty, 
self-esteem and power were identified to be important moderator variables. Although the 
present research provides converging evidence in support of the main hypotheses that 
uncertainty leads to an authoritarian reaction of low SEs and that the salience of high power 
can cancel out this effect, some open questions remain that call for further investigation. How 
can stronger feelings of uncertainty be induced (4.4.1)? What is the process that mediates 
the differential reactions of high and low SEs to uncertainty (4.4.2)? Are there other variables 
beside power that can cancel out these reactions (4.4.3)? How can these reactions be 
assessed more precisely (4.4.4)? And how do these attitudinal reactions relate to behavior 
(4.4.5)? 
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4.4.1 The Situational Precondition – Further Manipulations 
The present studies already relied on two different ways to induce self-uncertainty, that is, 
salience of trait uncertainty and priming of state uncertainty. However, it seems important to 
put the hypotheses to the test with even broader ways of uncertainty and threat 
manipulations. Terror Management Theory, for example, supposes that people who are 
reminded of death or who perceive a deadly threat (mortality salience) are more likely to 
favor charismatic and authoritarian over relationship-oriented leaders (Cohen, Solomon, 
Maxfield, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2004; Cohen, Ogilvie, Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2005; Landau et al., 2004). In line with TMT, even stronger effects on 
authoritarian leadership evaluations for more threatening stimuli could be postulated for low 
SEs. The authoritarian and democratic reactions only found on implicit measures in the 
present studies might, then, enter the reflective system and be expressed also on explicit 
measures. On the other hand, the present findings show that even mild uncertainty cues can 
have authoritarian effects. Thus, the present findings are compatible with a general 
uncertainty regulation perspective and terror management theory at the same time, both of 
which are equally capable of predicting authoritarian reactions following from mortality 
salience, that is, the strongest form of self-uncertainty induction. Contrary to assumptions of 
terror management theory, however, the present findings show that it does not have to be 
personally held or culturally endorsed political values that are responsible for resorting to 
authorities. 
In addition, it is seems promising to directly investigate whether the link between 
situational threats and authoritarianism is moderated by self-esteem and is mediated by 
perceived self-uncertainty.  
4.4.2 The Individual Predisposition – Mediating Processes 
In the present dissertation it was hypothesized that under uncertainty the motive of 
uncertainty resolution activates possible coping strategies and considerations about the 
expectancies to successfully employ them. Whereas high SEs believe in their capability to 
provide meaningful input and that their voice effectively contributes to uncertainty reduction, 
low SEs doubt their capabilities and, therefore, avoid having voice in decisions. Thus, it was 
argued that high SEs strive to maximize while low SEs to minimize their contribution to the 
uncertainty reduction process resulting in a democratic versus an authoritarian reaction in 
high and low SEs, respectively. The proposed underlying construct responsible for this 
differential effect can be understood in terms of self-efficacy. Bandura (1986) defined 
perceptions of self-efficacy as “people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize and 
execute courses of action required to attain designated types of performances” (p. 391). It 
seems worthwhile to directly assess this individual-difference variable as a potential 
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mediator. For this purpose the differentiation between global and specific self-efficacy might 
prove useful. In a further step, feelings of self-efficacy could be induced experimentally (see 
Brockner et al., 1998), expecting that the differential reactions to uncertainty of high and low 
SEs would be cancelled out.  
4.4.3 Further (Re-) Solution 
Perceived self-uncertainty should contradict the motivation of individuals “to see themselves 
as adaptively and morally adequate, competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of 
free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes, and so on.” (Steele, 1988, p. 262). 
One possible strategy to cope with uncertainty is the affirmation of some other unrelated 
aspect of the self, because “salient, self-affirming thoughts should make it easier to be 
objective about other, self-threatening information; they should reduce the pressure to 
diminish the threat inherent in this information.” (Steele, 1988, p. 290). McGregor and 
colleagues (2001) investigated the effects of personal uncertainty on compensatory 
conviction and found that participants hardened their attitudes towards social issues 
compared to a non-threatening condition. In another condition, however, this effect did not 
occur due to a self-affirmative task. Participants were instructed to select a value that was 
important to them and to write down reasons for their decision and how they have acted and 
will act in accordance to this value. De Cremer and Sedikides (2005) induced self-affirmation 
by instructing participants to list and think about three positive self-attributes and found that 
voice effects of individuals with an unclear self-concept were lessened compared to a no 
self-affirmation condition. Thus, self-affirmation seems to be a constructive and effective 
means to neutralize the threat of self-uncertainty and prevent the subsequent reactions 
regarding leadership preferences, in particular the authoritarian reaction, found in the present 
research. 
4.4.4 Further Assessment 
The IAT is a relative measure that is comparative in nature because a certain target category 
is always contrasted to a counter-category. In the present studies these were the categories 
democratic versus authoritarian. However, it has been argued that a traditional IAT is 
ambiguous in the absolute evaluation of the respective target concepts (Blanton, Jaccard, 
Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Nosek et al., 2005). Thus, it 
is difficult to infer from the present findings whether the democratic and authoritarian 
reactions are caused by changes in the evaluation of democratic or authoritarian leadership 
or by both at the same time. Wigboldus, Holland and van Knippenberg (unpublished 
manuscript) introduced a modification of the traditional IAT procedure that assesses the 
evaluation of a target object in absence of a counter-category, the Single-Target Implicit 
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Association Test (ST-IAT). That is, the participants are only presented with one of the target 
categories, whereas both attribute categories remain. Bluemke and Friese (2008) 
successfully demonstrated the ST-IAT’s reliability and validity in assessing non-relative 
implicit target evaluations. Hence, the ST-IAT seems to be a promising tool in order to 
disentangle the complex attitudinal patterns of the democratic and authoritarian reaction. 
4.4.5 The Attitude-Behavior Link 
Although the relationship between attitudes and behavior is complex and sometimes difficult 
to reveal, it seems very important to investigate whether the democratic and authoritarian 
reaction on implicit measures can influence actual behavior (see 4.2.5) such as voting for 
political candidates, support and donations for democratic institutions, or choices of an 
employer. In future research, therefore, behavioral measures should also be employed and 
the mediational role of implicit evaluations on actual behavior should be investigated.  
4.5 Democracy at Risk? – A Conclusion  
The present dissertation set out to determine the conditions in which individuals prefer an 
authoritarian over a democratic leader. When and why do individuals that hold strong 
democratic values tend to favor authoritarian leaders? The present studies are the first to 
directly investigate the effects of self-uncertainty on the evaluation of democratic and 
authoritarian leadership styles. Previous research focused on the link between social threat 
and authoritarianism in general, but not on self-uncertainty and leadership in particular. As 
self-uncertainty can be conceived of as the internal complement of many external threats and 
leaders are persons in power, influencing others and making the decisions, it seems quite 
important to combine threat approaches to authoritarianism with the present research on 
uncertainty and leadership. Self-esteem turned out to be an important moderator with low 
levels of self-esteem posing a threat to the democratic standard attitude. The differentiation 
between valence and success proved to be especially useful, because the hypothesized 
drop in the preference for democratic leadership under uncertainty only emerged on the 
cognitive success dimension. In addition, the use of implicit measures was crucial for 
unravelling the authoritarian reaction indicating their value for the sensitive research topic of 
authoritarianism. The present findings demonstrated that introspection and thoughts of self-
uncertainty were sufficient to activate authoritarian associations in low SEs. More frequent or 
stronger feelings of self-uncertainty could make these associations also accessible for 
explicit judgments and as success evaluations are ambivalent, propositions consistent with 
the authoritarian associations could prevail. Thus, in extremely uncertain situations, 
authoritarian leadership may gain influence and importance because valence judgments 
retreat into the background and in the sense of the necessary evil, success evaluations 
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become predominant. As implicit evaluations are assumed to have a direct impact on 
behavior and strong and persisting feelings of uncertainty carry the danger to bring the 
associative evaluations to the surface of explicit judgment, the authoritarian reaction 
assessed in the present findings can posit a real threat to democracy. As it seems difficult to 
prevent individuals from perceiving uncertainty especially in the present times of increasing 
economic threat and international terrorism, approaches to strengthen the self-esteem of low 
SEs or to provide them with confidence in themselves are promising venues for the future. 
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Appendix A - Uncertainty Manipulation 
Study 3b 
Exact wording of the (un-)certainty manipulations used in Study 3b: 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensiv in die folgende Situation: 
Stellen Sie sich vor, wie es ist, wenn Sie sich Ihrer selbst unsicher sind.  
 
Was für Gefühle löst der Gedanke in Ihnen aus, sich Ihrer selbst unsicher zu sein? 
Was passiert körperlich mit Ihnen, wenn Sie sich Ihrer selbst unsicher fühlen? 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensiv in die folgende Situation: 
Stellen Sie sich vor, wie es ist, wenn Sie sich Ihrer selbst sicher sind.  
 
Was für Gefühle löst der Gedanke in Ihnen aus, sich Ihrer selbst sicher zu sein? 
Was passiert körperlich mit Ihnen, wenn Sie sich Ihrer selbst sicher fühlen? 
 
Study 4b 
Exact wording of the (un-)certainty manipulations used in Study 4b: 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensiv in die folgende Situation: 
Stellen Sie sich vor, wie es ist, wenn man sich seiner selbst unsicher ist.  
 
Was für Gefühle löst Ihrer Meinung nach der Gedanke aus, sich seiner selbst unsicher zu 
sein.  
Was passiert körperlich, wenn man sich seiner selbst unsicher fühlt. 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensiv in die folgende Situation: 
Stellen Sie sich vor, wie es ist, wenn man sich seiner selbst sicher ist.  
 
Was für Gefühle löst Ihrer Meinung nach der Gedanke aus, sich seiner selbst sicher zu sein.  
Was passiert körperlich, wenn man sich seiner selbst sicher fühlt. 
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Appendix B - Spatial Power Measure 
Instruction of the Spatial Power Measure in two different versions and the measure. 
Black Circle 
Bei der nächsten Aufgabe werden Ihnen die folgenden Kreispaare präsentiert. Stellen Sie 
sich bitte vor, die Kreise bei einem Kreispaar stellen zwei Personen dar. Sie selbst sind der 
schwarze Kreis, eine andere Person ist der weiße Kreis. 
                                                                     
 
 
In unterschiedlichen Kombinationen werden nun immer zwei Kreispaare einander 
gegenübergestellt. Bitte vergleichen Sie die jeweils gegenübergestellten Kreispaare und 
kreuzen Sie das Kreispaar an, das eher zu Ihnen passt. Bitte gehen Sie die 
durchnummerierten Kombinationen von oben nach unten der Reihe nach durch.  
 
Geben Sie bitte für jede Kombination ein Urteil ab. Antworten Sie so spontan wie möglich. Es 
gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wählen Sie das Kreispaar, das eher zu Ihnen 
passt. 
White Circle 
Bei der nächsten Aufgabe werden Ihnen die folgenden Kreispaare präsentiert. Stellen Sie 
sich bitte vor, die Kreise bei einem Kreispaar stellen zwei Personen dar. Sie selbst sind der 
weiße Kreis, eine andere Person ist der schwarze Kreis. 
                                                                     
 
 
In unterschiedlichen Kombinationen werden nun immer zwei Kreispaare einander 
gegenübergestellt. Bitte vergleichen Sie die jeweils gegenübergestellten Kreispaare und 
kreuzen Sie das Kreispaar an, das eher zu Ihnen passt. Bitte gehen Sie die 
durchnummerierten Kombinationen von oben nach unten der Reihe nach durch.  
 
Geben Sie bitte für jede Kombination ein Urteil ab. Antworten Sie so spontan wie möglich. Es 
gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wählen Sie das Kreispaar, das eher zu Ihnen 
passt. 
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The Spatial Power Measure 
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Appendix C - Power Manipulation 
Study 4a 
Exact wording of the leader and follower position manipulation used in Study 4a: 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensive in die folgende Situation: 
Bitte rufen Sie sich ein bestimmtes Ereignis in Erinnerung, bei dem Sie selbst einer anderen 
Person gegenüber in einer Führungsposition waren. 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation- was ist passiert, wie Sie sich gefühlt haben, etc. 
 
Bitte versetzen Sie sich nun möglichst intensive in die folgende Situation: 
Bitte rufen Sie sich ein bestimmtes Ereignis in Erinnerung, bei dem eine andere Person 
Ihnen gegenüber in einer Führungsposition war. 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation- was ist passiert, wie Sie sich gefühlt haben, etc. 
 
Study 4b 
Exact wording of the leader and follower position manipulation used in Study 4b. Instructions 
directly preceded IAT completion. 
 
Bei der Bearbeitung der nun folgenden Aufgabe stellen Sie sich bitte eine andere Person 
vor, die Ihnen gegenüber in einer Führungsposition ist. 
Um zu beginnen drücken Sie bitte jetzt die LEERTASTE.  
 
Bei der Bearbeitung der nun folgenden Aufgabe stellen Sie sich bitte eine andere Person 
vor, der gegenüber Sie selbst in einer Führungsposition sind. 
Um zu beginnen drücken Sie bitte jetzt die LEERTASTE.  
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Appendix D - Implicit Leadership Measures 
German target and attribute stimuli of the valence and success IAT used in Study 1, 2, 3b 
and 4b. 
 
 
German Target Stimuli (Valence & Success IAT) 
demokratisch autoritär 
sensibel bestimmt 
teamfähig direktiv 
liberal energisch 
integrativ patriarchalisch 
kumpelhaft dominant 
 
 
 
 
German Attribute Stimuli (Valence IAT) 
ANGENEHM UNANGENEHM 
JUWEL LÄUSE 
DÜFTE MASERN 
ENGEL SCHLEIM 
MEER POCKEN 
DIAMANT DRECK 
 
 
 
 
German Attribute Stimuli (Success IAT) 
ERFOLG MISSERFOLG 
SIEG FEHLSCHLAG 
AUFSTIEG VERSAGEN 
TRIUMPH KRISE 
GEWINN VERLUST 
GELINGEN FLOP 
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Appendix E – Explicit Leadership Measures 
Item-based Valence Evaluation  
Für wie angenehm bzw. unangenehm halten Sie die folgenden Führungseigenschaften? 
 sehr  
angenehm 
 
    sehr  
unangenehm 
teamfähig 
 
O O O O O O O 
direktiv 
 
O O O O O O O 
energisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
integrativ 
 
O O O O O O O 
dominant 
 
O O O O O O O 
sensibel 
 
O O O O O O O 
bestimmt 
 
O O O O O O O 
liberal 
 
O O O O O O O 
patriarchalisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
kumpelhaft 
 
O O O O O O O 
 
Item-based Success Evaluation  
Wie stark verbinden Sie die folgenden Führungseigenschaften mit Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg? 
 sehr starker 
Erfolg 
 
                   sehr starker 
Misserfolg 
teamfähig 
 
O O O O O O O 
direktiv 
 
O O O O O O O 
energisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
integrativ 
 
O O O O O O O 
dominant 
 
O O O O O O O 
sensibel 
 
O O O O O O O 
bestimmt 
 
O O O O O O O 
liberal 
 
O O O O O O O 
patriarchalisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
kumpelhaft 
 
O O O O O O O 
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Item-based Leadership Categorization 
Für wie demokratisch bzw. autoritär halten Sie die folgenden Führungseigenschaften? 
 sehr  
demokratisch 
 
                   sehr  
autoritär 
teamfähig 
 
O O O O O O O 
direktiv 
 
O O O O O O O 
energisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
integrativ 
 
O O O O O O O 
dominant 
 
O O O O O O O 
sensibel 
 
O O O O O O O 
bestimmt 
 
O O O O O O O 
liberal 
 
O O O O O O O 
patriarchalisch 
 
O O O O O O O 
kumpelhaft 
 
O O O O O O O 
 
General Valence Evaluation 
Für wie positiv halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie angenehm halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie erfreulich halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie positiv halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie angenehm halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie erfreulich halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
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General Success Evaluation 
Für wie effizient halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie gewinnbringend halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie erfolgreich halten Sie demokratische Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie effizient halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie gewinnbringend halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
 
Für wie erfolgreich halten Sie autoritäre Führung? 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Überhaupt nicht O O O O O O O extrem 
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